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Subject : **LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS IN INDIA: IT IS PROPOSED TO IDENTIFY THE REASONS FOR THE GROWTH OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS (LICO) IN INDIA WITH SPECIFIC FOCUS ON LICO AS A FORM OF WARFARE IN THE FUTURE AND TO SUGGEST COUNTER MEASURES**

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A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of symbol ‘psc’ and MSc (Defence and Strategic Studies) Degree, at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS IN INDIA

By

Major SP Vishwasrao, Sena Medal

A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of symbol 'psc' and M.Sc., (Defence and Strategic Studies) Degree, at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, affiliated to the University of Madras.

February 2002

SELF DECLARATION CERTIFICATE

I, Major Sanjay P Vishwasrao, Sena Medal, declare that, the dissertation titled “Low Intensity Conflict Operations in India: It is Proposed to Identify the Reasons for the Growth of Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO) in India with Specific Focus on LICO as a Form of Warfare in the Future and to Suggest Counter Measures”, submitted by me for the award of Degree of Master of Science (MSc) in Defence and Strategic Studies by the University of Madras is original and that, this work or part thereof has not been submitted for award of any Degree or Diploma of either this or any other University.

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ACRONYMS USED

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AR	Assam Rifles
BLTF	Bodo Liberation Tiger Force
BSF	Border Security Force
CDR (cdr)	Commander
CISF	Central Industrial Security Force
CRPF	Central Reserve Police Force
DG	Director General
DSSC	Defence Services Staff College
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HG	Home Guard
IAF	Indian Air Force
ITBP	Indo Tibet Border Police
IG	Inspector General
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence Agency
IS Duty	Internal Security Duty
JIC	Joint Intelligence Centre
LICO	Low Intensity Conflict Operations
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NSA	National Security Act
NSC	National Security Council

NSAB	National Security Advisory Board
NSG	National Security Guard
PMF	Para Military Force
POTO	Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
RAF	Rapid Action Force
RR	Rashtriya Rifles
RPF	Railway Protection Force
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SF/ SOF	Special Operations Force
TADA	Terrorist and Disruptive Acts (Act/ Legislation of Parliament)
ULFA	United Liberation Front of Asom
VDC	Village Defence Committee
WHAM	Winning Hearts and Minds
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS IN INDIA

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Low Intensity Conflict Operations are the only kind of war that fits the conditions of Modern Age".

Liddle Hart

1. Understanding future warfare is the most important responsibility of those who must defend a nation from future enemies. Barring the unlikely event of world peace, the occurrence of Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICOs) will unfortunately be far more prevalent in this century. The proxy war unleashed by Pakistan through its support to various terrorist groups, and the activities of its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in various parts of India remains the major factor in India's internal security scenario. In India, indigenous and foreign terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir, insurgency and ethnic violence in the North-East States, the left-wing extremist (Naxalite) movements in parts of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa, and violence perpetrated by private armies in Bihar are problems that continue to fester.[1] The year 2001 witnessed new disturbing trends along India's borders with Nepal and Bangladesh, which

[1] Rabindra Ray. The Naxalites and their Ideology. Delhi: Oxford University Press,1988. p. 108.

have become a safe and trusted smuggling route for the arms trade and for the movement of subversives and terrorists. Another serious dimension that poses enormous internal security challenges is the large-scale induction of lethal and sophisticated weapons, narcotics, and fake currency from across India's borders with Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh.

2. The process of rapprochement between India and Pakistan began seven years ago during Prime Minister I K Gujral's tenure. The thread snapped during the Kargil conflict and has once again snapped after the terrorist attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly and the National Parliament in 2001. The Agra Summit between India and Pakistan, which was held on 15-16 July 2001, failed to produce a breakthrough.[2] In 2001, 4,057 people have been killed in terrorist violence which when compared to the 3,288 deaths recorded in 2000, indicates that, violence is on the increase. Casualties in terrorist violence for 2001 have been the highest figure for any year since the present phase of militancy began in 1988-89. A graphical representation and tabulation of casualties in LICOs in India for the years 1989 to 2001 is given alongside.[3](Table 1 *and* Figure 1)

3. The popularity of creating a politico-military confrontation between a target state's established authority and group (s) of people of that state by providing ex-

[2] South Asian Terrorism Portal. Delhi. <http://www.satp.org/News /2001/July/news17.htm#1>.

ternal support is due to the low cost, avoidance of direct conflict and absolute lack of casualties to the regular army of the nation perpetuating the conflict.[4] The existence of national leaders who still seek goals through the use of force has made LICO more attractive.[5] These conflicts have some major characteristics namely; they tend to be asymmetrical, are ambiguous, are fought unconventionally using political and psychological means and, they are protracted wars of attrition.[6]

4. The recent upsurge in LICO in the country, in quantum and sophistication of violence which culminated in the 13 Dec 2001 terrorist attack on Parliament House, has once again brought into focus the relevance of LICO as the new war waging style. If the use of LICO is not contained effectively and soon, then, the Balkanisation of the Indian sub-continent may become a reality.[7] Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the global campaign against terrorism by an international coalition and Operation PARAKARAM along with its associated diplomatic manoeuvrings has resulted in the reordering of foreign policies of major powers and has set in motion, forces which have the potential of bringing about a significant restructuring of international relations. By initiating the diplomatic and political measures such as taken in the aftermath of the 13 Dec 2001 terrorist attacks,

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[3] South Asian Terrorism Portal. Delhi. < http://www.satp.org/India /J&K/Assessment.J&k. htm>.

[4] cf., Chapter III, par.10.

[5] Kshitij Prabha. Terrorism: An Instrument of Foreign Policy. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2000, pp. 44 -60.

[6] Sam Sarkesian. America's Forgotten Wars. London: Greenwood Press, 1984, pp. 237-239.

[7] infra., Chapter II, par. 7.

India has to rise to the occasion and make the most out of the prevalent political situation in the world.

CASUALTIES DUE TO LICO 1989- 2000




Figure 1

Annual Casualties in LICO 1995- 2001


Year	Incidents	Terrorists	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Total
1995	4479	1338	1161	297	2796
1996	4224	1194	1333	376	2903
1997	3004	1177	840	355	2372
1998	2993	1045	877	339	2261
1999	2938	1184	799	555	2538
2000	2835	1808	842	638	3288
2001	3278	2850	1067	590	4507
Total	47234	15246	11377	4110	30733

Table 1

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Statement of Problem



1. It is proposed to identify the reasons for growth of Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO) in India with specific focus on LICO as a form of warfare in the future and to suggest counter measures.

Hypothesis

2. Islamic fundamentalist encirclement of India generated by the ISI of Pakistan is the main reason for the proliferation of LICO in India. The best way India can tackle LICO is with a combination of deterrent foreign policy, unified command structure, good border management and a special internal security task force, all supported by 'National Will' and 'National Integration'.

Justification for the Study

3. Between 1945 and 1996, there have been some 250 major wars of which 160 in number can be classified as insurgency, guerrilla warfare or terrorism, killing more than 26 million people (refer table alongside)(Table 2).[8] The failure of some of the world's most powerful military machines in defeating the insurgent/ terrorist has led military analysts to do a re-think on the strategy and tactics required to combat this menace. The Americans withdrew in shame from Vietnam, the Soviet Army withdrew from Afghanistan as they found the Mujahideen guerrillas invincible in their country, the Israeli Army withdrew from Lebanon after an unsuccessful campaign against the Hezbollah, and the United Nations had to withdraw from Somalia. [9]

4. In India, since the outbreak of Pakistan-sponsored militancy in 1989-90 in Jammu and Kashmir, more than 34,000 people have been killed in separatist violence.[10] These include 12, 336 militants, 11,600 civilians, 2,282 security personnel, including 405 of the Jammu and Kashmir Police force.[11] Of the 11,600 civilians killed, 8,000 were killed by militants and 2,600 died in crossfire between security forces and militant groups.[12] In comparison, the Indian army suffered 1047

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[8] South Asian Terrorism Portal, Delhi <http://www.satp.org/India/ Terrorist%20Outfits India.htm>, op. cit.
[9] Martin van Creveld. op.cit.
[10] BBC World News, 22 Dec 2000.
[11] The Times of India, 6 Jan 2001.
[12] USA, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, US State Department, 2000. India Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999.

fatal casualties in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, 1155 in Sri Lanka[13] and 522 killed and 1274 injured in Operation VIJAY.[14]

5. LICO is not confined to any specific part of the world but is widespread. It is prevalent in all societies and nations and appears to be spreading. We as a Nation need to appreciate that our neighbours, having failed in their strategic aim of dominating India through a 'Limited War', are now finding it more cost effective to break up India by encouraging Indians to fight Indians. In order to bolster their confidence in their two nation theory, and reduce the advantage of India's size and power, Pakistan hopes to balkanize India into four parts.

"*India is not one country; it has never enjoyed the unity which is the hall-mark of a nation state. The people who can be regarded as being potentially separatist are the Sikhs, the Dravidians and the North Eastern people. If the people of the sub-continent can comprise two nations, why not three? Why not four or five?*"[15]

6. India has no doubt proved to be a genuine democracy but its democracy suffers from two major afflictions. Firstly, the Indian democracy provides the people with a democratic means of dissent but no real means to better the unresponsive functioning of the government institutions or its agencies. Secondly, a complex and unresponsive judicial system (in terms of time) further ensures that the people have no means for a quick redressal or response to routine troubles.

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[13] Maroof Raza. LICO: the New Dimension to India's Military Commitment. Meerut: Kartikeya Publication, pp.70.

[14] Lieutenant General PPS Bhindra, Commandant Defence Services Staff College DSSC. Lecture to DSSC 57, 'Operation VIJAY'. 04 Dec 2001.

[15] Lieutenant General (retired) Akram Khan, Director, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 'Shadows over South Asia'. The Muslim, Jan 1984.

The people, in general, lack faith in the ability of the State to genuinely look after their interests - a lack of faith which is easily exploited by the extremist movements.[16]

7. The stage is thus, set for a foreign power to move in, instigate a separatist movement, all with the aim of bleeding India with a thousand cuts which will ultimately result in India's Balkanization.[17]

Scope

8. This study concentrates on the reasons and relevance of LICO in India and suggests possible ways of combating the problem. This dissertation is limited to identifying the various reasons for LICOs in India, attempting to forecast the course LICO is likely to take in our Nation and, it also attempts to suggest possible ways of tackling LICO at the macro without going into the details of suggesting a political solution to the various insurgent/ terrorist/ separatist movements prevalent in India. Tactical micro level operations which need to be/ are being conducted in LICO are also not being covered.

Operational Definitions

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[16] Captain Ashish Sonal, Veer Chakra. Terrorism and Insurgency in India. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers Private Limited, 1994, pp.13-15.
[17] cf. ante., Chapter II, par. 5.

9. The term LICO emerged in the 1980's and is known to have been derived from United States of America (USA) Pentagon's image of spectrum of conflicts, where conflicts are divided into low, medium and high levels.[18] The special terms used in this dissertation are defined in the subsequent paragraphs:-

(a) High Intensity Conflict. Combat involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). [19]

(b) Mid Intensity Conflict. This is an armed combat between regularly organized military forces.[20]

(c) Low Intensity Conflict (LICO). LICO is a conflict that takes place at levels below conventional war but above the routine peaceful competition among states. They often involve a protracted struggle between principles and ideologies.[21]

(d) Military Operations Other Than War. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) encompass a wide range of activities where, the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than large

[18] Rod Paschall. LIC 2010, Washington, Brassey's.1990. pp. 7 -10.
[19] Lieutenant General (retired) V K Sood. 'LICO: Historical Perspective and the Indian Scene'. College of Combat, Combat Paper No.3, Mar 1992, p.7.
[20] ibid., p. 6.
[21] ibid., p. 7.

scale combat operations usually associated with war.[22] These operations focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, providing peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crisis. [23]

(e) Militant. An active aggressive belligerent, person vigorously pursuing some cause through a course of confrontation[24]. Also, an aggressive and pugnacious person engaged in warfare or warlike acts.[25]

(f) Insurgent. Somebody who rebels against authority or leadership, especially somebody belonging to a group involved in an uprising against the government or ruler of a country (a rebel).[26]

(g) Insurgency. An armed rebellion by a section of population against a legally constituted government, with the support or sympathy of local population, obtained voluntarily or by coercion. [27]

(h) Terrorist. Somebody using violence for political purposes: somebody who uses violence or the threat of violence, especially bombing, kidnapping, and assassination, to intimidate, often for political purposes.[28]

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[22] Richard Connaughton. The Nature of Future Conflict. London: Leo Cooper.1995. p. 39.
[23] US Army. Field Manual 100-20. pp. V-1, 1-1.
[24] Reader's Digest Association Limited. Universal Dictionary. London: William Collins Sons & Company Limited, 1990, p. 979.
[25] Mark P Roget. Roget's Thesaurus. Delhi: Goyal Saab, 1988, p. 345.
[26] Microsoft Corporation. Encarta ® World English Dictionary © & (P), Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 1999, 2000.
[27] College of Combat. Training Note on Low Intensity Conflict, 1992, p. 5.
[28] Microsoft Corporation. op.cit.

(i) Terrorism. The Universal Dictionary of Reader's Digest defines terror as, the systematic violence carried out against private citizens, public property, and political enemies with the aim of enforcing demands or maintaining supremacy; "a reign of terror".[29] Terrorist acts date back to at least the First century, when the Zealots, a Jewish religious sect, fought against Roman occupation of what is now Israel.[30] An aberration to this definition has been put forward by Mr. V Prabhakaran of the Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam (LTTE) when he asked the West to redefine its concept of terrorism to exclude groups like his own that, according to him, used violence for "a concrete political objective". Quoting the LTTE Chief:-

> "*We represent a people's movement. Western democratic nations should provide a clear and comprehensive definition of the concept of terrorism that would distinguish between freedom struggles based on the right to self- determination and blind terrorist acts based on fanaticism".*[31]

(j) Counter Insurgency. All measures of government activity to combat insurgency, including operations by military, civil administration, police organizations, economic development, political and administrative reforms and psychological warfare aimed at winning over the people. [32]

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[29] Reader's Digest Association Limited. op.cit., p.1561.

[30] Microsoft Corporation. op.cit.

[31] Nirupama Subramaniam. 'Prabhakaran asks West to Redefine Terrorism'. The Hindu. 28 Nov 2001. p. 21.

[32] Defence Services Staff College. Low Intensity Conflict Operations. ibid. pp. 4 - 5.

(k) Area Saturation Force Ratios. In the year 1990, Operational Research and Statistical Analysis Techniques were applied to analyse the Indian Army's LICO campaigns in the North-Eastern states. The study led to the development of the following new terms:- [33]

(i) Containment Ratios. It was found that, whenever the ratio of security forces to insurgents reached levels of 19:1, the security forces were able to contain the insurgency at the existing level. Its further escalation or spread was arrested.[34]

(ii) Breakthrough Ratios. Whenever the security forces were able to muster force ratios of 30:1 or more an operational break through immediately followed e.g., Shillong Accord in 1975 and Laldenga Accord. [35]

(l) Hot Pursuit. Close continuous pursuit of a fleeing suspected law-breaker or hostile military force especially across territorial lines.[36] Is lawful in international laws,[37] and is included in Article 51 of UN Charter.[38]

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[33] Colonel GD Bakshi. Armies in LICO. Wellington: Defence Services Staff College, Dec 1999, pp.4 - 5.
[34] ibid.
[35] ibid.
[36] Merriam Webster Incorporated. Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary. 2001. <www.merriem-webster.com/html>.
[37] LK Advani. India Today. 5 Nov 2001, pp. 17.

(m) Covert Action. Covert action is employed to influence politics and events in another country without revealing one's involvement or at least while maintaining plausible deniability. For this purpose, intelligence agencies have separate units or organisations to undertake special missions. In a way, covert political action is an extension of foreign policy.[39]

(n) Unified Command. When translated into institutional parlance it means, exercise of authority to coalesce existing forces and powers to fulfil a common aim or goal. In this sense, the Unified Command in LICO should be more than just a coordinating agency. It should be the nodal planning agency, working on a pre-defined goal. The concept flows from the "unity of effort" which is essential in any military endeavour, "a synergisation of the activities of the different elements for the achievement of the overall goal".[40]

(o) Pax-Indiana. State of peace in South Asian region imposed by a strong India on its weaker/ defeated neighbouring nations. First proposed by President Bill Clinton during his South Asian visit in 2000.

