INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY TO COUNTER FOREIGN SPONSORED POLITICAL DEFIANCE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN INDIA

A thesis submitted to the National Defence College, New Delhi.

BY

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
SIXTIETH NDC COURSE- 2020

Senior Directing Staff in charge Major General U Suresh Kumar, YSM, SM

INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY TO COUNTER FOREIGN SPONSORED POLITICAL DEFIANCE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN INDIA

Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir-
From Secessionism, Radicalism & Terrorism to National Integration







BY

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SELF DECLARATION CERTIFICATE

I declare that the dissertation "INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY TO COUNTER FOREIGN SPONSORED POLITICAL DEFIANCE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN INDIA", is submitted by me for the award of NDC parchment in original and that this work or a part thereof has not been submitted for the award of any Degree or Diploma of either this or any other University.

NDC, New Delhi — (Sanjay P Vishwasrao)
Date: August 2020 — Brigadier

CERTIFICATE

1. This is to certify that the dissertation "INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY TO COUNTER FOREIGN SPONSORED POLITICAL DEFIANCE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN INDIA", submitted for the award of NDC parchment is part of the original research work carried out by Brigadier Sanjay P Vishwasrao under my supervision.
2. To the best part of my knowledge, no part of this dissertation has been submitted for any other Degree or Diploma.

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Date: August 2020 — Major General

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

India led the world in observing the 150th birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi in 2019-2020. It is no coincidence that this thesis draws heavily on his ideals of *Swadeshi, Swaraj, Satyagraha,* and *Ahimsa*. It is ironic that today, this is being done to (again) win a *Swadeshi Swaraj* for India from the misuse of Gene Sharp's twist to his noble *Swaraj* by *Satyagraha* and *Ahimsa* i.e., Sharp's 'strategic nonviolent political defiance'.

This thesis is about finding a way for India to defeat externally sponsored and internally supported 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' based secessionism, radicalism and terrorism in the Union Territory (UT) of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).

This thesis is hence dedicated to Mahatma Gandhi.

I am grateful to the people of J&K, and of the States of Assam and Manipur for helping me understand and practise these Gandhian ideals and idea. I am also grateful to my seniors and colleagues whose efforts and sacrifices to undo 'disturbed' in these areas enriched my experience.

Major General U Suresh Kumar has been most enthusiastic about this thesis. His support and timely incisive inputs on various academic issues was always encouraging. Thanks are also due for his fresh theoretical insights into the historic, leadership and strategic issues at hand.

I am grateful to all my colleagues in NDC-60 for sharing their personal experiences which have added value to this thesis.

My deepest gratitude goes to my wife Sanjeevani for her proof-reading of the draft, and much more during the COVID-19 Pandemic.

DEDICATION

"All men dream: but not equally.
Those who dream by night in the dusty recess of their minds
wake in the day to find it was vanity,
but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men,
for they may act on the dream with open eyes, to make it possible."

-TE Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom

Dedicated to Mahatma Gandhi and
those who dream by day of an
Indian victory over separatism, radicalism and terrorism
in J&K.

ABSTRACT

1. 21st century is witnessing preference for hybrid/political/societal wars vis-à-vis conventional wars. After wars/guns failed Pakistan in J&K, it shifted from 'terror' to 'strategic nonviolent political defiance'. This is based on Gandhiji's *Swaraj* by *Satyagraha* and *Ahimsa* and Gene Sharp's 'From Dictatorship to Democracy' (1993). Short-sightedly labelling it as 'agitational terrorism' has prevented India from winning peace over it.

2. There is no literature on defeating 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' or on engineering a nonviolent movement for peace within a democracy. Hence, this thesis and its qualitative multi-tool research methodology.

3. **Key Findings**.

(a) Pakistan's most likely option in J&K against India in 2020-24 is 'strategic nonviolent political defiance', a sinister political/societal war.

(b) This strategy has failed Pakistan till date due to its falsehoods and violence, and due to the loyalty of J&K Police and segments of citizens. The continued legal empowerment of Indian security forces is a boon.

4. **Key Recommendations**.

(a) Centre of gravity of the Pakistan-led anti-India Nexus in J&K is the 'idea of *Azadi'* and that of Pakistan is the 'Two-Nation Theory'.

(b) Pakistan's J&K strategy has to be defeated by a *Satyagrahic,* smarter and active nonviolent movement to destroy secessionism, radicalism and terrorism. This can be replicated in other disturbed areas.

(c) In this war of ideas fought in peoples' minds, *Jus ad Bellum*, *Jus in Bello, Jus post Bellum* and strategic communication gain pre-eminence.

(d) India-Pakistan ceasefire needs to be expanded to 'cease societal war'.

5. The key contribution of this thesis is proving India can engineer a Tricolour Revolution in J&K to defeat secessionism, radicalism and terrorism.

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GLOSSARY

Serial	Phrase	Meaning
1.	Political Warfare[1]	Employment of all means, overt and covert, short of war to achieve national objectives. It is conducted in the 'grey zone' of conflict, not crossing the threshold of war.
2.	Hybrid Warfare[2]	Use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign, designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages using diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and overt military means and intelligence actions; and economic pressure.
3.	Societal Warfare[3]	Purposeful, systematic generation and dissemination of information to produce harmful social, political, and economic outcomes in a target country by affecting beliefs, attitudes and behaviour.
4.	Defiance, as by Gene Sharp[4]	Deliberate challenge to authority by disobedience, allowing no room for submission.

[1] Robinson, Linda, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, and Katya Migacheva, Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1772.html

[2] "Complex Crises Call for Adaptable and Durable Capabilites," *The Military Balance 114:1 (2015), 5.*

[3] Mazarr, Michael J., Ryan Michael Bauer, Abigail Casey, Sarah Heintz, and Luke J. Matthews, The Emerging Risk of Virtual Societal Warfare: Social Manipulation in a Changing Information Environment. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2714.html.

[4] All definitions are from Gene Sharp's 'From Dictatorship to Democracy'.

Serial	Phrase	Meaning
5.	Political Defiance, as by Gene Sharp	Is nonviolent struggle (protests, noncooperation, and intervention) applied defiantly and actively for a political purpose. It does not mean pacifism and moral or religious nonviolence. It is used to describe action by people to regain governmental institutions from a dictator's control by relentlessly attacking his sources of power and deliberately using strategic planning and operations to do so.
6.	Nonviolent Resistance	Same as political defiance.
7.	Grand Strategy, as by Gene Sharp	Grand strategy is the conception that serves to coordinate and direct the use of all appropriate and available resources (economic, human, moral, political, organisational, etc) of a group seeking to attain its objectives in a conflict.
8.	Strategy, as by Gene Sharp	Is conception of how best to achieve particular objectives in a conflict, operating within the scope of the grand strategy. It is concerned with whether, when, and how to fight, as well as how to achieve maximum effectiveness for certain ends. Strategy may also include efforts to develop a situation that is so advantageous that opponents are able to foresee that open conflict is likely to bring their certain defeat, and therefore capitulate without an open struggle. Or, if not, the improved situation will make success of the challengers certain. Strategy also involves how to act to make good use of successes.

Serial	Phrase	Meaning
9.	Tactics, as by Gene Sharp	Tactics relates to the skilful use of one's forces to the best advantage in a limited situation. A tactic is a limited action, employed to achieve a restricted objective. The choice of tactics is governed by the conception of how best in a restricted phase of a conflict to utilise the available means of fighting to implement the strategy. To be most effective, tactics and methods must be chosen and applied with constant attention to the achievement of strategic objectives. Tactical gains that do not reinforce the attainment of strategic objectives, may in the end, turn out to be wasted energy.
10.	Offensive Tactical Engagements as by Gene Sharp	Offensive tactical engagements are selected to support attainment of strategic objectives. Tactical engagements are the tools of the strategist in creating conditions favourable for delivering decisive attacks against an opponent.
11.	Nonviolent Campaign[5]	The power of a nonviolent campaign comes in creatively combining tactics, strategic thinking and participants' commitment. Influencing change on a specific issue requires a campaign or several campaigns. A campaign is a connected series of activities and actions carried out over a period of time to achieve specific, stated goals.

[5] Joanne Sheehan and Andreas Speck. 'Planning Nonviolent Campaigns', Handbook for Nonviolent Campaigns. War Resisters'' International. Wales, UK. 2014. p.46.

Serial	Phrase	Meaning
12.	Social Movement[6]	Are a type of group action- a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people make collective claims on others. They aim to promote or resist change. The levels of changes sought are global/national alteration of social structures to attitudinal, spiritual and lifestyle changes. Social movements may generate counter-movements to prevent reform.
13.	Strategic Communication, as per US Department of Defence	Focused efforts to understand and engage audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favourable for the advancement of interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programmes, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronised with the actions of all instruments of national power. Aim is to convince others to think and act in ways compatible with own objectives.
14.	Information Warfare[7]	Collection, transportation, protection, denial, disturbance and degradation of information, by which one maintains an advantage over one's adversaries.
15.	Strategic Corporal[8]	Leadership in complex, rapidly evolving mission environments devolves lower down the chain of command to better exploit time-critical information in the decision making process.

[6] RD Bhagat. Sociology of Social Movements. Centrum Press, New Delhi. 2013. pp.8-9 and 72-73.
[7] Megan Burns, (1999). "Information Warfare: What and How?" (Carnegie Mellon University). Available at https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~burnsm/InfoWarfare.html [accessed 03 March 2020].
[8] Major Linda Liddy, 'The Strategic Corporal', Australian Army War Journal. Vol II, No 2. Available at https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/liddy.pdf

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Serial	Abbreviation	Full Word/ Meaning
1.	AF(J&K)SPA-1990	Armed Forces (J&K) Special Powers Act-1990
2.	ANE	Anti-national element
3.	APHC	All Party Hurriyat Conference
4.	Cd'A	Charge d'Affaires
5.	CENJOWS	Centre for Joint Warfare Studies
6.	CI	Counter infiltration
7.	CIF	Counter Insurgency Force
8.	CoG	Centre of gravity
9.	CR	Critical requirement
10.	CT	Counter terrorism/ terrorist
11.	CV	Critical vulnerability
12.	D&MA	Defence & Military Advisor
13.	FATF	Financial Action Task Force
14.	GOC	General Officer Commanding
15.	HC	High Commissioner
16.	HCI	High Commission of India
17.	HRV	Human Rights Violation
18.	IDSA	Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies & Analyses
19.	IG AR	Inspector General Assam Rifles
20.	IMF	International Monetary Fund
21.	IS	Internal Security
22.	ISI	Inter Services Intelligence

Serial	Abbreviation	Full Word/ Meaning
23.	ISPR	Inter Services Public Relations
24.	IW	Information Warfare
25.	LC/ LAC	Line of Control/ Line of Actual Control
26.	LWE	Left Wing Extremism
27.	MLK	Martin Luther King Jr.
28.	NVC	Nonviolent campaign
29.	OGW	Over ground worker
30.	OODA	Observe-Orient-Decide-Act
31.	ORF	Observer Research Foundation
32.	Pak	Pakistan
33.	PLA	Peoples Liberation Army
34.	PR	Population Response (to questionnaire)
35.	PSA	Public Safety Act
36.	RR	Rashtriya Rifles
37.	SWOT	Strength-Weakness-Opportunity-Threat
38.	TAAW	Target audience analysis work (sheet)
39.	UAPA	Unlawful Activities Prevention Act
40.	USA	United States of America
41.	USI	United Services Institute of India
42.	UT	Union Territory
43.	J&K	Jammu & Kashmir
44.	J-e-I	Jamaat-e-Islami
45.	JRL	Joint Resistance Leadership
46.	VC	Violent campaign
47.	WHAM	Winning Hearts & Minds

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INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY TO COUNTER FOREIGN SPONSORED POLITICAL DEFIANCE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN INDIA

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO WAR BY NONVIOLENCE

"Non-violence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind.
It is mightier than the mightiest weapon of destruction devised by ... man."
-Mahatma Gandhi

Background

1. **New Warfare**. 21st century has seen expanding desire of nations to avoid conventional wars and use political/hybrid/societal warfare.[9] Inter-state conflicts are now limited to bilaterals where deterrence through parity in the capacity to wage wars is not established e.g., United States of America (USA) and Iran.