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[38] VS Mani. 'Counter Strikes and the Law', The Hindu. 12 Oct 2001, pp. 12.

[39] Bhashyam Kasturi and Pankaj Mehra. 'Geo-Politics of South Asian Covert Action: India's Experience and Need for Action Against Pakistan'. Indian Defence Review. vol 16 (2). <www.Satp.org/satporgtp/publication/idr/vol_16 (2)/kasturi.htm.#*#*>.

[40] Lieutenant General (retired) Mathew Thomas. 'Some Thoughts on Command'. Indian Defence Review. Jan 1992. p. 83.

(p) Jihad. The meaning of jihad is to strive to live as guided by the five pillars of Islam namely; *Shahda, Salat, Zakat, Swam and Haj* to overcome the selfishness and arrogance of human nature and rise above the traditional loyalty to family, tribe, sects and other groupings.[41]

(q) Pan-Islamism. The idea or advocacy of a political union of all Muslim nations.[42]

Methods of Data Collection

10. Data used for this dissertation has been collected from a large number of books, periodicals, magazines, journals that are available in the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) Library and the internet. The various guest lectures during DSSC 57 and Minor Research Projects executed by the student fraternity of DSSC 57 were perused and taken advantage of, in the research effort. An attempt has also been made to take advantage of the immense operational experience available in the Faculty and the Student Fraternity at DSSC by circulating a questionnaire to 50 officers with operational experience in LICO. The views received were categorized, tabulated and analyzed and, subsequently adopted in the study. The questionnaire circulated is given at Appendix A attached. A

[41] Lieutenant General ML Chibber. 'The Implication of Jihad'. Journal of United Services Institution of India, vol. CXXIX Oct - Dec 1999, No. 538, p. 499.
[42] Random House Incorporated. The Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary © 2001. <www.infoplease.com>.

schematic presentation of the various types of information sources referred to and used in this study is given at Appendix C attached.

Methods of Data Analysis

11. The views received as a result of the circulation of the questionnaire were categorized, tabulated and analyzed (Inferential Analysis) and subsequently adopted in the study. The views that the author felt were harbouring on the extremes/ unreal imagination were, after due consideration left out of the scope of the study. The population parameters were established and graphs used to represent them pictorially as given at Appendix B attached.

Research Process

12. This study was undertaken in a systematic approach which was supported by the student officer's experience in the conduct of LICO operations in Sri Lanka during Operation PAWAN, in Punjab during Operation RAKSHAK-I, and in Jammu and Kashmir during Operation RAKSHAK-II. The flowchart of the stages in the research of this dissertation is as given at Appendix D attached.

Organisation of the Dissertation

13. Chapter I: Introduction. This chapter traces the history of LICO and introduces the subject. The relevance of LICO in South Asia and India in particular and Pakistan's intention of attempting to Balkanize India using this form of warfare has also been briefly brought out.

14. Chapter II: Methodology. This chapter gives out the objective of the study through the statement of the problem and the justification for the study. It also includes the hypothesis and defines the scope of the study. 'Chapterisation' of the dissertation is also given in this chapter.

15. Chapter III: Defining LICO. This chapter defines LICO and other related terms and brings out the salient aspects of LICO. The chapter also identifies the environmental realities of LICO and their implications in the Twenty- first century.

16. Chapter IV: Relevance of LICO as a Future Form of Warfare. This chapter brings out relevance of LICO in today's world and compares LICO with conventional warfare. It also gives a brief insight into the factors responsible for LICO being adopted as warfare of the future and paints the likely picture of LICO in the Twenty-first century.

17. Chapter V: Relevance of LICO in South Asia and India in Particular and Factors which are Likely to Aggravate the Situation. This chapter brings out the

relevance of LICO in South Asia and in India in particular and India's susceptibility to this form of warfare. It also brings out the reasons for proliferation of LICO in India and identifies the role of Strategic Islamic Encirclement of India in the same. Pakistan's possible future strategy is also outlined in brief..

18. Chapter VI: Review of the Present System of Internal Security. and Counter/ Remedial Measures Against LICO. This chapter reviews the present system of internal security in India. It also includes a brief study of lessons learnt by other nations combating LICO.

19. Chapter VII: Suggested Counter/ Remedial Measures against LICO. After having identified the lacunae in the present policies and strategy employed in combating LICOs, this chapter includes the suggested approach to be adopted at national level to successfully combat LICO. The population responses to the questionnaire and the researcher's operational experience have been relied upon to arrive at the recommendations given in this chapter.

20. Chapter VIII: Conclusion. An attempt has been made in the dissertation to study LICO in detail and to examine its relevance in the present world, especially to India. The existing policies and strategies have been critically analysed to arrive at concrete recommendations that will surely ensure that India will emerge as a great global power by the year 2020.

CASUALTIES IN THE WORLD

Century	Casualties	Population
20th	16,147,550	305,000,000
19th	2,912771	171,530,000
18th	3,622,140	90,000,000
17th	2,497,170	55,000,000
16th	573,020	35,000,000
15th	285,000	25,000,000
14th	166,729	18,000,000
13th	68,440	
	68,440	13,000,000
13th		
12th	29,940	10,000,000
Total	**26,302,760**	

Table 2

CHAPTER III

DEFINING LICO

'Theological religion is the source of all imaginable follies and disturbances; it is the parent of fanaticism and civil discord; it is the enemy of mankind".[43]

Voltaire

LICO: A Historical Perspective

1. Carl von Clausewitz describes conflict as "peace time struggles or disagreements or clash of opposed principles between two or more groups so violent that, resolution by action other than verbal must be resorted to". Carl von Clausewitz in his masterpiece Vom Kriege (On War) had elaborated on what he considered as the Trinity of modern conflicts i.e., the state, its people and their

[43] Voltaire. The Philosophical Dictionary. Paris: 1764.

armed forces - to fight the external threat of societies with the similar organisations. However, the present proliferation of LICOs and their ill defined zones of conduct, the government and their armed forces are more often than ever before pitted against their own people. As per Harold Laswell, the very foundation of LICO is in the addictive nature of violence in human beings. Basic human instincts of pugnacity, self preservation and possession tend to dominate all levels of interaction from inter-personal, intra-state, inter-state to international levels to decide as to, "who got what, when and how".[44]

2. Chanakya and Sun Tzu, almost contemporaries in time, advocated use of armed civilians to fight the enemy. Presently the LTTE under Prabhakaran, various militant groups of Jammu and Kashmir, Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland and Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda (The Base) are executing LICO in one form or the other, with increasing sophistication and effect. LICO has thus, once again emerged as the powerful weapon of the weak.

Locus Standii of LICO in Conflict Spectrum

3. War has been classified as a highly specialised activity with primary reliance on lethal force; more lethal the force, more specific the activity. Due to the limitations on the use of nuclear weapons to settle MOOTW situations, the focus

[44] Brigadier (retired) DS Chauhan. 'LICO in India'. NDC Journal, vol. XV, Nov 1993, p. 137.

of the war machinery shifted from physical to the psychological plane where the societies rather than the armed forces became the target.[45]

4. The Conflict Spectrum. War and violence exist per se. Till mankind as a species sublimates its addiction for violence, it must learn to live with violence. The search for new forms of violence presupposes the existence of a spectrum of graduated scale of violence and its application. It can best be expressed as a "conflict spectrum". The conflict spectrum can be divided into two main-bands – the covert band and the overt band. The covert band includes pre-conflict destabilisation and LICO. The overt band includes mid-intensity conflict, high intensity conflict (conventional) and thermo-nuclear conflict.[46] High intensity conflict takes the legal form of a declaration of war by the two belligerent nations/ alliance of nations.[47] In the post war period, nuclear deterrence put severe limitations/ restraints on initiating mid or high intensity conflict due to the risk of escalation into a nuclear war.[48] LICO therefore emerged as the only permissible form of war in an era of 'Strategic Restraint'. The difference between military operations in LICO and mid or high intensity war is in the object. In the latter, success is measured in terms of winning battles and campaigns.[49] Refer figure opposite. (Figure 2)

---

[45] cf., Chapter II, par. 9 (d).

[46] Major GD Bakshi. 'LICO and the Conflict Spectrum'. Strategic Analysis, Sep 1986, p. 641.
[47] Kshitij Prabha. op.cit.., p.46.
[48] College of Combat. Seminar on LICO: Combat Paper No 3- LICO, Mar 1992, p. 7.
[49] ibid.

5. Levels of Conflict. As has been brought out earlier there are various levels of conflict depending on the forces used and the violence. These are based on the definitions as given by the United States Army which are as follows:-[50]

(a) LICO. It is a politico-military confrontation between an established authority (state) and group (s) of people with or without external assistance below the conventional war, but above the natural peaceful contents or competitions, with a view to achieve their ends.[51]

(b) Mid-Intensity Conflict. This is an armed combat between regularly organized military forces and describes the activity which most of the world's armed forces are organized trained and equipped to conduct. [52]

(c) High Intensity Conflict. Armed conflict, including use of nuclear, chemical and or biological weapons. It includes incidents or campaigns of low or mid intensity conflict.[53]

Defining LICO

[50] supra., Chapter II. par. 9.
[51] Ashok Krishna.' Low Intensity Conflicts: Future Trends'. Strategic Analysis, IDSA. Jul 1996, pp. 639-640.
[52] Lieutenant General (retired) V K Sood. 'Historical Perspective and the Indian Scene'. Combat Paper No 3- LICO. College of Combat, Mar 1992, p. 7.
[53] Rod Paschall. op cit., pp. 7 -10.

6. The term LICO has been used to connote a variety of derivatives based on different perceptions and expectations. Sarkesian observed that, "unconventional conflicts are politico-military struggles involving two or more groups ruled by the indigenous elite for the purpose of taking control of the existing system without resorting to war in the traditional sense".[54]

7. American Definition. The most comprehensive and all encompassing definition of LICO is given in the United States of America National Security Decision Directive which defines LICO as: -

"*A politico–military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above routine peaceful struggles of competing principles and ideologies. LICO ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational and military instruments. LICOs are often localised, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications".*[55]

8. Indian Army Definition. In the Indian context, The College of Combat, Mhow has defined LICO as: -

"*It is a politico-military confrontation between the established authority (state) and organised group(s) of people with or without external assistance beyond the scope of legitimate routine peaceful contest/ agitation. It is waged by a number of means employing political, religious, economic, social, cultural, psychological, informational and military instruments. Being on the low end of the conflict spectrum it imposes an undefined restraint on the execution of military operations".* [56]

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[54] supra., Chapter II, par. 9.
[55] US Army. US Declaration for Joint Operations in LICO, Oct 1990. p. 11.
[56] College of Combat. op.cit.

9. Spectrum of LICO. In terms of military involvement, LICO may include the following categories of operations:- (a diagrammatic representation of the various constituents of LICO is given along side)(Figure 3*)*

(a) Foreign Internal Defence. This essentially relates to counter insurgency operations in a friendly country at its request.

(b) Counter Terrorism. This involves all actions taken to prevent/ counter terrorism.

(c) Peacekeeping Operations. These may or may not form part of an international agreement.

(d) Aid to Civil Authority. This is for maintaining law and order, in assistance of civilian authority.

(e) Counter Insurgency Operations. Such as being conducted in Nagaland, Jammu and Kashmir, Assam and Punjab.[57]

(f) Special Operations. As undertaken by the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990.

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[57] Lieutenant General (retired) SS Sinha, Governor Assam. Guest Lecture to DSSC 57 on, 'Handling LICO in the North-East'. 06 Dec 01.

(g) Peacetime Contingency Operations. These encompass raids, border management, domination of geographically defined areas, and mounting of specific one time operations and other limited use of force.

10. Implications of LICO. From the definitions given above, it can also be concluded that, LICO as a form of warfare implies the following:-[58]

(a) It is a form of warfare where the level of force or fire power is restricted due to political constraints.

(b) It may be waged by one country against another but, the armed forces of one of the two countries are not directly involved, usually that of the aggressor nation. The armed forces of the victim country are drawn in at a later stage for defensive operations. The main elements of the conflict are usually irregular elements. This is state sponsored terrorism/ covert operations.[59]

(c) The instruments of LICO may be political, economical, psychological or military.

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[58] Maroof Raza. LICO: The New Dimension to India's Military Commitment. Meerut: Kartikeya Publication, 1987. p.72.
[59] Ashok Krishna. op.cit., p. 649.

(d) It also involves the response of the threatened state.

(e) The target will be all the organs of the state and its infrastructure.

(f) It is basically a regional and localized phenomenon but, can have global security implications.

(g) It is primarily a conflict of differing ideologies.

(h) The fundamental issues are violence and change.

11. Realities of LICO Environment. LICOs put heavy constraints on the general environment of a place. This is characterised by the following:-[60]

(a) Public. Insecurity, migration, reluctant cooperation with security forces and abeyance of militant dictates.

(b) Militants. A cult of guns and defiance of authority combined with the lack of motivation to gain aims with peaceful negotiations.

(c) Administration. Pressure due to threat of retribution leads to ineffectiveness.

[60] Captain DS Chahal. 'Human Rights and the Armed Forces in LICO'. Journal of United Services Institute of India. vol. CXXV, No. 522, Oct 1995, pp. 461-462.

(d) Police. Lack of motivation, training and equipment leads to erosion in credibility and lack of confidence amongst the people.

(e) Media. Credibility of pro government media is low and reporters resort to sensationalism.

(f) Laws of the Land. The laws of one state are not enforceable in another, and the new anti terrorist laws enacted to deal with the situation get branded as draconian and in violation of human rights.

(g) Neighbouring States. Inimical states exploit the unstable situation and initiate a proxy war.

(h) International Nexus. Militants/ insurgents establish a nexus with similar anti-government movements and religious fundamentalists.

(i) State Agencies. There is no coordination amongst the plethora of state and central agencies operating in the area.

12. Impact of these Environmental Realities. The impact of these environmental realities on operations carried out by security forces are as follows:-

(a) Delayed Deployment. Army generally gets deployed after the situation has gone out of the hands of the police forces.

(b) Resources. The army gets deployed for protracted periods of time and uses up large resources. Moreover, a great effort has to be diverted to prevent infiltration.

(c) Intelligence Vacuum. Intelligence vacuum due to language barrier and subversion of governmental agencies by the militants/ terrorists makes military operations less fruitful.

(d) Charter of Duties. Absence of a clearly spelt out charter of duties due to political compulsion makes it difficult for the army to evolve its aims, objective and plans thereby affecting operational efficiency.

(e) Media. Media is exploited by the militants to discredit the army.

(f) Integration. Lack of integration between various government agencies makes coordination difficult.

(g) Identification of Militants/ Insurgents/ Terrorists. Identification of these persons from the local population is difficult.

(h) Laws of the Land. Laws provide immunity to the militant and inhibit the security forces.

13. Modus Operandi in LICO. The insurgents and terrorist organisations waging a war against an established government vary their modus operandi according to the terrain, situation and reaction of population, credibility of established government and the effectiveness of security forces. Some of the common factors in their modus operandi are as follows:-

(a) Making an impact on the government, public and their own cadre to convince them about their strength and capability to challenge the government and to fight their cause successfully.

(b) Getting the population to support their cause and efforts since the terrorists have to operate among and through the people.

(c) Rendering the administration ineffective as it is a pre-requisite for the movement to sustain itself.

(d) Deployment of force to prohibitive levels to result in an unbearable strain on national resources.

Forms of LICO

14. Forms of LICO in India. Terrorism in India can be categorised into four types of ideological movements as follows[61] (refer table opposite):-(Figure 4)

(a) State separatist demanding a separate state within India.

(b) Secessionist movements demanding secession from the country.

(c) Religious fundamentalist movements.

(d) Left wing extremism.

(e) Non political terrorism.

[61] K Subramaniam. 'Handling Terrorism'. Hindustan Times. 10 Jul 1990.



CONFLICT SPEC-
Intensity
Spectrum
High Intensity
Medium Intensity
LIC/MOOTW

Figure 2



SPECTRUM OF LIC
LIC
PRESERVING INTERNAL SECURITY
AID TO CIVIL AUTHORITY
PROJECTION OF REGIONAL STRATEGIC INTERESTS
INTERNATIONAL PEACE KEEPING
INTERVENTION *
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENCE%
CI / GW
SPECIAL OPS
BORDER MANAGEMENT
HOT PURSUIT/ RAIDS
COALITION
UN
CT
POLICING
WHAM
Legend
CI-Counter Insurgency
Gw- Guerilla Warfare
CT-Counter Terrorism
*Intervention- Forced
%FID- On Request of Host Nation
WHAM- Winning Hearts & Minds

Figure 3




Figure 4

CHAPTER IV

RELEVANCE OF LICO AS A FUTURE FORM OF WARFARE

"***LICO is a major form of politico-military conflict, equal in importance to conventional warfare".***

John F Kennedy

LICO vis-à-vis Conventional Warfare

1. As was seen during Operation VIJAY and as is being proven in the ongoing Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, conventional weapons can cause tremendous amount of death, destruction and collateral damage which turns the world and public opinion against the perpetuator.[62] All conventional weapons of mass destruction and pinpoint delivery over very long distances are extremely expensive and very high technology dependent (a precision guided munition costs Rupees One Crore).[63] Therefore, no non state group waging a separatist war can afford these weapons nor can a sponsor state provide these in abundance. This does not preclude a conventional war between belligerent states but, the cost of such a war will be prohibitive and the results will not commensurate with the efforts. Hence, LICO becomes a preferable option.

Relevance and Proliferation of LICO

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[62] BBC World News Channel. 'News: Live Coverage of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM'.
[63] Lieutenant General Bhandari, Director General Artillery. Guest Lecture at DSSC 57 'Latest Trends in Artillery'. 29 Jun 2001.

2. Relevance of LICO. Expression of dissent and resistance to an established order is an age old phenomenon in the history of mankind. Indians as a community have been more war like and fond of blood shed than other societies.[64] Individuals and groups who felt aggrieved or oppressed have resorted to violence when they could not achieve their aims by peaceful means. These local violent movements have often been inspired, aided or abetted and directed by external forces to achieve political and ideological goals. Terrorism is at the very heart of this new paradigm of international conflict. For its sponsors and perpetrators, it is a low-cost option with a high cost-benefit ratio.[65] This strategy preys on domestic discontent, and involvement in other countries' internal conflicts. It is fast emerging as a preferred strategy for Nation-States, and as the most serious threat to regional security[66]. LICO has flourished to such an extent today, that most countries that would have been pre-

pared to wage a war in pursuit of their national interests would now prefer to sponsor LICO as a cheaper option.[67]

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[64] Nirad C Chaudhary. The Continent of Circe. London: Chatto and Windus, 1965, p. 97.
[65] supra., Chapter III, par. 10.
[66] supra., Chapter II, par. 3, 4, 5 and 6.
[67] Kenneth E Boulding. Conflict and Defence. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962, pp.142-144.

3. Reasons for the Proliferation of LICO. Modern liberal democratic states and societies have always been more vulnerable to manifestations of LICO. The reasons for the near permanency of LICO in the world today are as follows:-[68]

(a) Continuing profound and bitter ethnic, ideological and religious conflicts which generate terrorist violence.

(b) Large number of new states which have inherited from their de-colonization period strong nationalistic or secessionist challenges by ethnic minority movements.

(c) The strategic nuclear balance of terror between the great super powers which makes the risk of full scale war too high to be attractive.

(d) The track record of terrorism, guerrilla war and insurgency, in bringing useful tactical objectives to both states and factions.

(e) The opportunities for terrorism provided by modern technology in the form of visible targets and easily accessible weapons.

[68] Ashok Krishna. op.cit., p. 642.

(f) Relatively weak and anarchical nature of the international system which effectively precludes any concerted and firm international response.

Contemporary LICOs Worldwide

4. A list of the LICO in various parts of the world is given at Appendix E attached.

Face of LICO in the Twenty-First Century

5. In the Nineteenth century, the incidence of war stood at about 18 wars per decade. In the Twentieth century, the incidence of war increased to 27 per decade. The incidence rate per nation however decreased, there having occurred a three-fold growth in the number of sovereign nations. But the number of wars, particularly LICO, has increased (refer figure alongside). In the late Nineteenth century, 65 percent of all wars could have been described as LICO. In the 1970s, LICO represented 80 percent of all wars and in the 1980s and 1990s it accounted for 90 percent of all wars.[69] Besides this increase in the number of conflicts there has also been a perceptible shift in the categories of nations that are the target of LICO from Western supported governments to Third World nations with the Islamic Fundamentalists taking the drivers seat in the instigation of LICO. In

the Twenty-first century, LICO is likely to take on an alarming proportion with the improved science and technological threshold available for exploiting.[70] Hence, LICO world wide is expected to increase at a rate of 20 percent per annum.[71] Nuclear and Radiological terrorism is the latest threat emerging from the collapsing nuclear organizations of erstwhile Soviet Union states of the Central Asian Region. [72] As per Senator Sam Nun, combat proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons is the most pregnant issue we face today.[73] The prediction has come true to a large extent as proven by the anthrax attacks in USA of Dec 2001– Jan 2002, which successfully crippled the governmental machinery and also adversely affected the psyche of the nation.

6. Future Changes in LICO in the Third World. The character of LICO is changing profoundly to cope with the evolution of the Third World. To the already complex and combustible ingredients which constitute LICO, the modern environment has added four unassuming but extremely potent factors. These are:-

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[69] Ruth Leger Sivard. 'World Military and Social Expenditures'. World Priorities. New York, 1994, pp. 28 -31.
[70] Rod Paschall. op cit., p.146.
[71] Paul Wilkinson. 'The Future of Terrorism'. Terrorism: the British Perspectives. 1993, p. 423
[72] Gavin Cameron. A Threat Assessment for 21st Century. New York: St Martin Press, 1999, p. 2.
[73] Sam Nun (Ex Senator). Statement to US Senate, Congressional Record- Senate, S-11754, 28 Sep 1996.

(a) Financial Destabilisation. The nations are also attempting destabilisation of financial situation of other nations through narco-trade, export of counterfeit currency and trade barriers.[74]

(b) Arms Lobby. Arms Lobby of the industrialised nations will not desire peace and will use its not inconsequential clout to ensure adequate number of global flash points.

(c) NBC Terrorism. Ease of access to fissile material and technological know how in the form of unemployed / under paid Soviet (1000- to 2000[75]) and Pakistani scientists[76], NBC and radiological terrorism has become a reality in spite of the inherent disadvantages of using such weapons of mass destruction (WMD) namely; own safety, strong military repercussions, cost factor and potential loss of public support. The threat is more relevant to India, as fissile material is openly sold in the Peshawar weapon market in Pakistan.[77]

(d) Urbanization of Insurgency. Insurgency is slowly moving into urban areas and the difference between insurgency and terrorism is slowly clouding.

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[74] Dr Sukhwinder. Fighting the New Evil of Terrorism. Jammu: Trikuta Radiant Publication, Oct 2000.
[75] William Potter. 'Exports and Experts: Proliferation from Commonwealth '. Arms Control Today. Jan- Feb 1992, p. 34.
[76] The Hindu, 26 Nov 2001, pp. 14.

(e) International Effort to Combat Terrorism. In the wake of the USA led coalition launching Operation ENDURING FREEDOM against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda (The Base), a definite feeling has grown, that there is a need for nations to 'close ranks' to curb the menace of LICO.[78]

CHAPTER V

RELEVANCE OF LICO IN SOUTH ASIA AND INDIA IN PARTICULAR AND FACTORS THAT ARE LIKELY TO AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION

"***Pakistan has been the biggest blunder of my life".***[79]

Mohammed Ali Jinnah

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[77] Tim Mc Girk. 'A Year of Looting Dangerously'. The Independent. 24 Apr 1996.
[78] infra., Chapter VI, par. 21.

General

1. Of the 180 nations across the globe only 20 are nationally homogenous. So internal tensions are intrinsic in such delineation. While all religions have their chauvinists, it is resurgent Islam that appears to be in the forefront of terrorism.[80] South Asia with the most concentrated density of Muslim population remains one of the most volatile regions of the World. The states of the region besides training, arming and providing shelter, are also assisting in establishment of provisional government by the militants in their countries.[81]

2. When India gave itself an open, democratic system, its diverse multi-faceted mosaic had to assert itself, and it has done so in the form of various aspirations. Since, not all aspirations can be met; some have naturally erupted in violent forms, taking on the garb of insurgency, terrorism or other manifestations of LICO.[82] The presence of belligerent neighbours and the existence of minority population, distinct from the majority, in the border areas have further assisted the neighbouring states from taking this opportunity to instigate LICO in India.

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[79] Time, December 23, 1996.
[80] Air Marshal (retired) KD Chadda. 'Trans National Threats to International Peace and Security- Terrorism and Drug Trafficking'. Journal of United Services Institution of India, vol. CXXVII, Jan-Mar 1998, No. 531, p.45.
[81] Bard E O'Neil. Insurgency in the Modern World. Boulder, Colorado: West View Press, 1984, p. 15.
[82] Vijay Karan. War by Stealth- Terrorism in India. New Delhi, Penguin Books, 1997.

India as a Target of Sponsored Islamic Terrorism

Pakistan has thus fully involved itself into a proxy war against India. Since the 1970s Islamabad has been training Sikh and other Indian Separatist as part of ZA Bhutto's strategy of Forward Strategic Depth".[83]

3. International Islamic terrorist organisations had their origins in the failed state of Afghanistan, and in the rising internal disorder of Pakistan. Out of this unstable nation vortexes, the 'warriors of (extremist) Islam', the *mujahideen*, even today reach out into the fratricidal confrontations of the Balkans, Central Asia, and beyond, into the peripheries of China; from Pakistan, through Kashmir, into every theatre of existing or emerging conflict across the Indian sub-continent; and far into South East Asia – wherever 'Muslim grievances' and 'oppression' can be discovered or invented. ISI's game plan has been to escalate trouble in Kashmir and force India to hit back hard, convince the Islamic world that the Hindu government is perfecting a Muslim population; simultaneously exploit the insecurities and anger among other Indian Muslims by creating communal incidents and then to apply the same "Kashmir formula" elsewhere, whenever the State machinery hits back.[84]

Strategic Islamic Encirclement of India

[83] USA, 'Annual Report'. House of Representatives Republican Research Committee Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. 01 Feb 1993.
[84] SK Gosh. Pakistan's ISI: Network of Terror in India. New Delhi: APH Publication Corporation, 2000, p.8.

4. Pakistan has an estimated over 12 lakh unlicensed AK 47 rifles and one million students studying in more than 10,000 *madrassas*, with militant Islam as their core syllabus.[85] The ISI reportedly controls an army of 5,000 Muslim underground spies and agents in India.[86] An in-depth evaluation of this situation and of the existing LICOs in the Sub Continent that have a destabilizing effect on India and the region, are indicative of a 'Strategic Islamic Encirclement' of India by Pakistan led forces. Refer map opposite. (Map 5) This is further studied in the succeeding paragraphs.[87]

5. Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The separatist (LTTE) rebels fighting LICO since the early 1970's have continued their terror and intimidation tactics into the Twenty-first century. Norwegian and Indian efforts of 2001-02 to arrive at a negotiated settlement have not yet achieved a breakthrough.[88] ISI has been flirting with the LTTE, despite the latter's anti-Muslim activities in Sri Lanka's Eastern Province because, in return for ISI's assistance, the LTTE, through its supporters in Tamil Nadu, has been training the cadres of the Al Ummah and other jihadi organisations of South India and providing them with material assistance.

6. Nepal.

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[85] BM Reddy.' A Home Grown Menace'. Frontline. 01 Feb 2002.p. 12.
[86] Gosh. op cit, p. xii.
[87] supra., Chapter II, par. 2, 3 and 4.
[88] supra., Chapter II, par. 9.

"It is Nepal's dharma to go on making demands on India, and it is India's karma to cope with them as best it can".[89]

-Former Nepali Prime Minister, the late Manmohan Adhikari, to Indian counterpart, P.V.Narasimha Rao.

Although Nepal is not a threat by itself, India cannot avoid facing crucial challenges from Nepalese soil. The ISI has been steadily funding the influx of illegal Bangladeshi nationals into Nepal with short-term and long-term objectives. In the short-term, it has successfully inducted approximately 18,000 trained terrorists into the area who have begun operations from Nepal.[90] In the long-term, the idea was to change the demographic pattern of the region. These people have set up Muslim Fundamentalist organisations that are providing shelter to the North-Eastern insurgent groups. The Indo-Nepal border is a godsend for smugglers of arms and explosive. At 1,800 km, it is long and porous with only 18 international check posts along its length. Leftwing (Maoist) terrorism took birth in Nepal on 12 February 1996 and presently, the insurgents have made their presence felt in varying degrees in 68 of the total of 75 districts that constitute Nepal.[91]This situation is being exploited by the ISI to launch its covert operation into India from Nepal.[92] The coordinated simultaneous Maoist attacks in India and Nepal in Nov 2001 are proof of ISI's success in achieving its aims.[93]

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[89] Inder Malhotra. 'Focus shifts to Nepal'. The Hindu. 28 November 2001. p12.
[90] Ghosh. op.cit., p. 9.

[91] Farzand Ahmed. 'On Red Alert'. India Today. 10 Dec 2001. pp. 40-42.
[92] Rashmi Saksena. 'Brother in Arms'. The Week. 16 Dec 2001. pp. 24-25.

7. Bhutan. The situation in Bhutan has a direct influence on India's security. The main issues on the boiling pot in Bhutan are issue of democratisation of the polity as demanded by Nepali immigrants, the issue of Indian terrorist outfits which have set up bases in Bhutan, and the Bhutanese refugee issue. Indian terrorist groups, including the ULFA and the Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) continue to operate from Bhutan. As per Army figures, 4,000 ULFA and 1,000 NDFB militants are holed up in Bhutan.[94] This part of India's neighbourhood however, is relatively safe from the machinations of ISI. Increased support from the Bhutanese government is likely to assist the Indian Defence Forces in solving the problem through hot pursuit, raids and denial of safe hideouts/ training camps.

8. Bangladesh. Intelligence reports say that, the ISI and the Bangladesh Institute for Strategic Studies, Dhaka, a defence think-tank, evolved the theory of a "Strategic Frontier". Its aim has been to islamise the international border with India to facilitate the influx of terrorists through the Siliguri Corridor into India. Pakistani Prime Minister ZA Bhutto had laid claims to Assam and had conceived a design to convert Assam into a Muslim majority state by pushing in hordes of Pakistani nationals from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in an organized campaign.[95] During Begum Khaleda Zia's last tenure, Bangladesh had encouraged and allowed a large number of volunteers to fight in Afghanistan against the for-

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[93] Farzand Ahmed. 'A World to Win'. India Today. 07 Jan 2002. pp. 60 – 61.
[94] Kalyan Chaudhuri. 'Bhutan's Resolve'. Frontline. 01 Feb 2002. pp. 35- 36.

[95] Bhutto, ZA. The Myth of Independence.

mer Soviet Union and subsequently in Jammu and Kashmir. [96] A large number of these extremists are now present in Bangladesh and are spreading the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Bangladesh. This Bangladeshi movement has extensive connections with the International Islamic Jihadi movement led by the Afghanistan based Saudi fugitive, Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda.[97]

9. Afghanistan. The gaining of strategic depth in Afghanistan has been a major objective of Pakistan's policy since 1947. Pakistan's belief in seeking strategic depth was influenced by the American support it received in waging an armed response to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the need to route natural gas of the Central Asian Republics through a friendly Afghanistan. In the aftermath of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, it is evident that Pakistan has had to pay a heavy price for the chimera of strategic depth in Afghanistan. Nearly 60,000 Pakistanis have died in Afghanistan, Pakistan's economic revival has been hampered, and Pakistani society has been militated. The notion of strategic depth combined in it a territorial base for terrorism and a proxy war against India, with the alibi of Pakistan not being directly involved.

10. Pakistan: The Failed State and LICO.

Pakistan now faces a typical "principal-agent" problem: the interests of state (principal) and those of the militant groups (the agent) are not fully aligned.

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[96] Ghosh. op.cit., p. 8.
[97] Harroon Habib. 'No Taliban in my Govt: Begum Zia'. The Hindu. 11 Jan 2002. p.15.

… the militant groups that Pakistan supports and Sunni sectarian killers that Pakistan claims it wants to wipe out overlap significantly. By facilitating the actions of irregulars in Kashmir, the Pakistani government is inadvertently promoting sectarianism, supporting international terrorists, weakening the prospects for peace in Kashmir, damaging Pakistan's international image, spreading a narrow and violent version of Islam throughout the region, and increasing tensions with India – all against the interests of Pakistan as a whole[98].