2. ***Swaraj* by *Satyagraha* and *Ahimsa* to Colour Revolutions**. Mahatma Gandhi invented *Swaraj* (self-rule) by *Satyagraha* (truth-force) and *Ahimsa* (nonviolence). This idea of India's War of Independence was copied by Martin Luther King Jr. (segregation) in the USA and by Nelson Mandela (apartheid) in South Africa. Gene Sharp (Albert Einstein Institute, USA) studied these leaders/movements in his 'From Dictatorship to Democracy'[10] (1993) and renamed their idea as 'strategic nonviolent political defiance'.[11] Sharp's Gandhian idea has been used all over the world as part of inter-state political/hybrid/societal warfare to engineer following revolutions since 2000:-

Serial	Country	Name of Revolution	Year	Serial	Country	Name of Revolution	Year
1.	Yugoslavia	Bulldozer	2000	4.	Kyrgyzstan	Tulip	2005
2.	Georgia	Rose	2003	5.		Melon	2010
3.	Ukraine	Orange	2004	6.	Lebanon	Cedar	2005

[9] *See supra Glossary of 'Political Warfare', 'Hybrid Warfare' and 'Societal Warfare', xi.*
[10] Pdf available at https://www.aeinstein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FDTD.pdf
[11] *See supra Glossary of 'Defiance' and 'Political Defiance', xi-xii'.*

Serial	Country	Name of Revolution	Year	Serial	Country	Name of Revolution	Year
7.	Iraq	Purple	2005	13.	Egypt	Lotus	2011
8.	Kuwait	Blue	2005	14.	Bahrain	Pearl	2011
9.	Nepal	-	2006	15.	Yemen	Coffee	2011
10.	Myanmar	Saffron	2007	16.	China	Jasmine	2011
11.	Iran	Green	2009	17.	Russia	Snow	2011
12.	Tunisia	Jasmine	2010	18.	Armenia	Velvet	2018

Table 1: List of 18 Colour Revolutions 2000 to 2018

3. **Pakistan's Paradigms in J&K and Punjab**. After wars/guns failed Pakistan in the erstwhile state of J&K, it introduced the paradigm of 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' (a.k.a. *'Intifada'*) in 2008. It was an attempt to out-manoeuvre world's intolerance for terrorism (post 9/11), successes of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) (1991-2006) and the Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System (AIOS) (2004), and the resultant normalcy (Assembly elections 2002 and Parliamentary elections 2004). Similarly, it has introduced paradigms of drugs epidemic, Khalistan Referendum and Kartarpur Corridor in Punjab.

4. **Pakistan's Alternate Way of War**. Pakistan's attempts to destroy India's capacity/willingness to defend itself is an alternative way of war-political/hybrid/societal. Exploiting the grey zone under the threshold of war suits its spectrum of aims: from 'tie down India' to 'victory of the 'Two-Nation Theory''. In 2020, it used the Citizenship Amendment Act, COVID-19 Pandemic, India-China Stand-Off and #BlackLivesMatter to further its aims.

5. **India's Strategic Error in J&K**. India simplistically labelled Pakistan sponsored Kashmiri 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' as 'agitational terrorism'/'agitational dynamics'. This prevented connecting hybrid dots of:-

(a) Demand for *'Azadi'*.

(b) Rise of *Jamaat-e-Islami* Kashmir (J-e-I).

(c) *Wahhabi* Islam's replacement of *Sufism* and *Kashmiriat*.[12]

(d) Exodus of Hindus.

(e) Pakistan's deceitful 'indigenisation' of terror.

(f) Protest calendar of All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC).

(g) Use of social media.

(h) Protest/*bandh* calls and stone pelting (presence/absence).

(i) Attacks on J&K Police and soldiers from J&K.

(j) Allegations of 'mass graves' and demand for revocation of Armed Forces (J&K) Special Powers Act-1990 {AF(J&K)SPA-1990}.

(k) Propaganda in Pakistan, United Nations, European Union, etc.

Defining the Problem and Hypothesis

6. **Hope for India**. Successes/failures of the 18 colour revolutions above are a beacon of hope for India. Hope of victory and peace lies in India's defeat of use of 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) to engineer an *'Intifada'* in Kashmir 2008-10. India's security apparatus can not only defeat it again, but also engineer a revolution for permanent integration of J&K.[13]

7. **Indian Parliament's Internal Security (IS) Mission to its Armed/Security Forces**.[14] The mission by our Parliament to our Armed/Security Forces through the AFSPA-1958, AF(J&K)SPA-




Figure 1: Definition of Disturbed, Paragraph 3 of AF(J&K)SPA-1990

[12] Sheri Berman, "Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society," *American Political Science Association* 1, No. 02 (2003). 257-272.

[13] "Seven principles of nonviolence" by Joanne Sheehan, "Introduction to Nonviolence," *Handbook of Nonviolent Campaigns* (Wales, UK; War Resisters' International, 2014), 11.

[14] *Cf.post, Questionnaire, Questions and Population Responses- 5, 6 & 7, 54-56.*

1990, Public Safety Act-1978 (PSA) and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act-1963, amended 1969 to 2019 is- ***undo 'disturbed' to maintain sovereignty and integrity of India***.[15] This can be translated into '*Defeat separatism, radicalism and terrorism (undo 'disturbed') for permanent peaceful integration with India'*. This means addressing causal maladies of disturbances viz; separatism and radicalism, not just its chief symptom viz; terrorism.[16]

8. **The Problem**. Nonviolent campaigns have been successful 53% of the time, vis-à-vis 26% for violent campaigns.[17] There-in lay the contours of future threats to India. Today, Pakistan is under severe stress from its Army's capture of political power, international pressure to roll back on 'nuclear weapons aided terrorism', stagflation and the COVID-19 Pandemic.[18] This situation began in 2017 and may continue till 2022 (and beyond); weakest period in Pakistan's history.[19] Therefore, its likely option against India in J&K during 2020-2024 continues to be 'indigenous' terror and 'strategic nonviolent political defiance'. India must prepare to defeat this plan and use the same strategy to engineer a Tricolour Revolution- '*Defeat separatism, radicalism and terrorism for permanent peaceful integration with India'*. This can also be replicated in Punjab, Nagaland, left wing extremism (LWE) affected areas, etc.

9. **Objectives and Hypothesis of the Thesis**.

(a) **Objectives**. To study the use of 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' in interstate conflicts, examine its past/future use by Pakistan

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[15] AFSPA-1958, AF(J&K)SPA-1990 and UAPA (all versions) available at https://mha.gov.in/acts?page=1

[16] R Gorzdanova, "Incitement to Terrorism – Treating the Symptoms or Addressing the Causal Malady?", *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague,* 14 November 2018. Available at https://icct.nl/publication/incitement-to-terrorism-treating-the-symptoms-or-addressing-the-causal-malady/ [29 June 2020]

[17] Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works- The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," *International Security*, Vol 33:1, 8.

[18] C U Bhaskar, "Will terrorist tensions in Kashmir drive India and Pakistan to the brink of nuclear war?", *This Week in Asia*, 26 February 2019. Available at https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2187803/will-terrorist-tensions-kashmir-drive-india-and-pakistan-brink [27 February 2020].

[19] Murtaza Solangi, "Pakistan's Moment of Truth," *The Friday Times (Pakistan)*, 09 August 2019. Available at https://www.thefridaytimes.com/pakistans-moment-of-truth/ [22 February 2020].

against India, suggest measures to defeat it, and recommend ways to use it to win peace over secessionism, radicalism and terrorism within India.

(b) **Hypothesis**. India can defeat the use by external forces and internal anti-national elements (ANE) of 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' in the UT of J&K, and use the same idea to engineer a Tricolour Revolution there against secessionism, radicalism and terrorism.

Review of Literature and Research Methodology

10. **Availability of Literature**. The seminal literature on Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolent political movement is Gene Sharp's book 'From Dictatorship to Democracy' (1994). Other sources of books are the Indian Independence Movement, Serbian Revolution of 2000 and Arab Revolutions of 2011-2013.

11. **Non-Availability of Literature**. There is no literature on Pakistan's use of this strategy in J&K. Nor is there any literature advising a democratic government on countering this strategy or on using it to engineer a social movement[20] to win peace within. Available literature on terrorism/insurgency falls short in scope. This thesis targets these deficiencies.

12. **Research Methodology**. The primary method is qualitative research. Techniques of inductive questionnaire, unstructured interviews and tabulated case studies of Colour Revolutions/Arab Spring have been used due to lack of literature. The questionnaire along with analysis of population responses is given at the end of the thesis. Its inputs and inferences have been referred to in footnotes through-out the thesis. The researcher's epistemological position is *interpretivist,* while his ontological position is *idealist*.

Chapterisation

13. **Chapter 1: Introduction to War by Nonviolence**. It will introduce the paradigm of nonviolent interstate conflict and its use by Pakistan against India. Thereafter, it will draw an IS mission for India's Armed/Security Forces. After a

[20] *See supra Glossary of 'Social Movement', xiv.*

brief literature review, it will make a case for this thesis and give out the chapterisation.

14. **Chapter 2: History of Nonviolent Political Movements**. It will investigate origins of Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolent movement and highlight its use by Martin Luther King Jr. (MLK) and Nelson Mandela.

15. **Chapter 3: Use of Gene Sharp's 'Strategic Nonviolent Political Defiance'**. It will analyse 'From Dictatorship to Democracy'. Thereafter, it will investigate its use in the revolutions of Serbia (2000), Tunisia (2010), Egypt (2011), etc to draw lessons- both to defeat, and to engineer such movements.

16. **Chapter 4: Pakistan's Switch from Terror to 'Strategic (non)Violent Political Defiance' in J&K against India**. It will investigate Pakistan's 2008 shift from terror to terror assisted 'strategic (non)violent political defiance'. The aim is to unveil Pakistan's J&K Strategy and to learn lessons.

17. **Chapter 5: New Ideas in Support of 'Strategic Nonviolent Political Defiance'**. It will evaluate the use of art of manoeuvre warfare and the science of epidemics in defeating and engineering such movements.

18. **Chapter 6: Engineering a Tricolour Revolution in the UT of J&K**. It will examine Pakistan's options post non-operationalisation of Articles 370 and 35A of the Constitution. It will also suggest a strategy to defeat Pakistan's use of 'strategic (non)violent political defiance' and to engineer a Tricolour Revolution in the UT of J&K. The period of interest is 2020 to 2024.

19. **Chapter 7: Conclusion, Findings and Recommendations for National Internal Security Strategy**. It will list findings, subjects for further studies and recommendations for the IS strategy component of our national security strategy.

CHAPTER 2:

HISTORY OF NONVIOLENT POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

"The alternative to violence is nonviolent resistance.
This method was made famous in our generation by ... Gandhi ..."
-Martin Luther King Jr., 1956

"His (Mahatma's) philosophy contributed ... to healing ...
human divisions ... apartheid."
-Nelson Mandela, 2007

Chalo Dandi* to *Muzaffarabad Chalo

1. **Mahatma's *Chalo Dandi***. Salt *Satyagraha* (Dandi March) of 1930 led by Mahatma Gandhi grew over 384 kilometres, from an initial strength of 78, to a nation-wide 'civil disobedience' by lakhs. It led to the arrest of 60,000 Indians by the British. This nonviolent 'direct action' against British salt manufacturing monopoly 17 years later, led to India's independence. Subsequently, this idea helped end colonialism, advance minority rights and overthrow dictators the world over. It is also being used to destabilise societies/nations.

2. **Kashmiri *Muzaffarabad Chalo***. Pakistan backed Kashmiri Separatists gave a nonviolent *'Muzaffarabad Chalo'* call on 11 August 2008. It was in retaliation to the 'economic blockade' of Kashmir by Jammu. The latter was responding to Kashmir's protests against the 26 May 2008 transfer of land to Shri Amarnath Shrine Board for *Yatra* facilities. These terror assisted nonviolent political disturbances continued into 2010 {hereafter, 'nonviolent' for J&K is replaced by '(non)violent' as separatists do not follow *Satyagrahic Ahimsa*}. It erupted again in 2016 after killing of terrorist Burhan Wani. Hence, we need to study origin of 'strategic nonviolent political defiance'.

Mahatma Gandhi's *Swaraj* by *Satyagraha* and *Ahimsa*

3. **Mahatma Gandhi's Philosophy**. Mahatma Gandhi pioneered applying *Ahimsa*, not for personal salvation but, for solving day-to-day problems of commoners. He said, *"Nonviolence was conscious suffering, not by meek*

submission to the will of the evil-doer, but by putting one's whole soul against the will of the tyrant." This he said, *"Empowered every individual to defy an unjust empire to save his honour, religion and soul, and to lay the foundation for that empire's fall."*[21]

4. ***Satyagraha* in South Africa**. Mahatma Gandhi lived in South Africa 1893 to 1914. From initial protests against racial discrimination in trains, he graduated to leading protests against disenfranchisement of (British) Indians by the Natal Legislative Assembly Bill (1894). He introduced *Satyagraha* in 1906 while protesting against Transvaal Colony's Asiatic Registration Act.[22] In *'Hind Swaraj'* (1909), he declared that British rule over India had been established and was continuing only because of cooperation by Indians. He added, *Swaraj* would come if Indians refused to cooperate with the British.[23]

5. ***Swaraj* by *Satyagraha* and *Ahimsa***. Mahatma Gandhi returned to India in 1915. His *Swaraj* by *Satyagraha* and *Ahmisa* can be best analysed through seven key milestones of his leadership of India's freedom struggle:-

(a) **World War-1**. He justified enlistment by, *"... we should have the ability to defend ourselves ... to bear arms... If we want to learn use of arms ..., it is our duty to enlist ..."* He also stipulated, *"personally (I) will not kill or injure anybody, friend or foe."*

(b) **Champaran Agitation in Bihar, 1917**. This was to protest the forceful plantation of Indigo plants by the British. These nonviolent protests surprised the British and won concessions for the farmers.[24]

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[21] RK Prabhu and UR Rao, The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi (Ahmadabad; Navjivan Trust, 1967), 99-168.

[22] Ajay Shankar Rai, Gandhian Satyagraha: An Analytical and Critical Approach (New Delhi; Concept Publishing Company, 2000), 35.

[23] Mary Elizabeth King, Mohandas K, Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Bequest: Nonviolent Civil Resistance in a Globalized World," in *In an Inescapable Network of Mutuality Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Globalization of an Ethical Ideal,* ed. Lewis V. Baldwin (Eugene, OR; Cascade Books, 2013).

[24] David Hardiman, "Champaran and Gandhi: Planters, Peasants and Gandhian Politics by Jacques Pouchepadass (Review)," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*. 11 (1), (April 2001), 99–101.