This view of Pakistan has been corroborated by President Pervez Musharraf during his address to his nation on 12 Jan 2002.[99] A report of the American Republican Task Force on Terrorism, which has studied militancy across the globe for years, states: "For Pakistan, Kashmir constitutes a combination of regional interest and commitment to the global Islamic cause".[100] General Zia Ul Haq developed his 'K2' strategy of 'Khalistan and Kashmir' to achieve what had not been achieved through the wars of 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 i.e., 'making Kashmir a part of Pakistan'.[101] Accordingly, an operation codenamed Operation TOPAC was to be executed by the ISI and the Pakistan army had to be carried out in three phases, as tabulated alongside.[102](Table 3) The entire operation has been sponsored by the narcotics trade, which according to one estimate, is worth US $120 billion per year for Pakistan.[103]

11. An evaluation of Operation TOPAC is tabulated alongside. (Table 4)

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[98] Jessica Stern. 'Pakistan's Jihad Culture', Foreign Affairs, Nov-Dec 2000.
[99] BBC World News Service. 'Live telecast of Presidents Address to Pakistan'. 12 Jan 02.
[100] Ghosh. op.cit., p.5.
[101] SK Ghosh. op.cit., p.3.
[102] ibid., pp. 298-300.
[103] ibid., pp. 87- 89.

12. Remarks by Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf in the *New York Times* in June justified *jihad* and claimed that it was 'a tolerant concept'.[104] In the post 11 September 2001 and later and more significantly in the post 13 Dec 2001 period the government threatened to rein in sectarian outfits but, its threats have elicited counter threats by extremist organisations and open defiance of government directives.[105] Besides these Jammu and Kashmir centred terrorist groups operating in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Islamabad (refer Appendix F attached for list[106]), urban Sindh, particularly Karachi continued to be the battle-ground for politico-sectarian and ethnic violence.

LICO as a Future Form of Warfare as Applicable to India

13. Security Competition in South Asia. Both India and Pakistan can be termed as being dissatisfied states after their partition and birth in 1947. Therefore, there exists a three dimensional security competition between the two states revolving around territorial, ideological and political differences. The competitive nature of South Asian politics in South Asia is reflected in the divergent objectives pursued by India and Pakistan. This can be tabulated as follows:-

Type of	**India**	**Pakistan**

[104] supra., Chapter II, par. 9 (p).

[105] Rory McCarthy, 'Can Pakistan Change'. India Today.28 Jan 2002. pp. 30 - 39.

[106] Government of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs. 'The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001'. The Gazette of India. New Delhi: Government of India Press, 24 Oct 2001. p. 49.

Objective		
Political	Achieve security with status	Resist Indian domination
Military	Acquire capability to defeat Pakistan and to deter China	Preserve territorial integrity and secure disputed territory

14. Reasons for Continued LICO in India's Future. In the present unipolar world, the threat of annihilation by nuclear means has been replaced by the threat of LICO. India faces several military and non-military threats to its National Security. While there are military threats from its neighbours, Pakistan and China, it is mainly the threat from Islamic terrorism and ethnic insurgency which is of concern due to the external support these movements enjoy. Due to the geopolitical and economic situation in the Indian subcontinent, and the security competition tabulated above, it appears that, India will continue to be a target of LICO by Pakistan and China. In addition these nations could also be covertly supported by the Islamic Nations of the Middle East. The possible role of India's neighbouring states in its internal security in the future and internal reasons for LICO could be as follows:-

(a) Pakistan. In spite of the changes being promised by General Musharraf, LICO sponsored by Pakistan will peak in the near future.[107] The reasons for Pakistan to do this are as follows:-

[107] Rory Mc Carthy. loc., cit.

(i) The perception that Kashmir must be a part of Pakistan, and thus she will fight for it.

(ii) The animus against India, in-built into the very psyche of the Pakistani mindset, ever since Partition.

(iii) Pakistan has incorporated the concept of 'terror' as an instrument of state policy.

(iv) Pakistan lacks both economic as well as military depth, as well as the strength, to fight a conventional war. A nuclear confrontation has every scope of invoking the concept of 'mutually assured destruction'. Thus to further her policy aims, she has no recourse other than to resort to a 'LICO'.

(b) China. There are ten separatist groups operating in the Xingjian region of which the Turkistan Terrorist Force has direct links with Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda.[108] For years these groups of Turkic speaking Uighurs trained in Afghanistan have been engaging in LICO against Chi-

[108] South Asian Terrorism Portal, Delhi <http://www.satp.org/ China/Assessment)_ htm>

nese rule and the influx of settlers of Han group from Southern China.[109] As for India, LICO sponsored by China will primarily affect the north-eastern states. However, the support provided by China to Pakistan will continue to encourage Pakistan to sponsor terrorism and insurgency in India. China is determined to see that the next Dalai Lama would be a man of its choice and that his selection would be under its supervision. This could lead to ferment in Tibet after the exit of the present Dalai Lama, with a fall-out in the Tibetan Diaspora in India, West Europe and the USA. Till the Dalai Lama's succession issue is resolved, Beijing would prolong the border settlement talks in order to keep the border dispute alive for possible exploitation by it, if necessary.[110]

(c) Sri Lanka /LTTE. The southern states are likely to continue to be influenced by the LICO in the island nation. The effect of this however may not reach the proportions as is evident in the rest of the country.

(d) Nepal. Distinct tilts towards China, its emergence as a major terrorist base for operation against India in the North-East, the Maoist movement with its connections in India, and an increased momentum in the movement for demand of Greater Nepal are some of the potential problems for India.

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109 The Hindu. 19 Nov 01. p.16.

110 B Raman. 'National Security: Points to Ponder'. SAPRA India. 15 Feb 2000.

(e) Internal Reasons.

(i) Naxalite Movement. There are forty groups of Naxalites in the country. People War Group movement in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka is likely to continue for sometime.[111]

(ii) Terrorism. The well developed mega cities are foresee ably going to be embroiled in terrorism due to drug trafficking, economic terrorism and smuggling.

15. Pakistan's Future Strategy. Pakistan's game plan of supporting terrorism culminated in its desperate bid to make a direct military intervention in Kargil in 1998. Pakistan, now firmly feels that the solution to its aim is not to be found in the immediate political environment of Jammu and Kashmir or India but in the capitals of the Western World. It has been heartened by West Asia and Ireland conflicts. Pakistan has dovetailed its support to its sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir to other sinister machinations in border areas and interior parts of India. Its plans for the future could be as follows:-[112]

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[111] Ved Marvah. 'Threats to Internal Security', in Securing India's Future in the New Millennium. Edited by Brahma Chellaney, Hyderabad: Orient Longman. 1999, pp. 306-307.
[112] Dr Sukhwinder. op cit., pp. 49-51.

(a) Firstly, Pakistan is forcing on India the right wing reaction by engineering atrocities on Sikhs, Hindus and Kashmiri Pundits in Jammu and Kashmir. The ISI is likely to play the communal card, targeting the Buddhists and the Muslims in Ladakh in the future.[113]

(b) Secondly, it is repeatedly telling the fatigued terrorist groups that they would achieve the goal of self-determination.

(c) Thirdly, Pakistan is carrying out an elaborate plan that will cause destabilization through espionage, gun-running, hijacking, sabotage, communal discord and economic manipulation (in the form of circulation of fake currency).


16. Crystal Gazing for India's Future. Because of the defeat suffered in 1971 the Pakistan Army will continue to strive to redeem its honour.[114] Through a series of ISI sustained subversive activities, Pakistan's military junta will aim to and succeed in keeping the Indian Army heavily committed in order to create operational imbalances and, thus, reduce India's conventional edge. With the nuclear deterrence in place, and our track record of not having reacted too sternly, Pakistan will make bold moves to embark on such ventures in the years to come. With heavy defence spending, it continues to modernise and also strives to re-

[113] VK Shrivastava. 'Indian Army: The Challenges Ahead'. Journal of Indian Defence Strategic Analysis.<http.//www.idsa.org>
[114] VK Shrivastava. op.cit.

duce the gap of conventional asymmetry with India (refer table opposite for defence spending of Pakistan) (Table 5).[115] Hence, there is a need to review our existing 'Internal Security Apparatus' and improve upon it to defeat LICO.

STRATEGIC ISLAMIC ENCIRCLEMENT OF INDIA

[115] Shalini Chawla. 'Pakistan's Military Spending: Socio Economic Dimensions'. Strategic Analysis, vol. XXV, No.5, pp. 704-705.



Map 5

OPERATION TOPAC

Phase	Event
Phase 1.	
	Initiate a low level insurgency against the regime.

	Subversion of police, financial institutions, communication network and other important organisations.
	Whipping up anti India feeling amongst students and peasants to enlist their active support for rioting and anti-government agitations.
	In collaboration with Sikh extremists, create chaos and terror in Jammu to divert attention from the Valley at a critical juncture and discredit the regime even in the Hindu mind.
Phase 2.[116]	
	Exert maximum pressure on the Siachen, Kargil and Rajauri Poonch Sectors to force the Indian Army to deploy reserve formations outside the main Kashmir Valley.
	Attack and destroy base depots and Headquarters located in Srinagar, Pattan, Baramulla, Bandipur and Chowkibal by covert action at a given time.
	Finally, a special force under selected retired officers belonging to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir with the hard core from Afghanistan to be ready to attack and destroy airfields, radio stations and block Banihal tunnel and the Kargil –Leh Highway.
Phase 3.	
	To internationalize the issue.
	Create high voltage propaganda with reference to human rights.
	Paint India as an anti Muslim Hindu fundamentalist nation and claim support from rich Muslim nations.
	Liberation of Kashmir Valley and establishment of an independent Islamic state to be undertaken while the Indian Army was employed in Operation PAWAN in Sri Lanka.
	To degrade India's conventional superiority.[117]

Table 3

EVALUATION ON OPERATION TOPAC

Failures	**Successes**
(i) No worthwhile military pres-	(i) The ISI succeeded in the efficient

[116] Dr Sukhwinder.op.cit., p. 299.

[117] Lieutenant General CK Kapur. 'Proxy War'. Journal of the United Services Institution of India. vol. CXXXXIII, Jul- Sep 1998. pp. 369-370.

sure could be exerted in the Siachen, Kargil and Poonch - Rajouri sectors. (ii) No large-scale destruction could be carried out of government infrastructure, regular army Headquarters or installations (iii) The civil population did not rise in an open agitation to confront the State/Central Government. (iv) Fair and free elections could be held and Farooq Abdullah became the Chief Minister on a popular vote. (v) (vi) The Kashmir issue could never be internationalised in a manner as desired by the Pakistani leadership even during the height of OPERATION VIJAY in 1999.	subversion of the state police and, civil and administrative setup. (ii) Induction of Afghan mercenaries was and is continuing efficiently. These have been used a force multiplier to improve the fighting standards Kashmiri militants. (iii) Pakistani agents could motivate young Muslim boys into fighting the war of liberation not only in Kashmir but also in Afghanistan. (iv) Pakistan has been able to provide a steady flow of arms and ammunition into the Valley. (v) Misinformation campaign against the Kashmiri populace has been successful. (vi) The minority Kashmiri Pundits have fled the Valley to escape the ethnic cleansing of the Valley. This has created a wedge between the two communities in other parts of the country as well.

Table 4

Year	Defence Ex-penditure	Defence Ex-penditure as Percentage of Total Ex-penditure (Rs Million)
1979-80	12,654.8	23.2
1980-81	15,300.1	23.2
1981-82	18,631.0	24.5
1982-83	23,224.0	26.7
1983-84	26,798.0	26.8
1984-85	31,866.0	27.3
1985-86	35.606.0	26.5
1986-87	41,335.0	27.1
1987-88	47,015.0	26.1
1988-89	51,053.0	25.4
1989-90	58,708.0	26.5
1990-91	64,623.0	24.8
1991-92	75,751.0	23.6
1992-93	87,441.0	25.0
1993-94	91,776.0	25.2
1994-95	1,00,221	23.4
1995-96	1,15,252	23.3
1996-97	1,31,400	26.26
1997-98	1,33,834	26.2
1998-99	1,45,000	26.1
1999-2000	1,42,000	22.0

Table 5

Source: Pakistan Economic Survey, Islamabad, Pakistan, The Military Balance (International Institute of Strategic Studies-IISS), 1995-96, 1996-97, 1998-2000; Military Technology, Vol. Xxiii, Issue 1. 1999, as cited by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema; Jasjit Singh, "Defence Expenditure in South Asia, An Overview", Regional Centre for strategic Studies (RCSS) Policy Studies 10, Colombo, 2000, pp.53-54.

CHAPTER VI

REVIEW OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF INTERNAL SECURITY

"LICOs cannot be won or even contained by military power alone; it requires the synchronized application of all elements of national power across the entire range of conditions which are the sources of conflict".

General Donald R Morelli, 1984

General

1. The Indian Army has an outstanding and unrivalled record of success in MOOTW/ LICO.[118] In the four and a half decades of near continual operations, the Indian Army has most successfully tackled tribal insurgency in the North-East, urban insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and terrorism in Punjab[119]. In peace keeping operations in Korea, Congo, Indo-China, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Kampuchea, Bosnia and Rwanda, the Indian Armed Forces have won handsome tributes for their professionalism and unquestioned expertise in this genre of conflict.

2. The Indian LICO Doctrine. Initially, the Indian Army borrowed heavily from the British Templar model of Malaya to devise its tactics for counter insurgency operations. However, over the years these have evolved, with experience, into an operational style that is uniquely Indian and highly successful.[120] The present tactics are based on a very humane approach of 'Psychological Dissuasion' and 'Winning the Hearts and Minds' of the population. In operational terms, the Indian

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[118] Lieutenant General SK Sinha. op.cit.

[119] infra., Appendix B. (Population Response Figure 4)(Population Response Figure 4)

Army has repeatedly used the 'Area Saturation' mode with resounding success in the North-East, in the Punjab and now in Jammu and Kashmir[121]. Tactically, it has relied upon an 'Area Grid' of company sized posts for area domination and population control.

Present System of Internal Security; a Review

3. Failure of Indian Strategy (Briggs Strategy). The Indian Armed Forces has fought LICOs on the pattern established by the British Army under General Gerald Templar in Malaya to subdue the Communist terrorists in the period 1948-1956.[122] Templar's counter-insurgency plan was cobbled together by Lieutenant General Harold Briggs.[123] The Briggs template has failed in eradicating the problem in Kashmir and in the Indian North-East for mainly two sets of reasons as follows[124]:-

(a) The inability of the military, police and the civilian administrators to work hand-in-hand.

(b) The Indian Army is not innately geared to waging a 'no holds barred' LICO.

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[120] Colonel GD Bakshi. op. cit.
[121] supra., Chapter II, par. 9 (k)
[122] Bharat Karnad, 'Winning LICO: Special Operations Forces' South Asia Terrorism Portal <http://www.satp.org/India/Terrorist%20Outfits_India.htm>.
[123] Frank Kitson. Bunch of Five. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977.

4. Macro Level Fault Lines.[125] In spite of the success of the Indian Armed Forces in combating LICO, the very number of conflicts and the long drawn out process of reconciliation indicate that a few faults exist at the strategic and operational levels. These shortcomings are discussed below. The macro level shortcomings are as follows:-[126]

(a) Lack of a Clear Policy. The government of India lacks a clear policy for LICO. Ad hoc-ism is prevalent and there is a total lack of political consensus (As per the population response given at Appendix B, this is the main reason- 22 percent).

(b) Strategic Thought. All through our history, India has displayed a bewildering lack of strategy, especially in matters of national security. The argument provided by our politicians, is that, planning and strategy circumscribe action and that their absence affords flexibility is, only an excuse.[127] This has led to the absence of a pragmatic foreign policy and a defence strategy to defend the Nation.[128]

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[124] Bharat Karnad. op.cit.
[125] Dua. op.cit., p. 200.
[126] infra., Appendix B. (Population Response Figure 1)(Population Response Figure 1)
[127] Vijay Karan. op. cit. pp.101.
[128] Major General (retired) VK Madhok. Re-Powering National Security. Mumbai: Aditya Prakashan, 1998.pp. 53 - 58.

(c) Own Strength. Under estimating of own national strength including the resilience of the people and the consequences of improved relations with China.

(d) Overestimation of Pakistan. This has lead to wrong appreciation of her national motives and fears and the Indian failure to identify and exploit the cleavages in Pakistani society.

(e) Elimination of LICO. Wrong belief that insurgency can be eliminated by just a few military blows.

(f) Lack of National Integration. This has given rise to many of the separatist movements.

(g) Media. We have failed to understand the significance of media and to counteract the false propaganda.

(h) Forecast of Force Requirements. We have not tried to crystal gaze and plan for the type and quantum of forces and the methods of coordination required. Long term planning in all Indian services including military and civil administration has been faulty.

(i) Confidence in the Nation. Lack of confidence in the futility of Pakistan sponsored insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and North-East, as was the case in Punjab.

(j) Higher Direction of War. The present organisations meant to provide higher directions for LICOs are ineffective and do not in any manner assist the Armed Forces in LICOs.[129]

5. Operational Level Short Comings. As per entry No 1 of list II of the Seventh Schedule of our Constitution, public order and its maintenance is a state subject, while entry No 1 of list III in the same schedule lists criminal law under the concurrent list. The armed forces are placed under the union list by the entry No 2 of list I in the same schedule.[130] Entry No 2 A states, "deployment of the armed forces of the union in aid to civil power is subject to the

control of the union". The implication of resting the power of deployment of the armed forces under the union are as follows:-

[129] infra., Appendix B. (Population Response Figure 7)(Population Response Figure 6)
[130] Durga Das Basu, Justice. Constitutional Law of India. New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India Private Limited, 1985, pp. 424-443.

(a) The states have to create their own security forces for internal security. Thus the nation has forces of the state (armed/ unarmed), those under the Ministry of Home Affairs and the armed forces.

(b) The very large amount of forces defeats the very purpose for which they are created. Inter service rivalry and varying ideologies results in tunnel vision and over loss of efficiency.

(c) State forces are subject to all the allied political and bureaucratic pressures often used to favour the anti-social elements due to vote bank politics and the political criminal nexus.

(d) Raised from the areas in which these forces have to operate these forces are subject to blackmail and threats. This reduces their response to a passive submission and reduces their credibility.

(e) Inter state and inter forces/ formation boundaries are sanctuaries for terrorists / insurgents.

(f) The requisitioning of the army for LICO is generally done after the state forces are no longer able to deal with the situation. This is invariably too late.

(g) The alienation of masses is generally complete even before induction of armed forces.

(h) By the time the armed forces become effective, this situation is explosive enough to demand short term measures in order to restore public faith and order.

(i) Banning of unlawful organizations is a long delayed process enabling them to take advantage of the interim period to generate fund and resort to propaganda to create popular support (refer Appendix B).[131]

(j) Due to the absence of unified command and accountability coordination between the armed forces and the state / Para military forces is absent resulting in inefficiency and duplication of effort.[132],[133]

(k) The contribution of other strata of the Indian society in dealing with the situation is extremely poor.[134]

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[131] infra., Appendix B. (Population Response Figure 2)(Population Response Figure 2)
[132] Sukhwinder Singh. op.cit., pp.198 -199 and
[133] infra., Appendix B. (Population Response Figure 7)(Population Response Figure 1)

[134] infra., Appendix B. (Population Response Figure 6)

(l) No real time intelligence flows down from higher headquarters as the system of reporting does not provide for agencies to feed raw information direct to the fighting troops.

(m) Prosecution of insurgents / terrorist is lacking due to the faulty and archaic laws and the lengthy judicial procedure.[135] Since the birth of insurgency in the Kashmir Valley no militant has been prosecuted and sentenced by the judiciary.[136]

(n) Over ground, workers cannot be arrested and prosecuted due to the limitation of existing laws.[137]

(o) The state forces are not bound by an exclusive act like the Army Act and tend to misuse the vast powers granted to them under the various acts such as TADA/ NSA/ POTO.

(p) The general public loses faith in the law and order machinery and turns to the militants for protection.

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[135] cf ante., Chapter III, par. 11 (f).
[136] K Subramanian. 'Terrorism and the Law'. The Hindu. 24- 25 Jan 2002. p. 8.
[137] ibid.

(q) The army has to leave the state on normalization of the situation. The militants have the option of lying low during pressure periods and returning after the army returns to its barracks. As a result a tactical victory is not converted into a strategic victory and a long term solution is lost.

(r) The Indian Defence Forces are not adequately trained and equipped for LICOs. This has resulted in high militant to troop casualty ratio which has a negative effect on the nation as a whole.[138]

Lessons from Other Nations

6. Various manifestations of LICOs have existed all over the world and various nations have developed their peculiar methods of dealing with the terrorists/ insurgents. A tabulated list of lessons that can be learnt from a few of the contemporary LICOs the world is given alongside. (Table 6)

7. LICOs in India are not only here to stay but to spread to other parts of the country as well. The rise and the spread of fundamentalism in the immediate neighbourhoods have made in-roads into our multi-religious society. Growing regional and communal tendencies have potentials to tear apart our national fabric. The rising expectations of our people, and the government's failure to deliver, have led to conditions in many states that go beyond the sphere of law and order

situations. It needs no elaboration that the turbulence within exposes India to the threats of subversion and is indeed being exploited; notably by Pakistan.[139]

8. It is time that the nation recognised the gravity of the situation and carries out a pragmatic analysis essential to understand the problem in totality so that, the government and the military can adapt to the situation and formulate a coherent and unified national strategy to counter it. The next chapter thus deals with the recommended measures to combat LICO.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM OTHER NATIONS COMBATING LICO[140]

Ser No	Nation	Type of LICO	Lessons
1.	Spain	Galician ETA/ Basque	A well defined political aim. A clear, centralised chain of

[138] infra., Appendix B. (Population Response Figure 8)

[139] supra., Chapter V, pars. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

[140] Alex P Schmid. Western Responses to Terrorism. London: Frank Cass, 1998.

		Anti Fascist	command. Adherence to rule of law. A strong and centralised intelligence agency. Long term planning.
2.	**Italy**	Political Terrorism	Efficacy of emergency legislation. Re integration of former terrorists into society.
3.	**Austria**	German leftist terrorism Palestinian Terrorism Anti Turkish Movement	Diffusion of regional conflicts. Special Internal Security Force. Special legislation. International cooperation in combating terrorism.

Table 6

CHAPTER VII

RECOMMENDED COUNTER/ REMEDIAL MEASURES

TO COMBAT LICO

"The best politics is to do the right thing".

EM House

General

1. India's aspiration of attaining a rightful place in the region, and in the world, is weighed down by her internal challenges. Therefore, the text that follows, attempts to reflect upon such facets that have a bearing on the 'National Response' to quell internal unrest. The recommendations being made in this chapter are based on the Population Response given at Appendix B and the researcher's operational experience and research.

The Principles for Combating LICO

2. As soon as the challenge of LICO is in the open, the success of operations depends on degree of vigour, determination and skill with which the government acts to defend its citizens, both politically and militarily. The methodology of combating LICO, to be successful, has to be guided by a set of principles. Some of them can be enunciated as under:-

(a) First Principle.[141] The objectives of the Government, especially the political ones, must be spelt out clearly as military aims.

(b) Second Principle. The Government must not only have the will, determination, resources and ability to win, but must demonstrate it in

[141] cf ante., Chapter VI, par. 4.

deeds so, that the population is convinced of its sincerity and strength.[142] Strategic thought and serious political and military debate over the new challenges facing the country will enable in the developing of a national aim, strategy and foreign policy.[143]

(c) Third Principle. The Government must have an overall plan, which must include all measures- military and police, political, social, economic and administrative.[144] This plan may assign tasks to various agencies and also indicate coordinated programmes. The LICO effort must become a total war to defeat insurgency or terrorism, which are a phenomenon of total nature.[145]

(d) Fourth Principle. LICO can only be dealt with by a strong bonding in perception and action between the bodies dealing with both aspects of security—the defence, foreign and home ministries. The Government must therefore have a unified command at all levels.[146]

(e) Fifth Principle. The Government must act within the framework of law. Because it is there to enforce law, the government itself cannot af-

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[142] Major General (retired) A Karim. Terrorism the Pakistan Factor. New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991, pp. 87-88.
[143] Stephen Cohen. 'Is There a Road to Peace in South Asia? An American Perspective'. Journal of United Services Institution of India, vol. CXXIII, Apr- Jun 1993, No.512, p.147.
[144] Bard O'Neill. Insurgency and Terrorism. USA: Brassey's Inc, 1990, pp.142-144.
[145] cf ante., Chapter VI, par. 4 and infra., Appendix B(Population Response Figure 6).
[146] cf ante., Chapter VI, par. 4 and supra., Chapter II, par. 11(n).

ford to break the law. In case the existing legal provisions are either inadequate they must be modified to cope with the situation.

(f) Sixth Principle. The task must be finished and all actions must be taken to their logical conclusion.

(g) Seventh Principle. Effort of each measure of LICO has to be analysed. If the measure was used in other LICOs earlier, the reasons for its success or failures have to be located, analysed and then applied as per the situational requirements.

(h) Eighth Principle: A National Level Counter Insurgency/ Terrorism Organisation. It is essential to establish a permanent counter organization which does not change with the party in power or during President's Rule. Such an organization will provide stability and continuity regardless of the form or content of government and a reliable infrastructure to combat terrorism.[147] A suggested organization to carry out the above discussed functions will be discussed later.[148]

Progressive Steps in Combating LICO

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[147] infra., Appendix B. (Population Response Figure 10)

3. Fighting LICO requires a clear mandate which will allow our security forces to do what is necessary to crush this hydra-headed monster. To create this mandate and to translate it into action on the ground will require radical institutional changes, including legislation, a reform of our judicial and bureaucratic processes and institutions, and of the security forces. A stable government is needed to tackle internal and external challenges.[149] The major steps in the process which a nation will have to initiate to combat LICO to weed out terrorism and insurgency are as given in the figure alongside. The measures to be taken in each step are discussed below. (Figure 6)

Step 1: Develop Strategic Thought and Planning

4. Foreign Policy: Need for a Deterrent Foreign Policy. LICO can never be fought defensively at the strategic level. Thus, we have to be able to demonstrate our determination to resist its manifestations by all means, as well as be prepared to deal with the problem in the long term. This projection is not for the benefit of Pakistan alone but—given the strategic Islamic encirclement of India—to the world at large and our neighbours in particular. The first step in combating LICO should be to discard the tentativeness in external dealings i.e., our foreign policy. There is a need for a set of parameters that might help in sending a clear message to the world as to where India wishes to draw a line beyond which it will not

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[148] Colonel Ranjit Sen Gupta. Management of Internal Security. New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1994, chapter 4, pp. 63-68 and infra., Chapter VII, par. 9.
[149] Prime Minister Mr. AB Vajpayee as quoted in The Hindu, 22 Oct 2001, pp. 1.

tolerate any trespass/ interference.[150] This '***Lakshman Rekha'*** should be as given on the opposite page. *(* Table 7)

5. The terrorist attack of 13 Dec 2001 on the Parliament House in New Delhi may be seen as the crossing of the '***Lakshman Rekha'*** by the terrorists (and their sponsor state Pakistan). India's overriding objective for the future should be to ensure that, status quo is maintained as far as our national integrity is concerned and, this should be conveyed to the major powers of the world. No nation should be able to make us do that which we do not want to do as a Nation. The will to defy looming international pressures to change the status quo requires a brand new grand strategy to include political resolution of internal conflicts, sustained domestic reinvigoration and economic revival.[151] A deterrent nuclear policy (although overreacting if applied only to LICO) would also assist in preventing belligerent states from initiating LICOs against India.[152] However, application of the deterrent nuclear policy in this context requires more in-depth study so as to, make use of this deterrence more usefully and effectively to prevent the only war we will ever fight in all probability i.e., LICO.

6. National Security Council (NSC): A Suggested Reorganisation. Every nation has as its duty the task of giving its citizens a proper quality of life. This good

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[150] G Parthasarathy. Doordarshan National News. 24 Dec 2001.
[151] Shankar Bajjpai. 'The Inherent Contradiction', The Hindu. 17 Nov 2001, pp. 10.
[152] Lieutenant General VR Raghvan. Guest Lecture at DSSC 57,' India's Nuclear Strategy in the Coming Years'. 19 Nov 2001.

quality of life includes peace, prosperity, self actualisation and these cannot be realised until a nation ensures the three essentials of a secure state i.e., territorial integrity, political stability and legitimacy of state– through a proper functioning of the Government, the Armed Forces, the Police, the Magistracy, the Judiciary and the Jails. The correct utilization of these institutions maintains the internal and external security of the nation as is lacking presently.[153] A comprehensive grand strategy and internal security policy has never been evolved in India so that long term needs could be met.[154] The present LICO situation highlights the need to redefine national interests, and undertaking a pragmatic recognition of threats to national security and define without ambiguity the national strategic and operational objectives which national effort (including the security forces) can aim to achieve. This then would permit drawing up of a utilitarian defence policy, formulating new doctrines to wage LICO, realistic defence planning and institutionalised decision making.[155] Therefore, it is essential that a NSC be effective and responsive to the environment while carrying out its functions of integrated planning, decision-making and coordinating.[156] Such an institutionalized approach to the problem, dictated only by national interests will assist in display of national political will, which is the core of handling LICO.[157] Such an organisation is re-

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[153] infra., Appendix B. (Population Response Figure 7)

[154] Colonel Ravi Nanda. Strategic Compulsions of Nuclear India. New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1998, p. 207 and supra., Appendix B (Population Responses 1 and 3).

[155] PR Chari. 'South Asian Security'. Security in South Asia. Edited by Major General Dipankar Banerjee. New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2000, p. 23.

[156] Government of India, National Security Council Secretariat. The Kargil Review Committee Report. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 2000. pp. 254- 264.

[157] Lieutenant General VK Nayar. 'Management of Insurgency in the North East'. Indian Defence Review. Oct 1992.

quired both at national and state levels. Recommended organisations of the NSC and state level council to make them more responsive are given alongside.[158](Figure 7 *and* Figure 8*)*

Step 2: Discernment of a Conflict Situation

7. To deal with insurgency or terrorism an essential pre-requisite is its discernment. The aspects required to be discerned are discussed in the following paragraphs:-[159]

(a) Discern the cause or motive and devote energies towards removing the grievances.

(b) Identification of militant organisation and its leadership is an essential input for LICO.

(c) Knowledge of insurgent/ terrorist tactics provides important inputs for planning and conducting operation against them.

(d) Knowledge of likely targets of the insurgents and terrorists would allow for taking timely preventive measures.

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[158] Lieutenant General CK Kapur. 'National Security Council for India – A Proposal'. Journal of United Services Institute of India, vol. CXXVIII, Apr- Jun 1998, No. 532.
[159] College of Combat, Mhow. Training Note on Combating Terrorism, pars. 9 - 66.

(e) One of the main considerations for planning of operations would be to deny sources and block lines of supply.

(f) It is important to locate training facilities and put a stop to training.

(g) Discernment of recruitment set-up would assist in reaching up to the organisation, countering their recruitment drive and if possible planting recruits as part of an intelligence network.