(c) **Kheda Agitation in Gujarat, 1918**. This was a five-month long agitation in support of famine-hit farmers requesting for a tax waiver. He used protests, a signature campaign and boycott of Indian revenue officials to win concessions from the British.[25]

(d) **Khilafat Movement, 1919-22**. With the aim of achieving Hindu-Muslim unity, he led India's Muslims in support of the Ottoman Caliph. It is the first time Indian Muslims chose nonviolence as a political tool.[26]

(e) **Non-cooperation Movement, 1919-22**. This was launched against the Rowlatt Act (1919) and the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre (13 April 1919). He called it off after the Chauri Chaura Incident of 04 February 1922 in which protesters killed 22 policemen.[27]

(f) **Salt March, 1930**. He used 1922 to 1930 to train Indians in nonviolence. Thereafter on 26 January 1930, the Indian National Congress declared independence in Lahore and he conducted the Salt March, 12 March to 06 April 1930.[28]

(g) **Quit India Movement, 1942-47**. He opposed Indian participation in World War-II under the British- 25 lakh soldiers ignored this call. His calls for 'Orderly British Withdrawal', 'civil disobedience' and 'Do or Die' were given on 08 August 1942. His nonviolent caveats to freedom fighters were- neither kill nor injure the British, and be willing to suffer and die from British violence.[29]

MLK and Nonviolence

6. **Segregation to Equality by Nonviolence**. American society was moved from US Supreme Court's decision of 1857 '*Negro is not a citizen ...; he is*

[25] MK Gandhi, The Story of My Experiments with Truth (Noida, UP; Om Books, 2017), 491-493.
[26] ibid., 539-543.
[27] ibid., 513-528.
[28] Krishna Kriplani, Gandhi: A Life (New Delhi; National Book Trust, 2015), 126-129.
[29] Stanley Wolpert, Gandhi's Passion: The Life and Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi, (UK; Oxford University Press, 2002), 74–75.

merely property ... of his owner' and of 1897 *'separate but equal'* to that of 1956 *'racial separation is unequal'* and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

7. **Five Pillars of MLK's Nonviolence**. MLK explained these in his 1956 essay 'Nonviolence and Racial Justice'. On the choice of violence/ nonviolence, he explained, *"Violence solves no social problems; it merely creates new and more complicated ones."* His five pillars were:-

(a) **Active Resistance**. The nonviolent resister is not a coward and is strongly opposed to the evil against which he protests. He is nonaggressive toward his opponent, but his mind and emotions are always *active*, constantly persuading his opponent that he is mistaken. This method is passive physically, but strongly *active spiritually*.

(b) **End State- Redemption and Reconciliation**. Nonviolent resistance does not seek to defeat/humiliate the opponent, but to win his friendship/understanding. Nonviolent noncooperation is a means to awaken moral shame in the opponent, not the end. The *end* is *redemption* and *reconciliation*.

(c) **Direction of Nonviolent Attack**. The attack is directed against forces of evil, rather than against persons who are caught-up in those forces. It is *evil* that is sought to be defeated, not the *evil-doer*.

(d) **Goodwill Cuts Chains of Hate**. At the centre of nonviolence stands the principle of goodwill. Goodwill can cut the chains of hate by *goodwill* towards the evil-doer and *hate* for his evil deed.

(e) **Conviction in Support of the Universe**. Nonviolence is based on the conviction that the universe is on the side of justice. Faith in the future encourages the nonviolent resister to suffer without retaliating.

Nelson Mandela's Nonviolence


8. **Nonviolence to Violence, 1950 to 1964**. The African National Congress (ANC) began its anti-apartheid movement as a nonviolent effort in 1950. After

10 years of state violence, Mandela decided to adopt violence in 1960, forming the *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation) as the armed wing of ANC. This resulted in Mandela being jailed for life in 1964.

9. **Violence to Nonviolence, 1985 to 1994**. Mandela renounced violence in 1985 and invited the white supremacist regime for peaceful talks which culminated in elections in 1994. Therefore, unlike Mahatma Gandhi, Mandela's approach to violence/nonviolence was not ideological, but realistic.[30]

Lessons from Mahatma Gandhi, MLK and Nelson Mandela

10. **Reasons for Success**. Key reasons for success of nonviolent ways of these three leaders are tabulated alongside[31].

Serial	Belief/ Quality for Success			
1.	Belief in *Ahimsa*/nonviolence	👍	👍	👎
2.	Ultimate aim was to change society	👍	👍	👍
3.	Visionary committed leadership	👍👍	👍👍	👍
4.	*Ahimsa* & *satyagraha* as …	a moral tool		a tactic
5.	Training of people in nonviolence	👍	👍	👎
6.	Strategic communication skills	👍👍	👍	👎
7.	Strategic decisiveness	👍👍	👍	👍
8.	Personal morals an example	👍👍	👍👍	👍
9.	Post movement public office	👎	👎	👍

11. **Lessons for India Today**. Malcolm Gladwell has an important lesson in *'David & Goliath- Underdogs, Misfits and The Art of Battling Giants'* (2013). He explains how in 1963, MLK's African-American activists, having failed to incite Albany's Police to use violence on them, used smart and active nonviolent rallies by children (Davids) against Birmingham's Police (Goliaths) to incite police into 'violence' (use of police dogs and arrest of children). This

[30] Stephen Junes, "Mandela Violence vs Nonviolence," *Strategzie*, 15 December 2013. Available at https://popularresistance.org/mandela-violence-vs-nonviolence/ [18 February 2020]

[31] Joseph Kaifala, "Gandhi, Mandela and King: The Trinity of Nonviolent Civil Resistance," *The New Jurist*, 11 June 2016. Available at http://newjurist.com/the-trinity-of-nonviolent-civil-resistance.html [27 February 2020]

Police 'violence' was publicised by the media (picture alongside). It resulted in The Civil Rights Act being signed into law on 02 July 1964. Important lessons for India are:-



Picture 1: Police dog used against 17 year old protestor, 03 May 1963

(a) Smart and active nonviolent attacks on social evils can bring a social change.

(b) Vision, commitment, disciplined nonviolence, patience and leaders' character are necessary to mobilise peoples' change movement.

(c) Strategic communication is a success imperative.

(d) The end state must be reconciliation and peace.

Conclusion

12. Mahatma Gandhi and MLK mobilised their submissive societies to launch active nonviolent attacks on the British and white supremacists. Their success in persuading their oppressors to give up on evil by a sustained campaign of disciplined active nonviolent attacks holds many lessons for India's IS strategy. They all aimed for reconciliation and peace; similar to 'peaceful' and 'harmless' (antonyms of 'disturbed' and 'dangerous') as required by the AF(J&K)SPA-1990.

13. This Gandhian Model was replicated in the 21st century in the Colour Revolutions/Arab Springs. This is analysed in Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3:

USE OF GENE SHARP'S 'STRATEGIC NONVIOLENT POLITICAL DEFIANCE'

"It will be exceptionally difficult to disintegrate the dictatorship if the police, bureaucrats and military remain supportive of the dictatorship. Subverting the loyalty of the dictators' forces should be given a high priority."
-Gene Sharp

Outmanoeuvring Dictators

1. **Disintegrating Dictatorships**. Gene Sharp (1928-2018) studied the achievements of Mahatma Gandhi, MLK and Mandela. This led him to conclude in 'From Dictatorship to Democracy' (1993) that disintegrating dictatorships required undoing of the dictator's weakening of social, political and economic institutions meant to atomize the population. This he wrote helps people regain the strength to resist. He also concluded that, nonviolent resistance outmanoeuvres the dictator's monopoly over violence, while insurgency/terrorism invites repression, which makes people feel helpless.

2. **'Strategic Nonviolent Political Defiance'**. Sharp renamed this strategy as 'strategic nonviolent political defiance'. Key elements of his 'grand strategy' are strengthening people to resist, creating new social resistance groups for mass mobilisation and sustained active nonviolent campaigns against sources of power of the dictator.

Applying 'Strategic Nonviolent Political Defiance'

3. **Grand Strategy**. Sharp suggested a five-stage 'grand strategy':-[32]

   (a) **Stage 1: Spreading the Idea**. Enough people have to be convinced to refuse to cooperate with the regime for long enough despite repression. It is also used to prepare leaders and structures, issue guidelines, and to train people in nonviolence and to face brutalities.[33]

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[32] *See supra Glossary of 'Grand Strategy', 'Strategy', 'Tactics' and 'Offensive Tactical Engagement', xii-xiii.*
[33] *See supra case of 'Non-cooperation Movement, 1919-22', 9.*

(b) **Stage 2: Selective Resistance**. Popular anti-regime issues (social, economic and/or political) are used to unfold simultaneous campaigns. Issues are to be chosen so as to keep some parts of the socio-political system out of the regime's control, to regain control of parts controlled by the regime, and/or to deny the regime an objective.[34]

(c) **Stage 3: Symbolic Challenge**. Initial nonviolent actions are to be symbolic and non-cooperative so as to gain local, national and international attention. These are by the original resisters.[35]

(d) **Stage 4: Spreading Responsibility**. Gradually, other social, economic, and political groups and institutions outside the control of the dictatorship are to be roped-in. Weakening the dictator's ideological influences will help widen participation. Each new nonviolent campaign[36] (new groups/issues) has to help spread moral disapproval of the dictator and withdrawal of people's cooperation/obedience.[37] While campaigns unfold, autonomy of resistance groups has to be defended for 'democratic space' of the society to increase and the dictator's space to shrink.[38]

(e) **Stage 5: Aiming at the Dictator's Powers**. Participation and momentum of defiance has to be steadily increased to produce mounting political paralysis. People have to take greater risks.[39] Fence sitters, bureaucrats, police and military have to be targeted to undermine their morale and subvert their loyalties. If and when the dictatorship intervenes to halt this 'escalating freedom', nonviolence can be applied to defend this newly won space and the regime will be faced with a new 'front'. Eventually, this will lead to disintegration of the dictatorship.

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[34] *See supra 'Swaraj by Satyagraha and Ahimsa', 8-9.*
[35] *See supra 'Salt March, 1930', 9.*
[36] *See supra Glossary of 'Nonviolent Campaign', xiii.*
[37] Gene Sharp lists 198 nonviolent methods of protesting. Gene Sharp, From Democracy to Dictatorship (East Boston, USA; Albert Einstein Institution, 2002), 17-24.
[38] *See supra 'Direction of Nonviolent Attack', 10.*
[39] *See supra 'Active Resistance', 10.*

4. **Attack Dictator's/Regime's Sources of Political Power**. Despite repression, democrats/resisters must gradually lengthen the duration for which regime's sources of power are restricted. Political starvation (disobedience of people) will ensure death of the regime's power, leading to paralysis in the regime and its eventual collapse. The dictator's/ regime's sources of political power to be attacked and his/its weaknesses to be exploited are tabulated alongside.

Sources of Political Power	Sources of Political Weaknesses
Legitimacy of authority by peoples' belief in the regime	*Inefficiency to tackle nonviolent situations*
Obedient people e.g., police	*Inflexibility due to limited resources for new nonviolent tasks*
Skills of cooperating groups e.g., bureaucrats helping rule	*Erosion of command-control due to false reporting, error of judgement and erosion of control*
Ideology- induces people to help	*Erosion of power of ideology, myths/symbols, finances & mutiny by police/ military*
Resources- help rule & oppress	
Power to punish for submission	

Table 3: Dictator's sources of power and weaknesses

Further lessons can be learnt from the analysis of recent Colour Revolutions/Arab Springs.

Analysis of Colour Revolutions/Arab Springs 2000 Onward

5. **It Can Never Happen Here!** Sradja Popovic has named the first chapter of his book *'Blueprint for Revolution'* (2015) as 'It Can Never Happen Here'. This was after an under-training Egyptian resister responded in 2009 to the history of Serbian Otpor![40] Revolution of 2000 with: *"Sradja, we are all impressed with what happened in Serbia. But Egypt is very different. It can never happen there."* It did happen under Serbian training in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Lebanon (2005), Maldives (2008) and Egypt (2011-13).[41] It can be made to happen anywhere: J&K, Punjab, Nagaland, Delhi, New York, etc!

6. **Case Studies**. 'Strategic nonviolent political defiance' has failed to achieve its final end state in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen (and Pakistan in J&K).

[40] Otpor! means resistance in Serbian language. It's logo is a closed black fist. Kashmir's JRL has a similar logo.
[41] Sradja Popovic, Blueprint for Revolution (New York; Spiegel & Grau, 2015), 16.

Only Tunisia has completed its transition from authoritarian rule.[42] Lessons from Serbian, Arab, Occupy and Black Lives Matter movements are:-

Serial	Country	Lessons Learnt *(repetition avoided)*
1.	Serbia[43]	(a) Long-term vision helped transition to democracy.
		(b) Branding, laughtivism and clever selection of battles helped gain popular support and aggravate regime's problems by attacking all its pillars of power.
		(c) External advice and support helped success.
		(d) The movement was safer & efficient as it was leaderless.
		(e) Skills at making the regime's oppression backfire by playing its strongest card against it (jujitsu) helped outsmart the regime. Use of women is a part of this tactic.
		(f) Training to go to jail, unified support to those jailed and selling 'getting jailed' helped overcome fear of repression.
		(g) Calendar was designed to unfold protests to a dateline.
		(h) Enforced unity of political parties and society (races, religion, etc) helped during and after the revolution.
		(i) Maintaining pressure even after the dictator was dislodged, helped build a new democratic system.
2.	Tunisia[44]	(a) Flat world with social media as a force multiplier helped speed up the revolution and spread it to Egypt, etc.
		(b) All humans contributed. Non-governmental organisations (NGO) contributed by empowering each human.
		(c) Repression led police and military to ditch the dictator.[45]

[42] Stephane Lacroix and Jean-Pierre Filiu, Revisiting the Arab Spring (London; Hurst & Company, 2018), 2-3.
[43] Sradja Popovic, ibid.
[44] Sari Hanafi, "Lessons of the Jasmine Revolution," *Al Jazeera*, 23 January 2011 and Ossama E Harb, "Tunisia's Lessons in Revolution," *Egypt Independent*, 18 January 2011.
[45] Larbi Sadiki. "Egypt and Tunisia: Regime Failure and the "Gymnasiums" of Civic Empowerment," *Middle East Institute Viewpoints: Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East* (September 2011), 19-22.