Step 3: Establish an Organisation to Combat LICO

8. Distribution of Responsibility of Internal and External Security. At present LICO operations are being under taken by the Armed Forces and Para Military Forces (PMFs). As a reaction to the internal security situation the government has been raising new PMFs on an ad hoc basis which later have been misused and have now come to stay as permanent forces. There has been no clear cut and pragmatic demarcation of responsibility as a central coordinating agency has not been created. Hence, there arises the need of a Ministry of Internal Security or Motherland Security and a Chief of Internal Security or Chief of Motherland Security on the line of the Chief of Defence Staff. The present over commitment of the Army in LICO is not desirable although the responsibility of the same

should continue to be with the Armed Forces.[160] A suggested distribution of responsibility of maintaining national security is as given in the figure alongside. (Figure 9 *)*

9. Unified Command and Control. To achieve synergy by coordination and improved efficiency of all security forces, a unified command is necessary in LICOs.[161] The present dichotomy of responsibility for shared jobs by security forces needs to be addressed through a doctrinal formulation of unified command at the national and regional levels. Unified Command with a broad political objective must be created by legislative or executive order to give it powers.[162] Its task should be dissemination of information about overall objectives, coordination of security forces operations, intelligence input sharing, and planning. Towards this end, it must be headed by the Chief Minister or Governor, and in command must be an Army Officer, whose job would be to coordinate operations. The unified command should have representatives from state government, including additional chief secretary (home), state police chief, Para-military forces' Director Generals, intelligence representatives and officers of other civil administrative agencies.[163] Recommended Unified Headquarters for national and state levels are given at figures alongside.(Figure 10*,* Figure 11 *and* Figure 12*)*

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[160] infra., Appendix B (Population Response Figure 5)
[161] Dua. op. cit., pp. 195-189.
[162] Bhashyam Kasturi. 'Unified Command HQ in Counter Insurgency and Role of Intelligence in J&K'. Indian Defence Review. vol 16(i).
[163] infra., Appendix B (Population Response Figure 6)

10. A Special Task Force for LICO. That there is "no military solution to LICO" is just a half-truth that has been elevated to the status of popular dogma. Military means alone cannot comprehensively and permanently defeat the various manifestations of LICO; but neither can any other means succeed unless these are backed by military force.[164] Thus the Defence Forces cannot be divorced from internal security while, at the same time this employment has dented the morale and fighting efficiency of the soldier.[165] The most viable solution in the present context would be having a special LICO force under the command of the army.[166] This force should be an independent organisation under the army with separate regional wings/ commands for the North, West, South and the North-East. This force can be based on the extended version of the Rashtriya Rifles on a Light Infantry Division format. The CRPF with more than 250 battalions raised for this purpose should be better armed and trained to assist the Rashtriya Rifles under the over all command of the Army. A suggested organization is as given alongside.[167](Figure 13 *and* Figure 14) A Special Operations Force (SOF) of a Division size should be raised to conduct special operation like deep strike, hot pursuit,[168] sabotage, counter intelligence and other 'dirty jobs'. As mentioned by G Parthasarathy, "this SOF Division can also conduct operations in the strategic space between LICO and nuclear conflict as has been expressed by General (re-

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[164] KPS Gill. Economic Times. 06 Oct 2001.
[165] Jaswant Singh. Defending India. Bangalore: Macmillan India Limited, 1999. p. 262.
[166] Kshitij Prabha. loc.cit., p. 162.
[167] infra., Appendix B. (Population Response Figure 9)
[168] supra., Chapter II, par. 9 (l) and infra., Appendix B (Population Response Figure 10).

tired) VP Malik".[169] No peace process can be fruitful until it is demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt that, ***violence will not pay*** and herein lies the need for an organisation as suggested above.[170]

11. Joint Intelligence Organisation.

(a) Strategic Intelligence Organisation. The achievement of the deterrent foreign policy and de-Islamic encirclement of India requires the employment of active measures like covert actions against our neighbours.[171] Such operations, often called covert or special missions, involve carrying out clandestine missions, ranging from pro-insurgency, insurgency, sabotage and deception to, political assassination and political subversion. The proposed strategy is to undertake covert passive and active measures against neighbouring states including, psychological operations, disinformation, and strikes at terrorist camps and border raids. Thus there is a need for providing the Research and Analysis Wing with such capabilities in cohesion with the Special Forces organisation suggested above. Coordination at international level will also assist in identifying peace enhancing

[169] Raj Chengappa. 'In Cold Pursuit'. India Today. 24 Dec 2001. pp. 38-39 and Guest Lecture at DSSC by Mr G Parthasarathy.
[170] India, Defence Services Staff College (DSSC 57), Minor Research Project. 'Self Reliance in India's Security'. 15 Jan 2002.
[171] supra., Chapter II, par .9 (m).

and peace endangering elements and also in increasing operational intelligence.[172]

(b) Operational/ Tactical Intelligence. An effective intelligence organization is vital for efficiency of any force engaged in LICO. The intelligence requirements for LICO cover the gambit of political and operational intelligence. Thus, there is a need for a central coordinating agency to coordinate the inputs of strategic and operational level agencies and to establish a Defence Intelligence Agency for the Army including the Rashtriya Rifles.[173]

Step 4: Restriction of Anti National Activity

12. Changes in the Judicial System. The present rules of the land are woefully inadequate in posing deterrent to prospective anti national elements as the various laws were framed when the nation was not facing such divisive forces puling at its integrity. The weaknesses of the present judicial system are tabulated alongside. (Table 8) The weaknesses in TADA required that a new law be enacted at the earliest.[174] The President had promulgated the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001 (POTO) on 24 Oct 2001.[175] The Ordinance was issued in the

[172] Hesi Carmel. Intelligence for Peace. London: Frank Cass. 1999. pp. 99 – 117.
[173] Major General VK Madhok. op.cit, and Government of India, National Security Council Secretariat. ibid.
[174] BP Singh Sehgal. Global Terrorism. New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995.
[175] Government of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs. ibid.

background of the intensification of cross border terrorism targeted at destabilizing India and the continued offensive agenda of Pakistan ISI in this direction and recent developments of national and international consequences in the post 11 Sep 2001 scenario. However, the POTO also falls short of the ideal law in combating LICO and the following should be included in the law/ introduced by a subsequent law :-

(a) Magisterial powers to Class I gazetted officers of Armed Forces while combating LICO.[176]

(b) Application of Army Act in disturbed areas wholly/ partially along the IB where infiltration occurs.

(c) Death penalty to offences of anti national elements to include white collar crimes of civil administration authorities.

(d) Non application of any human rights/ normal citizen rights to foreign mercenaries operating in India against the national interests of the country.

13. Military Operations to Neutralise Anti National Elements: Lessons from Operation in Algeria and Malaya. In both these counter insurgency operations the forces combating LICO were occupation forces and they both i.e., the French

from Algeria and the British from Malaya left the territories in spite of successful operations. In Algeria, President De Gaulle in spite of French military victory had to concede defeat. In Malaya the inducements to the local population and the close coordination between all agencies resulted in military and political victory. From these operations we can assume that the Malayan strategy with a more humane touch and more firm laws as relevant today should be applied in our nation. The military operations to neutralize and destroy militants / terrorists/ insurgents/ guerrillas should be conducted over the following plains:-

(a) Offensive Counter Measures. The offensive LICO operations are those which are designed to physically root out and destroy the insurgents themselves.

(b) Defensive Counter Measures. Defensive operations are basically those which are designed to prevent insurgents from disrupting the government plans or programmes.

(c) Border Management. The influx of population apart, unchecked cross-border movements give rise to many other ills—smuggling, gun running, drug trafficking, movement of insurgents, and the like. In essence, the remedy lies in the effective management of our borders. The situation along each of these borders differs vastly on many counts. The

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[176] ibid., Part II, Sec 1, par., 7. (*I, 2*), p. 9. and Lieutenant General Kaushik in an interview.

importance of all-encompassing and well-coordinated efforts towards better border management cannot be over-emphasised. Due to the variety of borders that India has, and the variety of border manning forces there is a requirement for establishing a 'Ministry for Border Management'.[177] Electronic equipment like sensors, high voltage cobra wire and unmanned aerial vehicles when deployed to assist in detecting infiltration, will improve border management.[178]

Step 5: Measures to Reduce Alienation and Win Over Population from Insurgents

14. Rude behaviour of police and security forces deployed in LICO is the main cause of alienation of the local population. The operations per se, brutality and disrespect are the main reasons for the population getting motivated towards supporting the separatists cause. Hence, 'Winning the Hearts and Minds' (WHAM), polite cum courteous behaviour, economic and social development and involvement of the local militia/ Village Defence Committees/ Home Guards/ counter insurgent groups in operations is important.

Step 6: Restore Popular Political Rule

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[177] India, Defence Services Staff College (DSSC 57), Minor Research Project – Border Management. 2002.
[178] C Raja Mohan. 'US to Help India in Border Management'. The Hindu. 25 Nov 2001. pp.1.

15. One of the major aims of the terrorists and their sponsors is to subvert normal democratic and secular processes. A climate of political ambivalence and turbulence suits them best; restoration of a popular rule on the other hand will thwart their designs. It is the democratic process which can restore and maintain the strong cohesion which must exist between the government and the people. It has been amply demonstrated by now that President's Rule has failed to curb violence or check terrorism. A popular government with hard hitting forces at its disposal alone can put the terrorists on the run. Economic upliftment and industrial development of the state is likely to be much quicker under an elected government.

Step 7: Political/ Diplomatic/ Military/ Economic Measures to Prevent Recurrence

16. Political Measures. To achieve internal security by provoking instability among its neighbours has been Pakistan's strategy and to defeat this will require paradigm shifts in the way polity runs India.[179] The measures suggested in prevention of the birth of such conflicts are as follows:-

(c) National Policy. India should articulate a national policy that recognises its multifarious culture. It should encourage the free expression of

[179] KPS Gill. 'De-Legitimise Terror as State Policy'. Pioneer. 17 Nov 2001.

every group personality within the overall frame work of the national integrity.[180]

(d) National Integration. Develop national integration by the translation of the national goals of socialism and secularism into reality with rapid socio-economic development. The aim being to achieve '***varna dharma***' by following the principle of '***Raja Dharmasya Karanam'***.

(e) Political Solutions to Problems. Finding honest political solutions to various movements in the country within the frame work of the constitution.[181] An attempt to discern the underlying pattern of the five major separatists movements in India reveal that each one of them flared along the geographical and political extremities of the nation. The geographical distance from Delhi, the low arithmetic representation in Parliament and the lesser say in the political calculus of power play need to addressed to prevent an escalation of the situation.

(f) Law and Order on Concurrent List. There is a requirement of placing law and order on the concurrent list, despite greater demand of more power and autonomy to states. The Central Government should

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[180] Satyendra Kishore. National Integration in India. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Limited, 1989, p. 85 and cf ante., Chapter VI, par. 4.

[181] Tavleen Singh. 'Part of the Problem'. India Today. 5 Nov 2001. p. 12.

continue to remain as a watch dog to ensure security and integrity of country.

(g) Control of Communal Factor. One positive method of controlling the Muslim Fundamentalism is by reinforcing our secular fabric. This would assist in combating the communal virus with total and ruthless disregard to the political aims of some political parties who use religion as a tool for furthering their own ends.

(h) Rehabilitation of Refugees. Thousands of Kashmiri, Bangladeshi and Tamil refugees are languishing in refugee camps in sub human conditions. The State has to take adequate steps to ensure these refugees return to their homes at the earliest and are provided security against militants/ terrorists.

(i) Corruption and Criminality. The country needs a sincere national effort to eliminate the prevailing ethos of corruption, criminality and venality.

(j) Transparency in Rule. A closed and secretive system tends to become arbitrary and only succeeds in alienating the people. Where as, a transparent policy for governance creates atmosphere of credibility and can pave the way for dialogue and settlement. Human rights and interac-

tive and publicly spelt out strategic planning should become part of the national policy.

(k) Rehabilitation of Surrendered Insurgents. The government will have to ensure 100 percent rehabilitation through a pragmatic surrender policy.

17. Diplomatic Measures. If the Third World suffers from LICO, the entire international system may be harmed. As per Mohammed Ayoob, a Hobbesian periphery and a Lockeian core cannot exist without the periphery exporting some instabilities to the core.[182] India dominates the South Asian region in political and strategic terms as perceived by other smaller nations of the Pax-Indiana region.[183] The smaller nations resist Indian domination by seeking to draw extra-regional powers into the region to counter balance the weight of India in regional polity. In this backdrop India needs to initiate the following diplomatic measures:-

(a) Foreign Policy. Initiate a deterrent/ dissuasive foreign policy. The diplomatic manoeuvres taken in Dec 2001- Jan 2002 after the 13 Dec 2001 attack on Parliament House are a true representative of such a policy. The '*threat in being'* of a limited offensive across the IB combined with a nuclear threat of massive retaliation is the main instrument of dissua-

[182] Mohammed Ayoob. The Third World Security Predicament. London: Lynne Reinner Publications, 1995. p. 196.
[183] supra., par. 13 (p).

sion.[184] Along with this, India should consider making multi-pronged approaches in the Afghanistan-Pakistan- India region, in the Iran-Gulf region, in South Asia, in Indochina and ASEAN countries and in the non-aligned group of nations and of course with Russia, China and the USA and Japan.[185]

(b) International Pressures. One of the most convenient ways to curb state sponsored LICOs are international forums. Differing perceptions of terrorism inhibit international efforts to combat terrorism.[186] The foreign office and the corps of diplomats will have to work overtime to put forth the Indian view point to the world as regards LICOs.[187] The measures taken by the present government in forging an international alliance against terrorism is a step in the right direction.[188] The recent Indo Russian declaration to combat terrorism,[189] the Indo-Thai improvement in judicial and security relations, [190] the Indo-US cooperation in combating cyber terrorism and in border management, and alliance with Afghanistan are the kind of

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[184] Ashley J Tellis. Stability in South Asia. New Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2000, pp. 110-113.
[185] TN Kaul. India and the New World Order. New Delhi: Gyan Publication House, 2000. p. 90.

[186] Major General Afsir Karim. 'International Terrorism – The Indian Response', in, Indian Foreign Policy: Agenda for Twenty-first Century. by United Services Institute of India. New Delhi: Konark Publishers Private Limited. pp. 176 – 193.
[187] Kshitij Prabha. loc.cit., p. 158
[188] infra., Appendix B. (Population Response Figure 11)
[189] PS Suryanarayana. 'India, Russia Sign Declaration to Combat Terrorism'. The Hindu. 07 Nov 2001, p.1.
[190] Amit Baruah. 'India, Thailand Should Focus On Security Ties: an Interview with T Shinawatra, Prime Minister of Thailand'. The Hindu. 26 Nov 2001, p.14.

measures that India should take to cause the diplomatic isolation of nations sponsoring LICO against India.[191] Some international measures that need to be instituted to combat this menace in a coordinated method world wide are as follows:-

(i) Effective system of intelligence pooling.

(ii) Establishment of multinational hostage rescue commando group based on the Allied Mobile Force of NATO established in 1961.

(iii) Allied Counter Terrorist Force to tackle international terrorism.[192]

(iv) International Nuclear Emergency Search Group.[193]

(c) Relations with Belligerent States. Improvement of relations with neighbouring belligerent countries through confidence building measures. [194]

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[191] Rashmi Saksena. 'Building Bridges'. The Week. 25 Nov 2001. p. 44.

[192] infra., Appendix B.((Population Response Figure 11)

[193] supra., Chapter IV, pars. 4 and 5.

[194] Aabha Dixit. 'India- Pakistan Relations: A Survey'. Securing India's Future in the New Millennium. Edited by Brahma Chellaney, Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1999, pp. 439-466 and Wing Commander NK Pant. 'Need To Mend Fences With Neighbours'. Journal of IPCS. Article No 558. <www.ipcs.org/documents/statements-index.htm. Sep 2001>.

(d) Comprehensive and Cooperative Security for South Asia. Former Prime Minister IK Gujral, while discussing the Gujral Doctrine, identifies the South Asian countries—Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan—as forming the first concentric circle in India's foreign policy (See table opposite for Gujral Doctrine)(Table 9*).* Bringing out their relevance he states that, India's nature and strength cannot be divorced from the nature of relations it has with these neighbours. The eternal state of LICO that the South Asian region has experienced since Aug 1947 has resulted in poor economic growth of the region. There is, therefore, a pressing need to give way to a collective concept of peace, security and cooperation to catalyze economic growth with the credo of, ***"security with others and not against others"***. This would need a reorientation of military capabilities to re- deploy revenue saved from reduced defence expenditure for development. The steps that can promote the establishment of a Comprehensive and Cooperative Security for South Asia may be categorized into military and non military confidence building measures. The Gujral Doctrine is relevant in this scenario and requires greater examination. However, the fear of a Pax-Indiana situation should be prevented from taking roots, as it would derail the peace process. As Indira Gandhi had said, "A strong and stable neighbourhood will assist India in the long

run".[195] SAARC and ASEAN can become the pivots of peace and prosperity and freedom from fear and want. If we succeed in coming closer together socially, economically and culturally, it would make political cooperation easier and more profitable for all.

(e) International Laws. The international community has failed to address the basic cause of terrorism. There is an urgent need to formulate a comprehensive convention against all acts of terrorism in the United Nations as proposed by India. This should include laws for '**extradite or prosecute**',[196] laws to initiate action against state sponsored terrorism including the use of force instantly and overwhelmingly in response to any terrorist act.[197] The improved implementation of the SAARC Convention on Terrorism 1987 will also assist in combating LICO.

18. Economic Development. As Robert McNamara said, "*Security is not military hardware and military force alone. Security is development and with out development there can be no security*". The state government will have to ensure employment especially for the educated youth to ensure against their exploitation. Corruption should be weeded out and accountability enforced. The most important facet is to develop the essential services in the state. The state of the es-

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[195] Virender Grover. 50 Years of Indo Pak Relations- 2. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1998, p. 521

[196] RP Dhokalia. Terrorism and International Law. Delhi: Central Electric Press, 1989, p. 27.