Serial	Country	Lessons Learnt *(repetition avoided)*
3.	Egypt[46]	(a) Tunisia's revolution contagion crossed borders to Egypt.
		(b) Focus on removal of the dictator resulted in takeover by the military (it sided with people) and Muslim Brotherhood.
		(c) Young educated Arabs and Muslims revolted in nonviolent ways for their human rights.[47]
		(d) Islamists have been forced to move away from 'Islam is the solution' and *jihadis* are on the way to become obsolete.
		(e) Social issue networks (not leaders) helped subvert state security, develop cohesion and coordinate efforts.[48]
		(f) Offline and online campaigns need to be synergised.[49]
4.	Syria[50]	(a) Lack of strategy led to the divided rural oppressed converging on Damascus without a plan, leading to failure.
		(b) Armed rebellion helped regime retain power by violence.
		(c) Media's publicising of repression led to mobilisation.[51]
5.	Libya[52]	(a) Absence of grand strategy and political parties, and a weak military which could not mutiny against the dictator, led to chaos.
		(b) Dictator used tribal rifts and violence to retain control.[53]

[46] Jean-Pierre Filiu, The Arab Revolution- Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising (London; Oxford University Press, 2011), 5-148.
[47] Stephen Zunes, "The Power of Strategic Nonviolent Action in Arab Revolutions," *Middle East Institute Viewpoints: Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East* (August 2011), 11.
[48] Basem Fathy. "A "Cute" Facebook Revolution?," *Middle East Institute Viewpoints: Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East* (August 2011), 39-42.
[49] ibid.
[50] Sam Hamad, "Where did the Syrian revolution go wrong?," *Trt World* (16 March 2018). Available at https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/where-did-the-syrian-revolution-go-wrong--15973 [25 February 2020].
[51] Erica Chenoweth, "Backfire in the Arab Spring," *Middle East Institute Viewpoints: Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East* (September 2011), 28-29.
[52] Frederic Wehrey, "Why Libya's transition to democracy failed," *Washington Post*, 17 February 2016.
[53] Barak Barfi. "Ties that Bind: The Social Pillars of Arab Authoritarian Regimes," *Middle East Institute Viewpoints: Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East*, September 2011, 15-17.

Serial	Country	Lessons Learnt *(repetition avoided)*
		(c) Pro-regime media flamed polarisation and fear, while international media supported the resisters.
6.	Yemen[54]	Lack of a grand strategy and popular support, tribal fissures, rebel violence and external interference squashed the movement.
7.	Occupy Move-ment of USA[55]	(a) Lack of a grand strategy and preparation, and directly moving to symbolic resistance failed to build participation and momentum. There can be no nonviolent blitzkrieg!
		(b) Use of one model of nonviolent protests (occupy public space) and social disunity (rich vs poor) led to its collapse.
8.	Black Lives Matter of USA	(a) Non-cooperation spreads from perimeter of dictator's weak supporters to the core, using protests, media, etc.[56] (b) 'Take A Knee' is 'Gandhian policing' to deny protestors state's violence to escalate their propaganda/participation.[57]

Table 4: Lessons learnt from Serbian, Arab, Occupy and Black Lives Matter movements

7. **Study 'Why Civil Resistance Works' by Maria & Erica**. Conclusion of study of 323 nonviolent/violent campaigns (NVC/VC) 1900 to 2006 is:-[58]

(a) **More Effective: NVCs or VCs?**

(i) External support to NVCs raises success chances x3 times.

(ii) Regime concessions to NVCs are x12 times more likely.

(iii) Crackdown enhances chances of success of NVCs x6 times.

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[54] Adam Bensaid, "How Yemen's 'Arab Spring' turned into a proxy war," *Trt World*, 11 December 2018. Available at https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/how-yemen-s-arab-spring-turned-into-a-proxy-war-22361 [16 February 2020].

[55] Andy Ostroy, "The Failure of Occupy Wall Street," *The Huff Post*, 31 May 2012. Available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-failure-of-occupy-wal_b_1558787 [15 February 2020].

[56] Franklin Foer, "The Trump Regime is Beginning to Topple," The Atlantic, 06 June 2020. Available at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/how-regime-change-happens/612739/

[57] Somasekhar Sundaresan "This is Gandhian policing", Twitter handle @SomasekharS, 7:28, 02 June 2020.

[58] Maria J, Stephen and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works; The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," *International Security*, Vol. 33, No 1 (Summer 2008), 7-44.

(iv) Security force defections in NVCs x4 times more likely.[59]

(v) Defections make NVCs x48 times more likely to succeed.[60]

(vi) Domestic pressure helps NVCs; external support helps VCs.

(b) **Advantages of NVCs**.

(i) Repression may backfire into mass mobilisation and international condemnation, raising cost to the regime.

(ii) Coercive power increases after defection of regime forces.

(iii) Non-governmental organisations find these more appealing.

(iv) Regimes may opt to negotiate earlier.

(v) International support is easy to get and is more effective.

(c) **Policy Recommendations**.

(i) There is no 'one blueprint' for success.

(ii) Providing lessons learnt and training helps in mobilisation.[61]

(iii) External support is counterproductive, if it hurts credibility.

(iv) Media has a role in facilitating backfire to repression.[62]

8. **Lessons for India Today**. Lessons in defeating and making succeed 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' are tabulated. It can be inferred that, just as the raw bits and pieces for strategy are battles, the raw material for nonviolent imposition of one's will on

Aspect/ Issue	Lessons to Defend Against & Defeat	Lessons to Initiate & Make Succeed
Preparation	*Address root cause (political, social, etc)*	*Training in non-violence & withstanding oppression*
Cohesion	*Rift amongst separatists & unity of nationalists*	*Spread across segments & unity for mass mobilisation*
Participation	*IW & negotiations to retain loyalty of people*	*Slogans, symbols & humour to increase*
Violence	*Smarter nonviolence*	*Disciplined nonviolence*
Sources of Power	*Strengthen against attacks (Police, nationalists, etc)*	*Attack to weaken (stone pelters, ideologues & terrorists)*
Use of Media	*Malign separatists, restrict participation & mould international opinion*	*Publicise repression, widen participation & win international support*
Security Forces	*Police & security forces- loyalty by empowering & good welfare for morale*	*Ideologues, stone pelters & terrorists- demoralise to switch side to Police, nationalists, etc*

Table 5: Lessons for defeating/making succeed nonviolent political defiance

[59] *See supra Table 4- Syrian, Libyan and Yemeni movements failed as rebels used violence, 17-18.*

[60] *See supra Table 4- movements in Serbia, Tunisia and Egypt succeeded after the military decided to support the democrats/resisters, 16-18.*

[61] *See supra 'training by Serbian Optor! to democrats/resisters of Georgia, Ukraine, Lebanon, Maldives and Egypt', 15.*

[62] *See supra Table 4- media played a major role in shaping perceptions on all sides of the conflict, 17-18.*

another is, people appropriately organised, trained and led (to a revolution or counter revolution).

Conclusion

9. In 'On War', Carl von Clausewitz wrote *"The political object is the goal, war is the means, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."* Examples at Table 4 hint at growing popularity of the choice of 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' for the purpose of political change. This strategy/method is summed up in Figure 2 below.




Figure2: Attacking sources of power of a dictator

10. Replacing 'dictator' with 'Indian Government', 'resister' with 'Pakistan sponsored Kashmiri separatists' and 'democracy' with *'Azadi'* in Figure 2 above, helps put Pakistan's use of 'strategic (non)violent political defiance' in J&K in 2008-2010 and in 2016 in a new perspective. It is not 'agitational terrorism'! Chapter 4 examines this and also investigates Pakistan's future options against India, especially in J&K.


CHAPTER 4:

PAKISTAN'S SWITCH FROM TERROR TO 'STRATEGIC (NON)VIOLENT POLITICAL DEFIANCE' IN J&K AGAINST INDIA


"Stone pelting ... sign of resistance ... against occupation & mis-governance. Hundreds of youth were killed in 2008, 2009 and 2010 ... none had (a) gun ..."
-SAS Geelani, 26 July 2016

Pakistan's Strategic Shift

1. **Pakistan's Paradigm of 'Strategic (non)Violent Political Defiance'**. Refer Graph 1.[63] Pakistan made a strategic shift in J&K away from terror in 2008. This was to undo disadvantages of world opinion against terror, ceasefire, AIOS, and elections in 2002 and 2004. Refer Graph 2. Simultaneously, it continued to use 'terror under nuclear umbrella' to tie down India.



Graph 1: Violence levels in J&K 2000 to 2020 with important events



Graph 2: Violence

[63] Data from satp.org at https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/india-jammukashmir [27 February 2020]. Same data source for Graph 2.

2. **Violence of Pakistan's 'Strategic (non)Violent Political Defiance'**. Details (satp.org) below hint at this strategic shift without *Satyagrahic Ahimsa*:-

Year	Trigger	Killed in Violence/Protests			Violent Events
		Terrorists	Civilians	Forces	
2008	Land transfer	382	71	85	261
2009	Alleged rape cases	248	53	75	209
2010	Death of Tufail Matto	258	189	69	189
2016	Death of Burhan Wani	165	267	88	267

Table 6: Details of violence of 'strategic (non)violent political defiance' in Kashmir 2008-2010 and 2016

Pakistan's New Strategy for Kashmiri *Azadi*

3. **Ground Indicators**. Images below prove events of 2008 to 2010 and 2016 were not 'agitational terrorism'; it was and is much more sinister:-



			
Muzaffarabad *Chalo* 2008	Candle light vigil	Logo- JRL[64]	Logo- APDP
			
#IAmBurhan movement	Pakistani use of Facebook[65]	Pakistan flag in terror funeral	
			
APHC's protest calendar	J&K Police under attack[66]	Army under attack[67]	

Table 7: Ground indicators of Pakistan sponsored 'strategic (non)violent political defiance' in Kashmir

[64] *See supra Table 4- Joint Resistance Leadership's (JRL) logo resembles that of Serbia's Optor! movement, 16.*
[65] Facebook page of a Pakistani actor Hamza Ali Abbasi who is part of ISPR's propaganda machine.
[66] *See supra 'Aiming at the Dictator's Powers', 14 and 'Defections ex forces make NVCs x48 times more likely to succeed', 19. J&K Police and AF(J&K)SPA were attacked to deny Indian Government its sources of power.*
[67] *See supra note 66, 22.*

4. **Pakistan's use of Sharp's Strategy**. Ideas and action points of 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' given in Chapters 2 & 3 are collated in Table 8 (left hand columns). These are then ticked/crossed for use by Pakistan led Nexus of separatists, radicals and terrorists in 2008-2010 and 2016 (right hand columns) to evaluate their plan. This is in addition to the use of Wahhabism, terror, propaganda, social fear, etc.

Plan Check List	Pak	Plan Check List	Pak
Spread Idea		**Aim at 'Dictator's' Powers**	
Use social media, TV, etc	✓	*Separate violence from nonviolence (distance)*	✗
Selective Resistance			
HRVs, missing persons, etc	✓	*Win bureaucrats (by J-e-I)*	✓
Symbolic Challenge		*Attack J&K Police to mutiny*	?
Use symbols, places, etc	✓	*Avoid attacking military*	✓
Nonviolence (terrorists & stones used)	✓	*Dis-empower India & Army (HRVs, revoke AFSPA)*	✓
Spread Responsibility		*Unity of people & parties*	✓
Students, women, lawyers…	✓	*Calendar of events*	✓
Coordinate online & offline	✓	*Smartly invite 'atrocities'*	✓
Project resisters as heroes	✓	*Publicise 'atrocities'*	✓
Networks, viral messages graffiti & radicalism	✓	*Prevent maligning due foreign help (indigenous)*	✓

Table 8: Evaluating Pakistan's 'strategic (non)violent political defiance' for *Azadi* in J&K

Pakistan's Options in J&K against India 2020 to 2024

5. **SWOT (Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats) Analysis of Pakistan**. It will help appreciate revisionist Pakistan's future course of action.

(a) **SWOT**. Brief analysis for 2020 to 2024 is at Figure 3 below.



Figure 3: Pakistan's SWOT analysis 2020 to 2024

(b) **Inferences for Pakistan**.

(i) Its geo-strategic and geo-economic situation may deteriorate.

(ii) It may continue to be run by its Army.

(iii) Its Army may believe that India will exploit this situation while planning a response to a major terror attack ex Pakistan.

(iv) Its Army may temporarily reel-in the use of terror as a tool till the situation once again turns in its favour.

(v) It may try to exploit India-China stand-off for its benefit.

6. **Pakistan's Options in J&K**. Based on the above, these are:-




Figure 4: Pakistan's Options in J&K 2020 to 2024

(a) **War**. Most unlikely.

(b) **Terror**. Less likely.

(c) **Political Defiance**. Likely.

(d) **Pause & Political Defiance**. Most likely. Pause till swearing-in of the new US president in January 2021 and issue of new US Af-Pak policy. Disturbances may be triggered in 2023 to impact Indian General Elections 2024. This pause will also help shore-up protest finances hit in 2019-20.[68]

7. **Lessons for India Today**. Thus, it is proven that Pakistan introduced 'strategic (non)violent political defiance' in J&K in 2008. It is not just a 'law & order'/'public order' issue which can be solved by 'Winning Hearts & Minds' (WHAM). The role of security forces in preventing a tipping point, especially of the loyal J&K Police and soldiers of Army's J&K Light Infantry is laudable. Sanctions alone, including our Pakistan Strategy of 'No Terror & Talks' will not be able to force a change in Pakistan's behaviour.[69] A perspective of hope emerges when in Figure 2 (page 20) we replace 'dictator' with 'Pakistan sponsored separatists, radicals and terrorists', 'resister' with 'nationalists' and *'Azadi'* with 'integration with India'. Defeating separatism, radicalism and

[68] *Cf.post, Questionnaire. Population Response- 3, 53.*

[69] Robinson, Linda, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, and Katya Migacheva, Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 236-239. Available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1772.html

terrorism (undoing 'disturbed') in J&K for its permanent peaceful integration with India now appears possible.


Conclusion

8. Militaristic Pakistan is now (re)trying a similar strategy in Punjab too. Its three strategic prongs visible in 2020 are drug menace,[70] Khalistan Referendum 2020 and Kartarpur Corridor. Statements (2019) of Pakistan's Prime Minister[71], and Foreign[72], Rail[73] and Science & Technology Ministers[74] hint at the threat. This was spoken about by Director General of Punjab Police on 21 February 2020- *"Kartarpur ... you send somebody in the morning ... and by evening he ... back as a trained terrorist."*[75]

	*"Kartarpur is Mecca of Sikhs."*
	*"Kartarpur Corridor is a diplomatic coup"* and *"Prime Minister Imran Khan's googly."* *(against India)*
	*"When Khalistanis come to Kartarpur, Pakistanis must welcome them and treat them well."*
	*"I appeal to all Punjabis in Indian army to refuse to be part of injustice/zulm and deny duty in Kashmir."*

Table 9: Quotes of Pakistani political leaders on Khalistan in Punjab

9. In the 21st century, application of 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' has morphed from the slow Indian independence movement to fast paced colour revolutions due to new ideas/technologies. These are examined in Chapter 5.



[70] "Drugs from Pakistan ruining youth in Punjab: Sikh leader," *Business Standard,* 24 July 2019. Available at https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/drugs-from-pakistan-ruining-youth-in-punjab-sikh-leader-119072401358_1.html [01 March 2020]

[71] Prime Minister Imran Khan's address to International Sikh Convention in Lahore on 01 September 2019. Video available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrrbJaLRluM https://youtu.be/n22oB9On-JY [22 February 2020].

[72] Videos of interview available at https://youtu.be/nbpoHtA72pU and https://youtu.be/n22oB9On-JY [22 February 2020].

[73] Video available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8efC1DE-Zo [22 February 2020].

[74] Available at https://twitter.com/fawadchaudhry/status/1161178275005239301 [22 February 2020].

[75] "Punjab DGP Claims Kartarpur Is a 'Security Challenge", SAD Calls Remark ' Insulting', *The Wire,* 22 February 2020. Available at https://thewire.in/security-security/kartarpur-security-challenge-punjab-dgp [23 February 2020].

CHAPTER 5:
NEW IDEAS FOR
'STRATEGIC NONVIOLENT POLITICAL DEFIANCE'

"It's always about people."
-Sradja Popovic, Serbian Otpor! Movement

Spiritual and Scientific Way to Peace

1. **Way out of No Way**. Recent studies show that nonviolent insurrections work twice as well as violent ones, and in one-third the time.[76] Yet, people after trying nonviolence for some days return to violence, which has not worked for centuries! Nonviolence offers a viable third way out of flight-or-fight conundrum; 'way out of no way'. *Satyagraha* empowers *Ahimsic* people by leading them to choose the right intention (*jus ad bellum*) and means (*jus in bello*). Thus 'way out of no way' is not a zero-sum game; you lost and so I won. The *Ahimsic Satyagrahi* remains focussed on liquidating antagonism and not the antagonist.[77] In this spiritual frame, the problem in J&K is *'Azadi'* (backed by Pakistan's 'Two-Nation Theory'), and not the people who believe in it.

2. **War's New Nature/Character**. Information revolution, globalisation, 'clash of civilisations' and 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' have made *'everything (is) a weapon'* (stones, media, etc). This requires awareness across technological, geographical and political boundaries. *Mahabharata's* Arjun with an INSAS rifle cannot survive this war. It is time to revisit old ideas for maintaining our *Swaraj*. These ideas are: centre of gravity (CoG), art of manoeuvre warfare, science of social epidemics and winning peace in war.

Revisiting Old Ideas for *Swaraj* by *Satyagraha* and *Ahimsa*

3. **CoG Defined**. CoG (*Schwerpunkt*) appears 40 times in Clausewitz's 'On War'. Pp 485-487: *"CoG is ... where mass is concentrated ... heaviest blow is*

[76] Erick Chenoweth and Maria J Stephen, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York; Columbia University Press, 2011).
[77] *See supra Table 2, 11.*

struck at the CoG. (In) a theatre of war, a single CoG can be identified. That is the place where the decision should be reached." Pp 595-597: *"CoG (is) hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed ... by constantly seeking out the CoG, only by daring to win all, will one really defeat the enemy ..."* Therefore, our colloquial use of *'people are the CoG in Kashmir'* is flawed at two levels. One, whose CoG are the people of Kashmir- of the Pakistan-led Nexus or of India? Two, will destroying/protecting all people of Kashmir (without categorisation) earn India victory/peace? Therefore, CoG of the anti-India Nexus in the UT of J&K is the 'idea of *Azadi'* (antagonism).[78] Same as Sharp's 'source of power'.[79]

4. **Art of Manoeuvre Warfare**.[80] Application of key ideas is explained:-

(a) **Aim of Strategy**. Strategy should aim to win peace by destroying the opponent's will/belief (CoG).

(b) **Attacking the Idea CoG**. Use all elements to isolate, fix and strike at critical requirements (CR) of the opponent's CoG using its critical vulnerabilities (CV). To the traditional means of firepower/ manoeuvre must be added information/idea neutralisation. Figure 3; neutralising fish (terrorists) would be slower by angling (killing each terrorist) i.e., attrition, and faster by breaking the glass tank (source of cohesion) i.e., manoeuvre. Meanwhile, own CoG must be defended by strengthening its CRs/repairing its CVs.



Figure 5: Manoeuvrist vs Attritionist Approaches in IS

(c) **Focus of Effort (FoE) and Subsidiary Efforts (SEs)**. FoE must target the opposing CoG or its CRs, exploiting its CVs. SEs must assist the FoE to achieve its aim. In a war of ideas, anti-national idea neutralisation

[78] *Cf.post, Questionnaire. Population Response-8, 57.*
[79] Gene Sharp, From Democracy to Dictatorship, 17-24.
[80] William S Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (New York; Routledge, 1985).

machinery is the FoE, while non-kinetic/kinetic tools assisting the new idea to enter peoples' minds are the SEs.[81] This is explained in Figure 6. Presuming SADHBHAVANA/ civic action or vanilla information warfare (IW) can kill *'Azadi'* is a strategic error.[82]




Figure 6: Explanation of CoG, CR, CV, and surfaces & gaps

(d) **Surfaces (no-go areas/strengths) and Gaps (go areas/ weaknesses)**. These must be identified in the opposing Cs'oG (and in their CRs/CVs). The opponent's surfaces are to be avoided or converted into gaps by SEs (fire/force/bridge/idea) for exploitation. Own gaps are to be converted into surfaces by SEs (fire/force/surveillance/obstacle/idea) to defend against attacks. Own original surfaces are to be strengthened for use as firm bases. The opponent's gaps are to be identified by reconnaissance pull (intelligence/surveillance) for the attacks by the FoE (idea/force) supported by SEs. In a war of ideas, surfaces/gaps are in the ideas/narratives and in the minds of the believers/non-believers.

(e) **Battles of Observer-Orient-Decide-Action (OODA) Loops**. In a war of ideas, in the opponent's strategic loops- destroy cohesion, synergy and understanding; in the operational loops- engineer missteps to trap;

[81] Mazarr, Michael J., Ryan Michael Bauer, Abigail Casey, Sarah Heintz, and Luke J. Matthews, The Emerging Risk of Virtual Societal Warfare: Social Manipulation in a Changing Information Environment (Santa Monica, CA; RAND Corporation, 2019). Available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2714.html. [27 February 2020].

[82] *Cf.post, Questionnaire. Population Response- 7, 56.*

and in tactical loops- corrupt freedom, initiative and speed of propagating ideas. Refer to Figure 7. At the same time, own loops are to be secured using quality surveillance, accurate cultural understanding, accuracy and speed of idea/action decisions, and high tempo of countering/propagating ideas and supporting actions to make target minds free to accept our (new) ideas.




Figure 7: Boyd's OODA Loop

5. **Battleswarming**.[83] Arquilla and Ronfeldt who invented this, define it as, *"amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to perform military strikes from all directions... It will work best ... only ... if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked manoeuvre units."* It applies both to soft and hard power e.g., many small teams for IW and for counter terrorism (CT) operations. These, when using manoeuvre warfare, can achieve victory at least cost and in least time.

6. **Science of Social Epidemics**. In *'The Tipping Point'* (2000), Malcolm Gladwell lists five principles which help engineer social epidemics.[84] Author's suggested Counter COVID-19 Pandemic Strategy based on these ideas was published




Figure 8: Network of Mavens, Connectors and Salesmen

[83] Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA; RAND Corporation, 2000) Available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB311.html [10 February 2020].

[84] Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things can Make a Big Difference (London; Abacus, 2000).

by CENJOWS on 02 April 2020.[85] These principles are:-

(a) **<u>Principle 1: Power of the Few</u>**. Epidemics are created by 90% contribution of 10% of the people called mavens *(ideators/strategists),* connectors *(people with large network of acquaintances)* and salespersons *(who win customers by building trust).* It is akin to battleswarming. Example 1; network of J-e-I has helped sell *'Azadi'*. Example 2; absence of security forces from social media allowed terrorist Burhan Wani to dominate it 2014-2016.[86]

(b) **<u>Principle 2: Context/Environment of Epidemic</u>**. Effectiveness of mavens, connectors and salespersons is enhanced by a friendly environment which helps in acceptance/spread of their message.[87]




Figure 9: Secessionist messages spread in anti-national environment

Example 1; Article 370 and excessive overt security forces' presence facilitated spread of *'Azadi'*. Example 2: Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi's 'Modi Jacket' and the International Day of Yoga helped Patanjali Ayurved,[88] Fabindia, and Khadi Village Industries Commission[89] increase their sales manifold from 2014 onwards. Context makes salespersons 'Pied Pipers'!

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[85]Sanjay P Vishwasrao, "A Counter Pandemic Strategy", (New Delhi; CENJOWS, 2020). Available at https://cenjows.gov.in/synodos-detail?id=113 [02 April 2020]

[86] *See supra 'Salt Satyagraha grew from strength of 78 to a nation-wide 'civil disobedience' by lakhs', 7.*

[87] *See supra for Pakistan's change of context by Wahhabi Islam's replacement of Kashmiriat and exodus of Hindus, which further made 'Azadi' spread, 2-3.*

[88] "Bend it like Baba: India's Patanjali takes on Western Consumer-Goods Firms," *The Economist*, 29 April 2017. Available at https://www.economist.com/business/2017/04/29/indias-patanjali-takes-on-western-consumer-goods-firms [14 March 2020].

[89]Sidhartha, "Khadi Sales Zoom 28%, KVIC Eyes Rs 5,000 crore in FY20," *Times of India*, 15 April 2019. Available at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/khadi-sales-zoom-28-kvic-eyes-rs-5-000-crore-in-fy20/articleshow/68881314.cms [14 March 2020]




Figure 10: Theory of Broken Window

(c) **Principle 3: Small Corrective Measures to Stop/Create Epidemics.** As per Theory of Broken Window, small corrective actions repeated over time help stymie an epidemic and create a new one. Example 1; New York's crime rate dropped after metro train graffiti was erased after each run. Example 2; use of Pakistani flags in terrorist funerals in J&K encouraged recruitment of terrorists/stone pelters.

(d) **Principle 4: Stickiness of Idea**. Stickiness of idea/message dictates its acceptance, saleability and its longevity in the minds of recipients. Friendly/truthful image of the salesperson helps the message stick. Example: APHC's protest calendar around 'memorials of indignity' ensured *'Azadi'* is repeatedly propagated in catchy ways.