[197] V Mani. 'Counter- Strike and the Law'. The Hindu. 12 Oct 2001. p. 12.

sential services is far from what is desirable. A multi pronged approach to improve the social services, educational system, health care and living conditions of the people will have to be adopted. India has very little direct leverage as a partner in the international coalition against terrorism. Its main leverage remains its bilateral relations with major power. India's entire influence in the world will depend on the level and quality of these bilateral relations. And major powers will attach importance to these relations only so long as Indian economy remains dynamic and its society resilient, cohesive and in peace with itself.

19. Military Measures.

(a) Declaratory Policy for Line of Control. The nation should not fall into the trap of Siachenisation of Kargil and other areas on the Line of Control (LC). A declaratory policy that, deliberate infringement of the sanctity of the LC and wanton cross-border terrorism in furtherance of proxy war will be met with prompt retaliation in a manner, place and time of own choosing needs to be urgently applied. The world must know that India's defence of the integrity of its own territory including that within its own side of the LC, is not and cannot be held to be escalatory and that the aggressor and his victim cannot be bracketed and placed on par.

(b) Military Preparedness. To be able to present a posture of dissuasion and to keep the threat of the declaratory policy, and to be able to exe-

cute option of hot pursuit/ deep strike/ limited war, India would have to possess a clear and overwhelming military superiority over its neighbours so that, the latter are under no illusion that, they can in any way benefit from escalating the situation to that of a near war. Hence, India has to maintain a strong positional defence for dissuasion and for counter/ pre-emptive offensive till Pakistan gives up sponsoring LICO.[198] At a later stage Indian Defence Forces should be capable of adopting a '**Win–Hold–Win'** strategy to be able to tackle Pakistan and China in the required sequence in case the two nations adopt concurrent offensive posture.

(c) Crisis Management Centre. A Crisis Management Centre at national and state level to deal with situations as created by the Hijack crisis of Dec 1999, attack on State Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir in Sep 2001 and the attack on the Parliament House on 13 Dec 2001 is the need of the hour. This Centre should be tasked to organise the Governments response to any situation until the security forces are in a position to take over the situation.

(d) Overhaul of Intelligence Set Up. India's intelligence agencies have deliberately been kept out of the scrutiny of the Parliament and are thus

[198] General K Sundarji. 'Future Security Threats to India: Internal and External National Strategy to Meet Them'. In, Indian Foreign Policy: Agenda for Twenty-first Century. By United Services Institute of India. New Delhi: Konark Publishers Private Limited. pp. 176 – 193.

answerable only to the political masters of the day. This has meant changing loyalties with changes in democratic government. This has resulted in loss of professional competence in the entire intelligence apparatus. Moreover, an intelligence system is generally reactive and oriented towards providing day to day information at the tactical level. There is a need to have long term strategic information regarding intentions of belligerent states. In addition there is a requirement of coordination and information sharing amongst the host of agencies operating in the Valley. Up gradation of Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) must be given top priority.

(e) Border Management. Our Northern and Eastern borders are extremely porous and assist the infiltration and exfiltration of migrants and militants with near impunity. Steps have to be taken to ensure the sanctity of borders or the country will continue to fight the militants and provide for illegal non-citizens till posterity. Drawing a lesson from the Israeli technique of security zones inside occupied territory, the creation of security zones within own territory imposed with curfew and de habitation is a necessary evil that will assist in improved border management.[199]

(f) Central Police Organisation's (CPO) Reorganisation. An appraisal of the CPOs role capabilities and organisation to tackle protracted

militancy is called for. A job oriented reorganisation is warranted. This re-organisation should be based on the distribution of responsibility of maintaining internal and external security as given at par 9 above.[200] The ongoing reorganisation of BSF and CISF to take over manning the international boundary and security of airports and personal security (VVIP) respectively, are steps in the right direction. [201]

(g) Political Awareness in the Army. An age-old taboo in the Army culture prohibiting the discussion of politics needs to be viewed dispassionately. A lesser informed officer cadre, in particular the senior officers, will be ill equipped to perform the internal security role and may fall prey to dubious political wrangles. Political awakening among the officers, therefore, is essential to understand the political operations.

(h) Introduction of Indian Frontier Administrative Service (IFAS). The need of the hour is to place dedicated officers in the administration who can continue to function without the threat of militants. Introduction of IFAS would be the step in the right direction. The recommended Ministry of Internal Security/ Motherland Defence should be manned by bureaucrats from this cadre.[202]

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[199] supra., Chapter VI, par. 6 (Table on "Lessons Learnt').
[200] supra., Chapter VII, par. 9 (Figure on "Distribution of National Security Responsibility').
[201] The Hindu. 01 Feb 2002. p. 10.
[202] supra., Chapter VII, par. 8.

(i) Village Defence Committees (VDC). There is a need to have well trained and equipped Village Defence Committees to provide inherent protection to all villagers in affected areas. The Army and the Rashtriya Rifles should train these VDC members and employ them in joint operations and, also to establish intelligence grids in affected areas.

20. India's national security thus requires a concerted national effort led by strategic thinking. The present day churnings taking place provide a historic opportunity to set things right before irreversible damage and unacceptable compromises are made to India's long term security interests. The best way India can tackle LICO is with a combination of deterrent foreign policy, unified command structure, good border management and a special internal security task force, all supported by 'National Will' and 'National Integration'.[203]

[203] supra., Chapter II., par. 2.




Figure 6

	INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: CARDINAL PRINCIPLES OF INDIA'S SUGGESTED FOREIGN POLICY (LAKSHMAN REKHA)[204]
1.	Dynamic pursuit of general nuclear disarmament.

[204] Major General Vinod Saighal. 'Sub continental Realities at the Turn of The Century''. Journal of United Service Institute of India, vol. CXXVIII, No .533. Jul – Sep 1998.

2.	Economic and ecological revival of the subcontinent and prevent the collapse of any of its neighbouring states.
3.	Friendly ties with neighbouring state with the aim to assure them of the absence of any hegemonistic aims on our part.[205]
4.	Continued faith UN and the democratization of the UN.
5.	To view any attempt at destabilisation of the sub condiment as a hostile act and the deterrent threat of reaction commensurate with national capabilities.
6.	Non acceptance of attempts to militarise the oceans surrounding the Indian Peninsula.
7.	Declare the closure of Kashmir issue at status quo. Basis of talks to be restricted to peaceful merger of POK with Jammu and Kashmir.
8.	Lead the world into establishing an International Counter Terrorist Task Force with supporting rules and regulation in place.
9.	Declare a Lakshman Rekha for all its neighbouring states which, if crossed in LICO/ NBC/ economic/ cyber warfare will entail full scale retaliation as deemed fit by India.
10.	Threat of HOT PURSUIT at own pleasure by raising a suitable Special Operation Force of up to a Army Division strength and locating it suitably opposite soft and critical targets of belligerent neighbours.[206]

Table 7

[205] India, Foreign Service Institute. Indian Foreign Policy- Agenda for the 21st Century. 1998.
[206] Karnad, Bharat. op.cit.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT SECRETARIAT
SECRETARY NATIONAL SECURITY
MEDIA MANAGEMENT CELL
STRATEGIC WG
OPERAATIONAL WG
SCIENCE & TECH WG
ECONOMIC WG
PROJECTS
SPACE TECH
TECH FORECAST
INT
GEO STRAT
MARITIME STRAT
FOREIGN STRAT
POL SYS ANALYSIS
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
BUDGET
DEF PLANS
CONVENTIONAL FORCES
NBC
BORDER MANAGEMENT
INTERNAL SECURITY
LIC
LGS MANAGEMENT
ARMS& AMN
Legend
NBC- Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
STRAT- Strategy
LGS- Logistics
DEF- Defence
INT- Intelligence

Figure 7



STATE LEVEL JOINT OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR LIC
MOTHER LAND SECURITY GROUP
STATE SECURITY COUNCIL
INSPECTOR GENERAL RASHTRIYA RIFLES
OFFENSIVE OPS
DEF OPS
WHAM
SECTOR CDRS
IAF UNITS
IG POLICE
IG BSF/ ITBP/AR
DIG INT
PWD/ HEALTH
CIVIL ADM
PRO & PSY OPS
VDC/ HG
LEGAL
RPF
CISF
Legend
•HG- Home Guards
•VDC-Village Defence Committee
•PWD- Public Works Department
•CIVIL ADM- Civil Administrative Offices

Figure 8




Figure 9 [207] [208]

[207] G Bhagat, Director General BSF. As quoted in The Hindu, 25 Nov 2001, pp. 13.
[208] Colonel Ravi Nanda. op.cit., pp. 201-213.



COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE
NATIONAL LEVEL
CABINET COMMITTEE ON SECURITY
NSAB
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
JIC
BORDER MANAGEMENT GROUP
MOTHER LAND SECURITY GROUP
CHIEF OF PARA MILITARY FORCES
LIC AND IS DUTIES
TERRORISM
CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF
CHIEF OF POLICE
BSF
AR
ITBP
ARMED FORCES
RR
RAF
CRPF
NSG
Legend
•IS- Internal Security
•JIC- Joint Intelligence Centre

Figure 10



COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE
STATE LEVEL(J&K)
CABINET COMMITTEE ON SECURITY
STATE SECURITY COUNCIL
BORDER MANAGEMENT GROUP
MOTHER LAND SECURITY GROUP
DG PMF J&K
LIC AND AID TO CIVIL AUTHORITY
TERRORISM
GOC in C NORTHERN COMMAND
IGP
BSF
ITBP
AID TO CA
LIC
POLICE
RAF
CRPF
NSG
GOC XV/ XIV CORPS
IG RR
Legend
•PMF- Para Military Forces
•CA- Civil Administrative Authority

Figure 11




Figure 12[209]

[209] Colonel Ravi Nanda. op.cit., pp. 201-224.



SPECIAL TASK FORCE: RASHTRIYA RIFLES
DIRECTOR GENERAL RASHTRIYA RIFLES
DIRECTORATE OF COMMAND, CONTROL, COORDINATION
REGIONAL FORCES NORTH,SOUTH,WEST, NE
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (REPS OF IB, RAW, DIA, SIB) +
DIRECTORATE OF PSY OPERATIONS AND WHAM+
ACTION GROUP
XX RR CORPS (NORTH)
XX RR CORPS (SOUTH)*
XX RR CORPS (WEST)*
XX RR CORPS (EAST)
FORCES (DELTA, KILO, VICTOR, ROMEO)
FORCES (ALPHA- ASSAM, ARUNACHAL PRADESH MIKE- NAGALAND, MANPPUR, MEGHALYA, TANGO-TRIPURA)
NOTE:-
LOGISTICS EX ARMY
*SOUTH & WEST- SUSPENDED ANIMATION
+AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND

Figure 13



CENTRAL SPECIAL TASK FORCE (STATE LEVEL)
MOTHER LAND SECURITY GROUP
STATE SECURITY COUNCIL
INSPECTOR GENERAL RASHTRIYA RIFLES
OFFENSIVE OPS
DEF OPS
WHAM
CORPS CDR
IAF UNITS
IG POLICE
IG BSF/ ITBP/AR
DIG INT
PWD/ HEALTH
CIVIL ADM
PRO & PSY OPS
VDC/ HG
LEGAL
FORCE CDR
SECTOR CDR
RPF
CISF
Legend
•HG- Home Guards
•VDC-Village Defence Committee
•PWD- Public Works Department
•CIVIL ADM- Civil Administrative Offices

Figure 14

DRAWBACKS OF EXISTING LAWS (TADA, CRIMINAL CODE)

Ser No	Drawbacks
1.	Separate definition of terrorist act, special provisions relating to financing of terrorism, use of explosives in public places causing death or injury to innocent persons and weapons of mass destruction and operations of terrorist organizations are non existent in the laws in force.
2.	Existing laws do provide for the offences of destruction of property, disruption of public supplies and services, unlawful detention of a person, etc. but they do not provide for special situations when these offences are committed with the means of explosives and dangerous weapons to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to create terror and strike fear in public mind.
3.	Punishments were not harsh enough to deter a prospective anti national element.
4.	The emerging threats arising out of use of weapons of mass destruction and substances of chemical and biological war-fare by terrorist groups are non existent in the laws in force by TADA.
5.	Slow process of conviction.
6.	Lack of/ low numbers of conviction due to misuse of loopholes in the laws and archaic procedures.

Table 8

THE GUJRAL DOCTRINE

1.	India will not insist in reciprocity on any concession that it might make with its smaller neighbours (Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka).
2.	India will not allow its territory to be used against the interest of other nations.
3.	Will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries in the area and would expect other nations to do the same.
4.	India will respect the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of other states of the region.
5.	India is determined to settle all disputes through bilateral negotiations.

Table 9

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

General

1. This dissertation has endeavoured to analyse the relevance of LICO for India in the future and, after the study it emerges that, in spite of the present international urge to combat terrorism and insurgency, India will continue to be plagued with LICO as an internal security problem borne out of Pan-Islamism in the sub continent. Looking into the future, the Third World will continue to be the source of most of the world's armed conflicts and the overwhelming majority of those wars are likely to be LICOs. The primary reason for proliferation of LICO in South Asia is the 'Strategic Islamic Encirclement' of India by Pakistan and the readily available reasons for instigation of separatists' movements in India due to its polity.[210] Regional belligerent states will find such conflicts acceptable as it saves them the inconvenience of internationalising their disputes and also the cost of conventional wars.[211] For the secessionists (that is the guerrillas and the terrorists) such conflicts are the only means by which they can effectively oppose a system. In short, the LICO phenomenon is now, more than ever before, here to stay.[212]

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[210] supra., Chapter V, pars. 1-5.
[211] Kshitij Prabha. loc.cit., p. 46.
[212] infra., Appendix B (Population Response Figures 1 and 2).

2. After analysing the relevance of LICOs in India's future, the dissertation has attempted to provide a more comprehensive and adequate solution to the problem. The findings of the study can be summed up by the following statement:-

India needs a "Rebellious Revolution" in strategic thinking to develop a deterrent foreign and defence policy. On the ground, a Unified Command over Special Task Forces for Internal Security and Border Management are essential for synergised national efforts".

3. The situation today is neither militancy nor insurgency. It is an all out war imposed by Pakistan against India by using Islamic fundamentalist mercenaries with the rallying cry of Islam in danger. It is a pity that Indian secularists and the liberal fraternity have closed their eyes to this aspect. The Islamic fundamentalist mercenaries need to be targeted and liquidated ruthlessly.[213] It is pitiable that, in spite of national consensus on the issue and an unanimous resolution in our Parliament, the government of India is following a weak- kneed policy. No country's foreign policy can exist merely on abstract concepts and has to be translated into action to meet its needs and requirements on the basis of ground realities.

4. The influx of population apart, unchecked cross-border movements give rise to many other ills—smuggling, gun running, drug trafficking, movement of insurgents, and the like. In essence, the remedy lies in the effective management

of our borders.[214] The situation along each of these borders differs vastly on many counts. So do our options and compulsions of dealing with different countries in the neighbourhood. Be that as it may, the importance of all-encompassing and well-coordinated efforts towards better border management cannot be overemphasised. Greater security cannot be achieved by military power alone, but along with doing away with the causes.

5. Ours is one of the oldest civilisations. Yet, as a nation state, India is only 50 years old. We are still in the early stages of global learning and formulation of national policies to include military strategies. The necessity of a modern army will grow, as an economically and technologically stronger India gets ready to play its part in the coming 'Age of Asia'. In the game of power play, nations know how to send and read signals. India has very little direct leverage as a partner in the international coalition against terrorism. Its main leverage remains in its bilateral relations with major powers. India's entire influence in the world will depend on the level and quality of these bilateral relations. And major powers will attach importance to these relations only so long as Indian economy remains dynamic and its society resilient, cohesive and in peace with itself. A credible defence strategy within the framework of a coherent and realistic national security policy is a necessity as respect and recognition in the international arena is contingent on power derived from military strength, and the understanding that such power will

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[213] supra., Chapter VII, par. 12.
[214] Gupta. op. cit., pp. 160-164.

be used to safeguard national interests. In that context, India's readiness, and its army's preparedness to respond decisively, will generate the right impulses for others to take a note of. The army, therefore, expects the government of the day to lay down policy parameters, as also to create dynamic structures and institutions to sustain all its endeavours.