Figure 11: Examples of sticky messages that went viral

(e) **Principle 5: Image of Salespersons**. Acceptance and spread of messages is better if the salesperson's image is good. Three examples are



Figure 12: Comparison of mavens/connectors/salespersons in three situations

given above. Hence, strategic importance of *Satyagrahic* and *Ahimsic* force ethos and force performance matrices. Gladwell repeats this in *'David & Goliath'* as the 'principle of legitimacy' quoting Sean Mac Stiofain, Chief of Staff, Provincial Irish Republican Army 1969-1972: *"It has been said that most revolutions are not caused by revolutionaries in the first place, but by the stupidity and brutality of governments."*

7. **Winning Victory or Peace in War/Conflict**. The answer of whether to aim to win victory or peace lies in the difference between post World War-II future of United Kingdom (UK) and USA. PM Churchill said*, "(our policy) is to wage war" and "(our aim is) victory at all costs"* while President Roosevelt's said, *"….victory for us means victory for religion … for institution of democracy"* and *"we are determined not only to win the war, but also to maintain the security of the peace that will follow."* The answer also lies in these statements of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart. Tzu- *"Only with strategy of taking the whole will the general find complete victory";* Clausewitz- *"War must terminate with and involve diplomatic and political efforts to make victory acceptable and sustainable"*; Hart- *"Imposing peace of entirely your own choosing … will reverse the settlement achieved by war."* Militaries should use a manoeuvrist approach i.e., attack the 'will' to set the stage for the attack on the 'means'. Moreover, for winning peace, military victory must be tactically attainable, strategically sustainable and politically usable, making *Jus ad Bellum*, *Jus in Bello* and *Jus post Bellum* (just post-war peace) important.[90]

Conclusion

8. Historian BR Nanda explained the ways, means and end state of nonviolent movements as, *"Satyagraha was not designed to seize any particular objective or to crush the opponent, but to set in motion forces which would lead to a new equation; in such a strategy it (is) perfectly possible to lose all the battles and*

[90] *See supra 'end state- redemption and reconciliation', 10.*

still win the war."[91] Sharp's Gandhian 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' aims to move a society/state from authoritarian to democratic rule in a similar war.[92] Likewise, ideas of Tsu, Clausewitz, Hart and Lind aim to win final peace (MLK's reconciliation), not battles.

9. The use of 'Take A Knee' by political leaders, policemen and soldiers of USA, UK, etc to defuse #BlackLivesMatter protests in May-June 2020 is smart *Ahimsa* to win the *'war'*. There is a lesson for India in this Gandhian de-escalation.[93]





Figure 13: Twitter debate on utility of 'Take A Knee' in USA and UK after death of George Floyd on 25 May 2020

10. Pakistan is likely to use 'strategic (non)violent political defiance' assisted by ideas in this chapter in J&K (and elsewhere). India needs to defeat this and to engineer an indigenous Tricolour Revolution (or Epidemic) for J&K's permanent peaceful national integration. A way ahead is presented in Chapter 6.



[91] Michael N Nagler, The Nonviolent Handbook; A Guide for Practical Action (San Francisco; Berret-Koehler Publisher, Inc., 2014), 41.
[92] William Zartman, "Lessons for Theory: Negotiating for Order and Legitimacy", in *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifada,* ed. William Zartman (Athens; University of Georgia Press, 2015), 420-436.
[93] *Cf.post, Questionnaire. Population Response-10, 59.*

CHAPTER 6:

ENGINEERING A TRICOLOUR REVOLUTION IN THE UT OF J&K

"We must match violence with an equivalent nonviolence."

-Michael N Nagler, The Nonviolence Handbook

Universal Aggressive Nonviolent Self Defence against Social Inequities

1. Judith Butler in her book *'The Force of Non-Violence'* (2020) argues that the only route to universal self-defence against social inequalities is sustained aggressive nonviolence. India needs to take this Gandhian idea to the drawing board to design a de novo *Swadeshi* Kautilyan (self-defence) peace winning strategy for J&K. Its end state- defeat of Pakistan's 'strategic (non)violent political defiance' and society-wide replacement of separatism, radicalism and terrorism (Judith's social inequalities) with permanent peaceful integration with India. *Satyagrahic*, smart and active nonviolence- jumps into a conflict and dramatises cum escalates it to force social change- is the way to this end state.

2. Its use in other disturbed areas may help India leap to a $5 trillion economy by 2025.

De Novo *Swadeshi* Kautilyan Security Strategy for J&K

3. **Attacking CoG of Anti-India Nexus**. Refer to Figure 14 for Nexus' CoG and its CRs/CVs. Article 370 was a CR: its de-operationalisation must be matched by a new strategy[94] with multiple lines of operations



Figure 14: CoG of Nexus and its CRs & CVs

[94] As per Pakistan, this change is as importance as the nuclear tests of 1998. Riaz Khan, Post 370 Options?, *Dawn* (Pakistan). 11 August 2019. Therefore, an equivalent of Kargil Intrusions may be expected.

attacking Nexus' CoG by destroying its CRs by attacking these CRs directly/or through its CVs.

4. **Defending Against Nexus' 'Strategic (non)Violent Political Defiance'**. This would be necessary to gain time till the plan to engineer a Tricolour Revolution is ready. Broad contours are:-

(a) **Win the Information Battle (Non-kinetic and Kinetic)**. Develop OODA transparency over the Nexus at strategic, operational and tactical levels.[95] That is: Pakistan, separatists, ideologues, terrorists, protest organisers, financers, over ground workers (OGW), social networks, etc.

(b) **Secure the Environment**.[96]

(i) Expand ceasefire to cease societal warfare to secure Kashmir from Pakistan (no infiltration of terrorists, warlike stores, IW, etc).

(ii) Intelligence, counter infiltration (CI) and CT grids to deny Nexus freedom of action and to physically secure people from it.

(iii) Destroy/deny re-building of Nexus' finances and structures.

(iv) IW grid to psychologically secure people from separatist and religious ideologues by using AF(J&K)SPA-1990, UAPA, PSA and media to counter, arrest and de-radicalise these ideologues.[97]

(v) Smart nonviolent 'Joint Counter Agitation Strategy' to deny protest triggers and mobilisation.

(c) **Shape the Environment**. Strategic communication and IW[98] to shape peoples' beliefs and to de-radicalise ideologues, and



Picture 2: IW in Army Goodwill School

[95] *See supra Figure 7, 29.*
[96] Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia (veteran). (Director CENJOWS). Discussion with author. 12 March 2020.
[97] Paul Martin and Thomas Erickson, Social Media: Usage and Impact (New Delhi; Global Village Publishing House, 2013), 167-191.
[98] *See infra Glossary of 'Strategic Communication' and 'Information Warfare', xiv.*

potential terror/stone pelter recruits.[99] IW using target audience analysis work (TAAW) sheets and an annual IW calendar is vital.[100]

5. **Engineering Tricolour Revolution**. Simultaneously unfolded as:-

(a) **Grand Strategy**.

(i) **Synergy**. Governor's rule {Unified Headquarters (UHQ)} to synergise intelligence, CI, IS, CT and IW grids of the Army, Police and Central Armed Police/Paramilitary Forces (CAPF)/(PMF). Whole of Governments approach to be coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC).

(ii) **Mission**. Engineer a Tricolour Revolution to replace separatism, radicalism and terrorism with permanent peaceful national integration by 2024.

(iii) **Objectives**. Disintegration of *'Azadi'*, radicalism, terrorism and Pakistan's interference, and national integration of J&K.

(iv) **FoE and SEs**. FoE is the self-defence revolution with universal participation in sustained *Satyagrahic*, smart and active nonviolence. SEs are intelligence, IW, IS, CI and CT grids. Objectives of SEs: primary; anti-national ideological bastions (leaders, institutions, towns), anti-national ideas/narratives and secondary; terrorists and OGWs. Mind density- not troop density- should guide density-pattern of deployment of these five grids[101]

(v) **Developmental Strategy**. To repair 'broken windows'.[102] Initially incentivise nationalists and remote areas (*Paharis, Gujjars*) to prevent unintended financing of urban political defiance.

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[99] Andrew Glazzard & Alastair Reed, "Beyond Prevention: The Role of Strategic Communications Across the Four Pillars of Counterterrorism Strategy," *The RUSI Journal*, 21 February 2020. Available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2020.1727165 [05 March 2020]

[100] *See supra 'Science of Social Epidemics', 28-31.*

[101] *See supra Figures 8 & 9, 29 & 30.*

[102] Fen Osler Hampson and Bessma Momani, "Lessons for Policy" in *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadows of the Intifadat*, ed. William Zartman (Athens; University of Georgia Press, 2015), 439-459.


Financial benefits of tourism/*Yatra* be regulated (using COVID-19 Pandemic) to extend window of 'calm' 2020 to 2024.

(vi) **Timelines**. Mobilisation may begin in 2020 and peak in Summer-2023, prior to Parliamentary (and Assembly?) elections in 2024. Progress may be related to India-Af-Pak and India-USA situations.

(b) **Strategy**.

(i) **Force Ethos and Matrices**. Friendly ('Strategic Corporals'[103]) to shape environment for Tricolour Narratives to be spread by the 'Pied Piper Soldiers/Policepersons'.

(ii) **Force Presence on Streets**. Offensive presence/conduct of forces (and graffiti) in public spaces- directly or as collateral damage- creates an environment in which the 'idea of *Azadi'* spreads. Standard operating procedures and the 'Joint Counter Agitation Strategy' need review.



Picture 3: Unfriendly graffiti and police presence

(iii) **Violence of Terrorists**. Be replied with minimum accurate violence for 'zero' collateral damage. Damage, if any, (destruction of houses) be immediately repaired to prevent negative psychological impact/exploitation by Nexus.[104] Terrorist violence and own zero collateral damage/repair of damage be used for IW.

(iv) **Graffiti and Violence of Stone Pelters**. Graffiti be removed daily and stone pelting be prevented/responded with smarter *Satyagrahic Ahimsa*. E.g., CRPF election patrol on being heckled in

[103] *See supra Glossary of 'Strategic Corporal ', xiv.*

[104] @SuaidAhmad tweeted 08 June 2020 after few houses were destroyed in CT operations: "... destruction in Nawakadal ... revealed our generous ... less than 7 days, 3 crore ... collected... ." Available at https://twitter.com/SuaidAhmad/status/1269866803347353600

Budgam on 09 April 2017 ignored the hecklers.[105] This unplanned act is similar to 'Take A Knee' of #BlackLivesMatter.

(v) **AF(J&K)SPA-1990, UAPA and PSA**. Provisions of secessionism, radicalism and terrorism be enforced to dis-incentivise ANEs and incentivise nationalists.[106]

(vi) **Tricolour Leaders, Groups, Networks and Narratives**. Preparations be completed by 2021. Adequate training and resources be allotted for empowerment/expansion. Civic action/ SADHBHAVANA be informationalised and synergised.

(vii) **Media**. Pakistan's access to Kashmir/Kashmiris be denied in all forms. Effective spread of the Tricolour Narrative(s) and real-time countering of Nexus' narrative(s) are essential.

(c) **Winning Peace by Tricolour Revolution/Epidemic**.[107]

(i) **Stage 1: Spread the Idea**. Identify nationalists, fence-sitters and terror/protest affected to establish core team of Tricolour Leaders and Groups. They be trained in *Satyagrahic*, smart and active nonviolence, explained the strategy and be imbibed with sense of 'we'.[108] Networks of mavens, connectors and salespersons be established on all media using 'Pied Piper' officers, soldiers and policepersons. Addressing tactical *mohalla* level issues/broken windows {e.g., daily cleaning of *'Azadi'* graffiti, celebrating national days (constructive only)} will win



Picture 4: Relation of graffiti with protests/stone pelting

[105] Shuja ul Haq, "Jammu and Kashmir Police registers FIR against hecklers who hit CRPF jawans returning from bypoll duty," *India Today*, 14 April 2017. Available at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/jammu-and-kashmir-police-fir-crpf-jawans-heckled-hit-srinagar-bypoll-971368-2017-04-14 [Accessed 14 March 2020]
[106] *See supra Figure 1, 3.*
[107] Aditya Raj Kaul. (Kashmiri Pandit journalist). Discussion with author. 12 March 2020.
[108] Laurence Cox, Why Social Movements Matter (London; Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 110-111.

support and faith. Countering negative perceptions on de-operationalisation of Articles 370 and 35A in the new political geography is a good start point.[109]

(ii) **Stage 2: Selective Resistance**. Plan village level tactical campaigns (drives/protests) by Tricolour Groups targeting one weakness and one segment (each) of the Nexus. The aim is to free these people from Nexus control/fear. Atrocities by Nexus against them be prepared for and exploited (e.g., Egypt's Battle of Camels, 02 February 2011 and killing of *Sarpanch* in J&K, 08 June 2020).[110] For a Tricolour Epidemic, issues/broken windows be related to those of Stage 1 and distributed in type, geography and participation. Examples: rapes/killings by terrorists (target is terrorists) and school absenteeism due to *bandhs* (targets are separatists). Tricolour Networks be continuously widened.

(iii) **Stage 3: Symbolic Challenge**. Operational (district) level drives/protests by Tricolour Groups to raise their momentum using logos, slogans, songs, art, humour, articles books, etc for contagiousness and stickiness. Their locations, methods and duration should aim to increase publicity and participation. New weaknesses and segments of the Nexus be attacked. The issues/broken windows be related to tactical ones, and be spread out in districts in geography, participation and time. This will help orchestrate an environment friendly for Tricolour Narratives of the growing



Picture 5: Nexus Revolution Art in NY Times, 12 June 2020

[109] Ayaz Wani, 'Life in Kashmir after Article 370', ORF Special Report No. 99 (New Delhi; Observer Research Forum). January 2020. Available at https://www.orfonline.org/research/life-in-kashmir-after-article-370-60785/ [10 March 2020]

[110] Asef Bayat, Revolution without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring (California; Stanford University, 2017), 8-9.