6. India's primary strategic objective, of necessity, must be to continuously seek durable peace and security so that socio-economic growth and development can be pursued without adverse impulses. The prevention of war and removal of the threat of war become important constituents in such a strategic framework. This would necessitate measures that not only reduce the risk of war and conflict, but in reality include even attempts to understand and reduce the threat perceptions of potential adversaries. In essence, there is a fundamental need to move from the classical paradigm of competitive security towards a co-operative model of inter-state security. Necessary precautions would, obviously, have to remain in place to cater for a potential adversary pursuing its own objectives and strategies. Thus, deterrence would have to be a central factor in the doctrine, while détente (at the ideal level) and strategic stability (as the optimum framework) are pursued vigorously in a sustained way. The strategic doctrine should be able to synthesise these two divergent, and even conflicting, demands on national strategy formulation.

7. In Pakistan's stability lies India's security. This stability can be enforced by destroying Pakistan or by engaging Pakistan. A middle path using the carrot and stick method i.e., a dissuasive threat and economic and political engagement seems more likely to succeed. In the long term, this could lead to the Pakistani state and society moving away from its anti-India stand to become a country that has come to terms with it and is able to construct itself in modern terms. It is in this context that, the ability of our deterrent though, reactive nuclear doctrine and the Gujral doctrine to achieve peace and stability, need to be studied in greater depth. President Pervez Musharraf seems to be leading Pakistan in the correct direction after 12 Jan 2002.[215] Continued cajoling will however be required to be done by India using a deterrent foreign and defence policy. But, in the short term, India will have to live with persistent Pakistani hostility even while it may attempt, in vain in a cycle of policies, ranging from military action to constructive engagement. Hence, is the need for a pragmatic national effort to combat LICO; an effort that should result in India emerging as a 'Great Power' in a multi polar world as tabulated alongside. (Table 10)

[215] Hasan Ziadi. 'Between a Rock and a Hard Place'. India Today. 14 Jan 2002. pp. 33 -36.

INDIA: A GLOBAL POWER

Ser No	Future Aspirations for India
1.	India should join the ranks of great powers in international politics.

	India should acquire robust conventional capabilities for rapid and decisive victory against Pakistan.
2.	India must develop military capabilities to neutralise Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
3.	India is has to be continually governed by a confident leader-ship.
4.	India has to become capable of pre-empting the formation of opposing international political-diplomatic conditions.
5.	Pakistan sponsored LICO has to be made increasingly unsuc-cessful, and finally has to be completely routed.

Table 10[216]

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[216] Ashley J Tellis. op.cit.

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Appendix A

(Refers to par 10 of Chapter II)

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS IN INDIA; REASONS, RELEVANCE AND MEASURES

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESPONSE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTIONS ON MANAGEMENT OF LICO

"The Guerrilla wins if he does not lose, the conventional Army looses if it does not win"

1. This questionnaire is being circulated to all army officers. It is essential for the completion of my dissertation with the statement of problem, "It is proposed to identify the reasons for growth of insurgency and LICO in India with specific focus on LICO as a form of warfare in future".

2. You are requested to put down your frank views on the subject and return his questionnaire to locker No 269 by 2001Oct 2001.

Maj SP Vishwasrao, SM

Proliferation of LICO

1. Grade the following reasons (besides those given in the General Staff Publication on Special Operations Part B) for LICO in our country in the priority as you perceive it to be:-

Priority

(a) Under estimating of own national strength and the consequences of improved relations with China.

(b) Overestimation of Pakistan leading to wrong appreciation of her national motives and fears and the failure to identity and exploit the cleavages in Pakistani society.

(c) Wrong belief that insurgency can be eliminated by just a few military blows.

(d) Lack of political consensus.

(e) Faulty long term planning in all Indian Services including military and civil administration.

(f) Lack of confidence in the futility of Pakistan sponsored insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and NE as was the case in Punjab.

2. Prioritize the reasons for proliferation of LICO in South Asia and India in particular :-

Priority

(a) Religious conflict.

(b) Secessionist challenges of ethnic minority movements.

(c) Strategic nuclear balance which makes High and Mid Intensity Conflicts untenable.

(d) Positive influences of new technologies on conduct of insurgent and terrorist activities.

(e) Weak and anarchical nature of international state system precluding any concerted and strong international response.

Indian Experience in LICO

3. The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka was totally uncalled for and OP PAWAN was a strategic/ strategic and tactical failure. (choose any one failure)

4. Militarily the Army has acquitted itself with mature competence in OPERATION RAKSHAK II (Jammu and Kashmir).
Yes / No

5. What obstacles did you face / what in your opinion are the obstacles the Army and the PMFs face while comb LICO in Jammu and Kashmir and the NE?
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

6. In my opinion the employment of the army has resulted in (tick any one):-
(a) The army has become tired and corrupt due to over employment and exposure to civilians.

(b) The army is picking up useful op experience for ops in United Nations Peace Keeping operations and force projection in our area of influence when required.

7. I will grade the contributions of various strata of society towards comb LICO as follows (tick your choice) :-

(a) Security Forces other than CPO - Best/ Satisfactory/ Poor.
(b) State Central Police Organizations- Best/ Satisfactory/ Poor.
(c) Bureaucracy - Best/ Satisfactory/ Poor.
(d) Politicians - Best/ Satisfactory/ Poor.
(e) Media - Best/ Satisfactory/ Poor.
(f) Other civilians by their morale support - Best/ Satisfactory/ Poor.

Conflict Management

8. Does training in the army in general meet the operational requirements satisfactorily for successful conduct of LICO? Yes/No

9. In my opinion, ***RashtriyaRifleisation*** of the Army in Jammu and Kashmir has been a step in the correct/ wrong direction and the performance of the RR concept and the attached benefits to the Army and the infantry in particular is

justification for the raising/ not raising of a separate Counter Terrorism Force under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

10. India's strategic defence against LICO should conform to the following broad priorities: - (give your own priorities and suggest any additional priorities)

Priorities

(a) Modernization of our concepts, techniques and equipment.

(b) Adopt a defence strategy that includes the creation of threat of HOT PURSUIT and unlimited response to any threat to national integrity.

(c) Reducing the aggressiveness of military posture to send positive signals to adversaries.

11. The major shortcomings in the present conduct of LICO are as follows:-

(a) Governmental / Strategic Level.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

(b) Military /Tactical Level.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

12. India should join an international effort against terrorism led by the United States or any other entity as long as it serves its purpose.
Yes / No

13. In my opinion, LICO in India will end only when the following condition are met/ made to come true:-

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

OR

In my opinion, LICO in India will never end completely.

Service Particulars of Respondents


- Arm -
- Service in LICO in Yrs -

Appendix B

(Refers to par 11of Chapter II)


LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS IN INDIA; REASONS, RELEVANCE AND MEASURES

ANALYSIS OF POPULATION RESPONSES




Population Response Figure 1

Appendix B (continued)




Population Response Figure 2

Appendix B (continued)



Population Response Figure 3




Population Response Figure 4


Appendix B (continued)

Q 5

The Emp of the Armed Forces in LIC for Over Four Decades has Resulted in:-




Population Response Figure 5




Population Response Figure 6

Appendix B (continued)




Population Response Figure 7

Appendix B (continued)




Population Response Figure 8

Appendix B (continued)




Population Response Figure 9



Population Response Figure 10

Q 10

Should India join in an International Effort Against Terrorism led by the US as Long as it Serves its Purpose



Yes **No**


Population Response Figure 11

(Refers to par 10 Chapter II)

SOURCES OF INFORAMATION

PHYSICAL FORM

INFORMATION SOURCES



Appendix C (continued)

CONTENT OF SOURCE


INFORMATION SOURCES

Primary Sources	Secondary Sources	Tertiary Sources
Research Reports (IDR, IDSA, SATP, USI)	*Bibliographies*	*Year Book 2001*
Official Websites	*DSSC Library*	*Dictionaries*
Indian Army Official Publications		*Encyclopaedia*
Personal Experience In LICO operations		
Questionnaire at Appendix A		


Appendix D


(Refers to par 12 of Chapter II)

FLOWCHART OF STAGES IN RESEARCH PROCESS



Appendix D (continued)


Oct 01
Data Collection, Distribution of Questionnaire
Oct-
Nov 01
Analyzing Data, Construct Arguments, Create Tables/ Charts
Inferential Analysis
06 Nov 01
Preparation of Draft & Bibliography
180 pp
First Draft


Oct 01
Check & Redraft
28 Oct 01
Second Preview
800 words
Nov 01-
04 Feb 02
Prepare Final Paper & Bibliography

Appendix E

(Refer to par 4 of Chapter IV)

LIST OF LICOs WORLD WIDE[217]

Africa

NATION	LICO TYPE	PRESENT POSITION OF WAR
ALGERIA	civil war	local attacks continuing
ANGOLA	civil war	continuing
BURUNDI	ethnic violence	continuing conflict despite peace talks
CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE	civil war	implementing recent peace accord
CONGO	multi-sided war	continuing conflict despite peace deal
ERITREA	interstate war	peace agreement recently signed
ETHIOPIA	interstate war	peace agreement recently signed
RWANDA	ethnic violence	recovery in progress
SIERRA LEONE	civil war	continuing conflict despite peace deal
SOMALIA	factional fighting	new government working to impose order
SUDAN	civil war	continuing conflict

Appendix E (continued)

Asia

AFGHANISTAN	civil war	continuing
BURMA	resistance to armed repression	continuing

[217] Peace Pledge Union, London. < peacenow@http//..www.gn.apc.org>

CHECHNYA	independence struggle	continuing
INDIA: BIHAR	inter-caste conflict	continuing
INDIA KASHMIR	inter-state territorial dispute	continuing
INDONESIA: ACEH	independence struggle	continuing tension despite truce
INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR	illegal armed occupation	transition after intervention
INDONESIA: MOLUCCAS (MALUKU)	sectarian/separatist violence	continuing outbreaks of fighting
PAKISTAN	sectarian strife	continuing outbreaks of fighting
PHILIPPINES: MINDANAO	separatist violence	continuing
SRI LANKA	civil war	continuing

Appendix E (continued)

Latin America

COLOMBIA	civil war	stalled peace talks
GUATEMALA	civil war	stalled peace talks
MEXICO	civil war	stalled peace talks
PERU	civil war	stalled peace talks

Middle East

IRAQ: KURDS	ethnic conflict	continuing
IRAQ: SHI'A MUSLIMS	ethnic conflict	continuing
ISRAEL/ PALESTINE	Jewish/Arab conflict	peace processes stalled by re-surgent violence

Europe

RUSSIA - Chechnya	independence struggle	continuing
TURKEY	ethnic oppression	partial unilateral ceasefire
KOSOVO	ethnic conflict	implementation of peace agreement problematic
ALBANIA	ethnic conflict	implementation of peace agreement problematic
SERBIA	ethnic conflict	implementation of peace agreement problematic

Appendix F

(Refer to par 12 of Chapter V)

LIST OF TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS OPERATING IN INDIA

State	Terror Group
Assam	1. United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) 2. National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) 3. United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) 4. Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) 5. Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) 6. Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) 7. Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) 8. Rabha National Security Force (RNSF) 9. Koch-Rajbongshi Liberation Organisation (KRLO) 10. Karbi People's Front (KPF) 11. Tiwa National Revolutionary Force (TNRF)

	12. Bircha Commando Force (BCF) 13. Bengali Tiger Force (BTF) 14. Adivasi Security Force (ASF) 15. All Assam Adivasi Suraksha Samiti (AAASS) 16. Gorkha Tiger Force (GTF) 17. Barak Valley Youth Liberation Front (BVYLF) 18. Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) 19. Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) 20. Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA) 21. United Liberation Militia of Assam (ULMA) 22. Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA) 23. Muslim Volunteer Force (MVF) 24. Muslim Liberation Army (MLA) 25. Muslim Security Force (MSF) 26. Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) 27. Islamic United Reformation Protest of India (IURPI) 28. United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UM-LFA) 29. Revolutionary Muslim Commandos (RMC) 30. Muslim Tiger Force (MTF) 31. People's United Liberation Front (PULF) 32. Adam Sena (AS) 33. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen 34. Harkat-ul-Jehad
Jammu and Kash-mir	35. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) 36. Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA, presently known as Harkat-ul Mujahideen) 37. Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) 38. Jaish-e-Mohammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem (JeM) 39. Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HuM, previously known as Harkat-ul-Ansar) 40. Al Badr 41. Jamait-ul-Mujahideen (JuM) 42. Lashkar-e-Jabbar (LeJ) 43. Al Barq 44. Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen 45. Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami 46. Al Jehad

	47. Jammu & Kashir National Liberation Army 48. People's League 49. Muslim Janbaz Force 50. Kashmir Jehad Force 51. Al Jehad Force (combines Muslim Janbaz Force and Kashmir Jehad Force) 52. Al Umar Mujahideen 53. Mahaz-e-Azadi 54. Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba 55. Jammu & Kashmir Students Liberation Front 56. Ikhwan-ul-Mujahideen 57. Islamic Students League 58. Tehrik-e-Hurriat-e-Kashmir 59. Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqar Jafaria 60. Al Mustafa Liberation Fighters 61. Tehrik-e-Jehad-e-Islami 62. Muslim Mujahideen 63. Al Mujahid Force 64. Tehrik-e-Jehad 65. Islami Inquilabi Mahaz
Manipur	66. United National Liberation Front (UNLF) 67. People's Liberation Army (PLA) 68. People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) 69. The above mentioned three groups now operate from a unified platform, the Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF) 70. Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) 71. Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup (KYKL) 72. Manipur Liberation Tiger Army (MLTA) 73. Iripak Kanba Lup (IKL) 74. People's Republican Army (PRA) 75. Kangleipak Kanba Kanglup (KKK) 76. Kangleipak Liberation Organisation (KLO) 77. Revolutionary Joint Committee (RJC) 78. National Socialist Council of Nagaland -- Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) 79. People's United Liberation Front (PULF) 80. North East Minority Front (NEMF) 81. Islamic National Front (INF) 82. Islamic Revolutionary Front (IRF) 83. United Islamic Liberation Army (UILA) 84. United Islamic Revolutionary Army (UIRA)

	85. Kuki National Front (KNF) 86. Kuki National Army (KNA) 87. Kuki Independent Army (KIA) 88. Kuki Defence Force (KDF) 89. Kuki International Force (KIF) 90. Kuki National Volunteers (KNV) 91. Kuki Liberation Front (KLF) 92. Kuki Security Force (KSF) 93. Kuki Revolutionary Front (KRF) 94. United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) 95. Hmar People's Convention (HPC) 96. Hmar Revolutionary Front (HRF) 97. Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) 98. Zomi Revolutionary Volunteers (ZRV) 99. Indigenous People's Revolutionary Alliance(IRPA) 100. Kom Rem People's Convention (KRPC) 101. Chin Kuki Revolutionary Front (CKRF)
Meghalaya	102. Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) 103. Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) 104. People's Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLF)
Nagaland	105. National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) – NSCN(IM) 106. National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) – NSCN (K) 107. Naga National Council (Adino) – NNC 108. (Adino)
Tripura	109. National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) 110. All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) 111. Tripura Liberation Organisation Front (TLOF) 112. United Bengali Liberation Front (UBLF) 113. Tripura Tribal Volunteer Force (TTVF) 114. Tripura Armed Tribal Commando Force (TATCF) 115. Tripura Tribal Democratic Force (TTDF) 116. Tripura Tribal Youth Force (TTYF) 117. Tripura Liberation Force (TLF) 118. Tripura Defence Force (TDF)

	119. All Tripura Volunteer Force (ATVF) 120. Tribal Commando Force (TCF) 121. Tripura Tribal Youth Force (TTYF) 122. All Tripura Bharat Suraksha Force (ATBSF) 123. Tripura Tribal Action Committee Force (TTACF) 124. Socialist Democratic Front of Tripura (SDFT) 125. All Tripura National Force (ATNF) 126. Tripura Tribal Sengkrak Force (TTSF) 127. Tiger Commando Force (TCF) 128. Tripura Mukti Police (TMP) 129. Tripura Rajya Raksha Bahini (TRRB) 130. Tripura State Volunteers (TSV) 131. Tripura National Democratic Tribal Force (TNDTF) 132. National Militia of Tripura (NMT) 133. All Tripura Bengali Regiment (ATBR) 134. Bangla Mukti Sena (BMS) 135. All Tripura Liberation Organisation (ATLO) 136. Tripura National Army (TNA) 137. Tripura State Volunteers (TSV) 138. Barak National
Left Wing Extremists	139. People's Guerrilla Arm 140. Peoples War Group 141. Maoist Communist Centre
Others	142. Deendar Anjuman 143. Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)