Tricolour Networks to gain traction. Examples of operational level issues/broken windows: drug addiction, death of Kashmiriat (target is radicals); and poor condition of Hindu refugees and their desire to return (target is entire Nexus).

(iv) **Stage 4: Spread Responsibility**. Gradually, other social, economic and political groups/institutions outside the control of the Nexus be included in these drives/protests. Examples: students, teachers and alumni of Army Goodwill Schools and families of policemen/soldiers. Each drive/protest has to provocatively question Nexus ideologues and their ideas. The selection of issues/broken windows has to graduate creatively to the strategic level i.e., previous/new issues now in ideological bastion towns/institutions of Sopore, Baramulla, Anantnag, Srinagar, Rajauri, etc; and Kashmir University, etc. New issues/broken windows could be dirty Dal Lakes, collapse of tourism and industry, closure of movie halls, Dukhtaran-e-Millat's *hijab*/veil order, lack of municipal facilities; and differences between Hindus-Muslims, Hindu Sikh-Muslims, Sunnis-Shias, Kashmiris-Gujjars, etc. The size and enthusiasm of Tricolour Networks/Groups has to be maximised so as to aggressively escalate protests to demand freedom from secessionism, radicalism and terrorism. New people be inducted/groups formed to include affected mothers/wives,[111] *sarpanchs/panchs*, boat/taxi drivers; rehabilitated local terrorists, stone-pelters and drug abusers; tourism/*Yatra* beneficiaries, minorities, Hindu refugee diaspora, etc. Unified people power be thus set for the final push to tip the situation against secessionism,

[111] Zeynep Gulru Goker, "Presence in Silence: Feminist and Democratic Implications of the Saturday Vigils in Turkey", in *Social Movements, Mobilisation and Contestations in the Middle East and North Africa,* ed. Joel Beinin and Frederic Vairel (California; Stanford University Press, 2011), 149-166.

radicalism and terrorism. Preparation for new political leaders/parties may now begin.[112]

(d) **Stage 5: Aim at Nexus' Sources of Power (CoG)**. The expanded and emboldened Tricolour Networks using *Satyagrahic*, smart and active nonviolence to now rally to a UT-wide unified movement aimed at secessionism, radicalism and terrorism. The political level broken windows (mix of constructive and evil destructive) to increase participation, tempo and momentum are: death of Sufism/Kashmiriat, exodus of Hindus, corruption of society by foreign terrorists, etc. Protests need to target Pakistan, leaders of APHC/JRL/J-e-I and terrorist organisations, etc. Location of protests to now be symbolic e.g., LC crossing points, Lal Chowk, Dal Lake, Kashmir University, derelict Hindu temples/houses, new monument on Hindu exodus, etc. Families of leaders of the APHC/JRL/J-e-I/terrorists to be targeted to deny power to the Nexus; local terrorists be encouraged to surrender. New political parties may now lead the movement under a unified banner, culminating in Parliamentary (and Assembly?) elections in 2024. The ultimate target is *'Azadi'* (secessionism and radicalism); not the APHC/JRL/J-e-I/terrorists.[113]



Picture 6: JRL's SAS Geelani painting graffiti


Picture 7: Pakistani flag on Lal Chowk Tower, Srinagar

(e) **Review and Contingency Plans**. A regular assessment of drives/protests is required: review of selection of issues/broken windows,

[112] *"(Political) parties & social outlets seemed to have very little influence on propensity for (Arab) revolutions".* Jason Noble, Seasons of Change: Lessons From the Arab Spring (Washington DC; US Army Command & General Staff College, 2012), 32.

[113] Lieutenant General SA Hasnain (veteran). Discussion with author. 02 and 08 June 2020.

impact of their repair, responsibilities, peoples' exhaustion,[114] timelines, etc. Modifications can then be made.

Conclusion

6. Vivek Agnihotri in '*Urban Naxals'* (2018) writes: *"An idea* (capitalism) *will kill an idea* (Naxalism). *A revolution* (direct market access to tribals) *will kill a revolution* (LWE)*."* As per Kautilya, *"The arrow shot by the archer may or may not kill a single person. But stratagems devised by wise men can kill even babies in the womb."* This plan (Figure 15) aims at killing the 'idea of *Azadi'* in the mind. It has to be assisted by politico-economic initiatives; but these alone will not win peace, just as IW alone will not destroy *'Azadi'*.[115]

7. A lesson for the Indian Subcontinent from Arab Revolutions is that such revolutions cross borders.[116] Hence, disintegration of *'Azadi'* may lead to the disintegration of Pakistan's 'Two-Nation Theory'; SAS Geelani tweeted on 01 July 2020: *"Relationship of Kashmir and Pakistan are based on Kalima."*[117] India needs to be prepared.




Figure 15: Defensive & offensive plans for Tricolour Revolutions in J&K 2020-24

[114] Marie Duboc, "Egyptian Leftist Intellectuals' Activism from the Margins" in *Social Movements, Mobilisation and Contestations in the Middle East and North Africa* ed. Joel Beinin and Frederic Vairel. (California; Stanford University Press, 2011), 60-61.

[115] SM Sahai. (ex Inspector General Police of Kashmir). Discussion with author. 16 March 2020.

[116] R Brynen, PW Moore, BF Allooookh and MJ Zahar, Beyond The Arab Spring: Authoritarianism & Democratisation in the Arab World (New Delhi; Viva Books, 2013), 257-279.

[117] @GeelaniOfficial available at https://twittr.com/GeelaniOfficial/Status/1278245039102201857?s=19

CHAPTER 7:

CONCLUSION, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIA'S NATIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY

"Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high
...
Where the world has not been broken up into fragments
By narrow domestic walls
...
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way
Into the dreary desert sand of dead habit
Where the mind is led forward by thee
Into ever-widening thought and action
Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let my country awake."

-Shri Rabindranath Tagore

Conclusion

1. **Destroying Root Cause or Nexus' Source of Power/CoG**. Mahatma Gandhi led India to independence in the 20th century. His ideas strengthened Europeans and Arabs to repeat his performance in the 21st century. But, India's security apparatus continues to tread dead kinetic habits of the 20th century. This is contrary to Pascal Nazareth's advice- in asymmetric warfare; Gandhian path of attacking root cause of conflicts is the safest for leaders/nations to follow.[118]

2. **Tricolour Revolution/Epidemic**. Freedom from fear, dogma and dead habit does not come free; requires relentless struggle.[119] This investigation concludes that breaking the chains of Pakistan's 'Two-Nation Theory' (root cause of conflict) and its sponsored *Azadi*, radicalism and terrorism in J&K can be achieved by a *Satyagrahic*, smart and active nonviolent participative social movement for change in these social injustices.[120] Only then will India awaken into the heaven of freedom. It is also applicable to *Swachh Bharat*, Make in India, Clean Ganga Mission, Digital India Programme, #BanChinaProducts, etc.

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[118] Pascal Alan Nazareth, Gandhi The Soul Force Warrior (New Delhi; Wisdom Tree, 2019), 81.
[119] Asef Bayat. op.cit., 227.
[120] RD Bhagat, Sociology of Social Movements (New Delhi; Centrum Press, 2013), 86.

Findings and Areas of Further Studies for IS Strategy

3. **Key Findings**. This thesis has analysed Mahatma Gandhi's *Swaraj* by *Satyagraha* and *Ahmisa,* and MLK's and Mandela's nonviolent destruction of white supremacy. It has also evaluated application of Sharp's 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' in recent revolutions and by Pakistan in J&K. The study of ideas that telescope timelines of such movements today vis-à-vis the 20th century, adds value to the thesis. Key findings are listed below:-

(a) **Finding 1: Interstate Conflict by 'Strategic Nonviolent Political Defiance'**. Due to deterrence and unpopularity of terror, this is the new way of war. Sanctions alone, including India's Pakistan Strategy of 'No Terror & Talks' will not suffice.[121] Securing India with a strong social topography and non-manipulative information environment, and instituting prompt mediation mechanism are peace prerequisites.[122]

(b) **Finding 2: Pakistan's Future Option in J&K**. 'Rest & recoup' 2020 to 2023 with a peak in 'strategic (non)violent political defiance' (as in 2008-2010 & 2016) in the run-up to Indian General Elections 2024.[123]

(c) **Finding 3: Key Causes of 'Strategic Nonviolent Political Defiance'**. These are: historical grievances ('Two-Nation Theory'/segregation), separatism (*'Azadi'*), radicalism, unpopularity of terrorism and external interference.[124]

(d) **Finding 4: Key Reasons for Speedy Success of 'Strategic Nonviolent Political Defiance'**. These are: outmanoeuvring regime's violence by nonviolence, high moral ground of resisters, use of social media, and support of security forces to the resisters.[125]

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[121] *See supra 'Sanctions alone, including our Pakistan Strategy of 'No Terror & Talks' will not bring change in Pakistan's behaviour,' 24.*
[122] *See supra Tables 4, 16-18, Tables 6 & 7, 22 and Table 8, 23.*
[123] *See supra Figure 3 & 4, 23-24 and Cf.post, Questionnaire, Population Response-3, 53.*
[124] *See supra Table 4, 16-18 and Graphs 1 & 2, 21.*
[125] *See supra 'Why Civil Resistance Works' by Stephen & Chenoweth', 18-19.*

(e) **Finding 5: Key Reasons for Failure of 'Strategic Nonviolent Political Defiance'**. These are: lack of preparation, adoption of violence, absence of leadership and unity, targeting dictator not his ideology, continued loyalty of police/military to the government, and use of media and external interference against resisters.[126]

(f) **Finding 6: Democracy in Muslim Societies and the *Ummah***. Educated Muslim societies (youth) have begun to favour secular democracies as an alternative; radicals and *jihadis* are losing favour. More importantly, the concept of *Ummah*/shared culture across borders helps 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' leap across borders.[127]

(g) **Finding 7: Key Reasons for Failure of Pakistan's J&K Plan 2008-10 and 2016**. These are: lack of vision, intent only to keep India embroiled, violence of terrorists and stone pelters, loyalty of J&K Police and segments of the population, and good ethos of the armed/security forces and their continued empowerment by AF(J&K)SPA-1990.[128]

(h) **Finding 8: Key Reasons for India's Failure to Win Peace in J&K**. These are: wrong identification of CoG of Pakistan led anti-India Nexus as 'people', limiting military operations to neutralising terrorists while ignoring secessionism and radicalism,[129] wrongly appreciating Pakistan's new strategy to be 'agitational terrorism',[130] assuming SADHBHAVANA/civic action is IW, and continued external subversion of people/private enterprises in Kashmir (and rest of India).[131] The premise

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[126] *See supra Table 4, 16-18 and 'Why Civil Resistance Works' by Stephen & Chenoweth', 18-19.*
[127] *See supra Table 4, 16-18.*
[128] *See supra Table 8, 23.*
[129] Ashish Dhar, "Army ... celebrating the killing of terrorists is juvenile because finite victories in an infinite contest are actually meaningless ... narratives is an infinite game". *Upward,* 04 June 2020. Video available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VDaxetOmZv0 [05 June 2020]
[130] *See supra 'not just a 'law & order'/'public order' issue which can be solved by 'Winning Hearts & Minds', 23 and Tables 6 & 7, 22.*
[131] *See supra 'CoG of the anti-India Nexus in the UT of J&K is the 'idea of Azadi' (antagonism). Same as Sharp's 'source of power', 27, 'Presuming SADHBHAVANA/ civic action or vanilla IW can neutralise idea of Azadi is a strategic error, 28 and Figures 6 & 14, 28 & 34.*

that agitations are a 'law & order'/'public order' problem to be dealt by the police using the 'Joint Counter Agitation Strategy' is also a factor.[132] Accumulated impact- strategically defensive national narrative and absence of whole of government approach to IS.[133]

(i) **Finding 9: New Strategic Context in J&K post De-Operationalisation of Articles 370 & 35A**. This de-operationalisation is a game changer; has threatened Nexus' CoG of *'Azadi'* and by extension, Pakistan's CoG of 'Two-Nation Theory'.[134] This needs to be followed through with a Tricolour Revolution for winning permanent peace.[135]

4. **Areas for Further Studies**. Based on observations in this thesis:-

(a) **Definition of India Pakistan Ceasefire**. Definition of 'no exchange of fire of weapons' gives space to Pakistan to interfere in J&K/India. It may be expanded to 'cessation of infiltration of terrorists, war-like stores, drugs, radio signals, IW, etc'[136] i.e., cease societal warfare.[137] A world-wide initiative to stop societal warfare would help.[138]

(b) **IW (The Key SE) for the Tricolour Revolution**.[139]

(i) **Offensive**. Mission, decentralised capabilities, organisations, and responsibilities, and synergy to create Tricolour Tipping Point of people's power against *'Azadi'* (and 'Two-Nation Theory').

(ii) **Defensive**. Inoculation of society from external machinations of societal warfare.[140]

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[132] *See supra Tables 6 & 7, 22, 'Secure the Environment', 34, Pictures 2, 3, 4 & 5, 35, 37, 39 & 40.*
[133] *Cf.post, Questionnaire. Population Reponses- 4, 7 & 10, 53, 55 & 58.*
[134] *See supra 'Attacking CoG of Anti-India Nexus'', 3 4.*
[135] *See supra 'Principle 2: Context of Epidemic … Article 370 and excessive troop presence have encouraged spread of Azadi', 30.*
[136] Shishir Gupta, 'Security Agencies Red Flag Imran Khan's 1,600 scholarship plan for Kashmiris', Hindustan Times, 11 June 2019. Available at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/security-agencies-red-flag-imran-khan-s-1-600-scholarship-plan-for-kashmiris/story-3vdJugg1JIRTOCqnaWh0pM.html
[137] *See supra 'Secure the Environment', 34.*
[138] *See supra Graphs 1 & 2, 21.*
[139] *See supra 'Shape the Environment', 34, Pictures 3 & 4, 37 & 39 and Figures 12 & 13, 33 & 41.*
[140] *See supra Glossary of 'Societal Warfare', xi and 'Secure the Environment', 34.*

(c) **Wider Impact of Tricolour Revolution in J&K**. The impact on the rest of India and on Pakistan may be studied before execution of this suggested plan.[141]

Recommendations for IS Strategy

5. **IS Strategy for the UT of J&K**. Clausewitz has said, *"The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and (to) deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need to make yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own political aims, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must."*[142] With the hypothesis being accepted, and learning from Tagore and Clausewitz above, the recommendations are covered in succeeding paragraphs.

6. **Mission**. Engineer Tricolour Revolution in the UT of J&K to replace separatism, radicalism and terrorism with permanent peaceful national integration by 2024.[143]

7. **Strategy**.

(a) **Defending Against Ongoing 'Strategic (non)Violent Political Defiance'**.

(i) **Outmanoeuvre (non)Violence by *Ahimsa***. Use *Satyagrahic,* smart and active *Ahimsa* to defeat the ongoing political defiance.[144] Protest triggers have to be denied and participation in protests has to be prevented/controlled.

(ii) **Dis-incentivise Anti-Nationalism**. Dis-incentivise *'Azadi'*, radicalism and terrorism, and incentivise national integration as per AF(J&K)SPA-1990, UAPA, etc.[145]

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[141] *See supra 'An important lesson for the Indian Subcontinent from the Arab Revolution is that such revolutions spread across borders', 42.*

[142] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1976), 73.


[143] *See supra Objective and Hypothesis, 4-5.*

[144] *See supra 'Graffiti and Violence of Stone Pelters', 37.*

[145] *See supra 'Development Strategy', 36 and AF(J&K)SPA, UAPA and PSA, 38.*

(iii) **Interference by Pakistan**. Make Pakistan pay higher cost for interfering in Kashmir/India to physically and psychologically secure Kashmiris/Indians from its sponsored secessionism, radicalism and terrorism.[146]

(b) **Engineering A Tricolour Revolution**. Engineer a social movement against Pakistan created social inequalities of secessionism, radicalism and terrorism using unified *Satyagrahic*, smart and active *Ahimsa*. Refer to Graph 3 for the broad plan.[147] Details are given below:-



Graph 3: Broad plan for Tricolour Revolution in J&K 2020 to 2024

(i) **Identity of CoG**. Pakistan's CoG is the 'Two-Nation Theory' and CoG of the anti-India Nexus in J&K is *'Azadi'*.

(ii) **Identity of FoE and Key SE**. The FoE should be the IS grid led Tricolour People participating in the *Satyagrahic,* smart and active *Ahimsic* Tricolour Revolution. This needs a rebalance between non-kinetic and kinetic forces. The key subsidiary effort should be IW.

(iii) **Footprint vs Mindprint of Security Forces**. Reduce overt footprint without reducing 'mindprint' necessary for the Tricolour Revolution.[148] Mindprint to cover full spectrum of social

[146] *See supra 'Secure the Environment', 35.*
[147] *See supra Figure 15, 42.*
[148] *See supra Picture 2, 36.*

communication: homes, *mohallas,* mosques, schools, sports grounds, social media, trains, *Yatra*, etc.[149]

(iv) **Empower Tricolour Forces**. Educate, train and provide resources to leaders, groups, networks, security forces and agencies for the Tricolour Revolution.[150]

(v) **IW For Tricolour Tipping Point**. Civic action/ SADHBHAVANA be remoulded as IW tool to repair broken windows. IW be supported by people friendly force ethos and performance matrices.[151] Timely repair of collateral damage, if any, of CT operations be incorporated into this.

8. **Coordination**.

(a) **UT and National Levels**. UHQ in the UT and NSC at the Centre.[152]

(b) **Strategic, Operational and Tactical Synergy**. Among:-

(i) Forces, intelligence and enforcement agencies and intelligence, CI, CT, IS and IW grids/efforts.

(ii) Ministries of External Affairs, Home Affairs (MHA), Defence, Finance and UHQ of J&K.[153]

9. **Role of MHA and CAPF/PMF**. Expanded role to MHA and Police/CAPFs/PMFs to increase their CI, CT, IS and IW effectiveness.[154] This is especially required for the ideological bastion of Srinagar which is under Police/CAPF.[155]

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[149] *See supra 'Science of Social Epidemics, 29-32.*
[150] *See supra Tables 2 & 5, 11 & 19.*
[151] *See supra Figures 5, 6, 9 & 10, 27, 28, 30 & 31.*
[152] *See supra 'Synergy', 36.*
[153] *See supra 'whole of Centre-State Governments approach', 36.*
[154] *Cf.post, Questionnaire. Population Responses- 5, 6 & 7, 53-55.*
[155] *See supra 'Synergy', 36.*

10. **IS Strategy for other Disturbed Areas**.

(a) **CoG**. Correctly identify CoG of anti-India Nexus in these areas. As per Clausewitz's definition, 'ethnocentrism' is the apt CoG of tribal separatist movements i.e., 'Nagalim, Hmarland, Kukiland, etc.[156]


(b) **Empower Forces/Agencies**. Educate, train and provide resources to officers, security forces and agencies to defend against 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' and to engineer Tricolour Revolutions. [157]

(c) **State-wise Tricolour Revolutions**. Develop state specific plans for Tricolour Revolutions aimed at nation building.

End Note

11. **Contribution of this Thesis**. Three major contributions are: One, CoG of Pakistan led secessionist Nexus in J&K is the 'idea of *Azadi'* and of Pakistan is the 'Two-Nation Theory'. Two, Pakistan is using 'strategic (non)violent political defiance' against India in J&K (and elsewhere) and a lack of appreciation of this threat has led to continued instability. Three, India can engineer a Tricolour Revolution in J&K to defeat separatism, radicalism and terrorism for J&K's permanent peaceful national integration. This can be applied in other disturbed areas too. Due to constraints, 'how to do the revolution' has been excluded- it requires deliberate planning.

12. **Business as Usual (BUA)**. BUA approach to IS could threaten the social fabric of India, holding the Government's vision of India becoming a $5 trillion economy by 2025 to ransom. People power is the key and hence, national security is now about ensuring that democratic governments maintain control over it in a democratic way. 'Take A Knee' in the ongoing Antifa led #BlackLivesMatter movement in USA holds an important non-BUA lesson for India.



[156] RD Bhagat, op.cit., 98-100.

[157] As per YouTube channel 'String', Gene Sharp's ideas were used by ANEs in the Delhi Riots of February 2020. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1cra3xVEZE {25 March 2020}

QUESTIONNAIRE


<https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1SAxYcMXmQLMbczUuPMbtNnicHcjEAuVtCS6YEdRZyxQ/edit#responses>

INDIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY


De-operationalisation of Articles 370 and 35A have changed the political geography of the UT of J&K. Pakistani response to this has been to try and instigate disturbances across India using propaganda, radicalism, terrorism, public protests, drugs, FICN, etc to exploit existing fault-lines. India needs to secure itself from this so as to achieve its dream of becoming a USD 5 Trillion economy by 2025.

Undoing 'DISTURBED' in J&K can be the first step towards this goal.

TOTAL POPULATION RESPONSE





CATEGORIES OF 97 IDENTIFIED RESPONDENTS



IMPORTANT INDIVIDUALS WHO RESPONDED


Lt Gen M Sabharwal (veteran), ex GOC 15 Corps	Ambassador Ajay Bisaria, ex HCI (Pak) (now in Canada)	Shri Sushant Sareen, ORF
Lt Gen SA Hasnain (veteran), ex GOC 15 Corps	Cd'A HCI (Pak) Gaurav Ahluwalia	Smt Smruti Pattnaik, IDSA
Lt Gen Satish Dua (veteran), ex GOC 15 Corps	D&MA HCI (Pak) Brig SS Virk,	Col Vivek Chadha (veteran), IDSA
Lt Gen KT Parnaik (veteran), Northern Army Commander	Brig T Tikko (veteran), Kashmiri Hindu	Maj Gen RPS Bhadauria (veteran), USI
Lt Gen V Bhatia (veteran), ex DGMO, Director CENJOWS	Shri Sneshesh Philip, media (The Print)	Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch (veteran), India Foundation
Lt Gen Rajinder Singh (veteran), ex GOC CIF Kilo	Maj Gen MV Chandran (veteran), ex IG AR (East)	Lt Gen Rameshwar Yadav, author at CENJOWS

ANALYSIS OF 97 POPULATION RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE	
Q 1.	Pakistan's strategy for J&K today includes political and religious radicalisation, terrorism, propaganda, public defiance protests, etc. This is today being called as COLOUR REVOLUTION or SOCIETAL WARFARE in the GREY ZONE. ***Agree OR Disagree***
A 1.	
Analysis	*Target population understands Pakistan is using societal warfare. However, this does not reflect in an appreciation of type of war-tools required to win peace in Population Response-6 (PR-6) below.*
Q 2.	Pakistan's strategies for India and J&K 2020 to 2025 will be dictated by its economic situation, US Strategy for Af-Pak, India-USA and India-China relations, China-Pakistan relations and difference/gap between Indian and Pakistani post COVID-19 revival. ***Agree OR Disagree***
A 2.	
Analysis	*The majority recognises impact of Pakistan's geostrategic and geo-economic situation on its India and J&K Strategies. There is a parallel 1998-2004: USSR's exit from Af-Pak and capture of Kabul by Taliban led to side-stepping of Pakistan's efforts to J&K. This is corroborated by 97.9% (78.5+19.4) support for a long-term strategy in PR-4 below.*

Q 3. In case of unfavourable geo-strategic, geo-economic, political and economic situation 2020-25, Pakistan's best option against India in J&K

Pakistan's Option	***Most Likely***	***Likely***	***Least Likely***
Relative calm as of 2011 to 2015			
Widespread public unrest (colour revolution) as of 2008 to 2010			
Relative calm in 2020-23 and unrest (colour revolution) in 2023-24 coinciding with Indian GE 2024			

A 3.




Analysis *The target population appreciates application of varying strategies by Pakistan based on the situation within Pakistan and in India. Majority responders expect relative calm from 2020 to 2023, followed by public disturbances from 2023 to 2024.*
(Note:- 2020 to winter 2022-23 and summer 2023 to 2024)

Q 4. India needs an IS Strategy and a J&K Strategy 2020-2025 to counter the likely Pakistani strategy against India and in J&K

-India already has strategies, OR Agree, ..., OR -Disagree

A 4.




Analysis *The target population recognizes the need for long-term strategies for Pakistan and J&K. This is corroborated by PR-2 and PR-3 above.*

Q 5. Paragraph 3 of AF(J&K)SPA-1990 defines DISTURBED in terms of 1. striking terror in people, 2. alienating section of people, 3. adversely affecting harmony amongst different sections of people, 4. bringing about cession of a part of territory of India and 5. causing insult to the National Flag, Anthem and the Constitution. Each of these five tasks of the Armed Forces requires (only one choice per row)

Option	***More Hard Power (CT)***	***More Soft Power (IO)***	***Equal balance***
1. Striking terror			
2. Alienating section of people			
3. Adversely affecting harmony ...			
4. Cession from India			
5. Insulting National Symbols			

A 5.



Ana-lysis

This breakdown of the mission assigned in the AF(J&K)SPA-1990 into five mission essential tasks has been done to highlight the wide spectrum of war-tools required to undo 'disturbed'.


Pakistan supported secessionism and radicalism which resulted in the destruction of communal harmony in J&K are the causal maladies of disturbances in J&K. The key symptoms of these disturbances are terrorism and, public protests cum stone pelting.

The target population comprehends the need for task based variations in CT/IW. Use of hard power against 'secession' & 'insulting national symbols' could be police/legal force, as gets clarified in PR-6 below.

Q 6. Out the five tasks listed in the AF(J&K)SPA-1990 the role of Army, including Rashtriya Rifles, is

Option	*Direct Role*	*No Role*	*Support Role*
1. Striking terror			
2. Alienating section of people			
3. Adversely affecting harmony ...			
4. Cession from India			
5. Insulting National Symbols			
6. (New) Countering public protest			

A 6.



Analysis

The majority view is that the Army should focus on CI & CT operations. However, a few with strategic experience have given an opposing view. The low percentage who believes in 'no role' in soft tasks (2 to 6) hints at low acceptance for multi-task role for the Army.

Inferences of high percentage believing in the Army having only a support role in soft tasks (2, 3, 5 & 6) are: they choose not to fight the full spectrum of war imposed by the enemy; RR is not accepted as a specialised CT force which must also do IW, but is part of the Army whose ethos may be adversely affected by carrying out IW; and, larger role for J&K Police and CAPF/PMF in IW even in areas where only the Army/RR is deployed. The latter will require a separate IW grid of J&K Police and CAPF/PMF, which will cost more. Moreover, this increased footprint will add to existing alienation of the people.


This latter view is contrary to the Army's reactions to attacks by China's Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) during the May-June 2020 stand-offs in Eastern Ladakh. The PLA used non-lethal weapons and the Indian Army responded with similar tools![158]

[158] Snehesh Alex Philip. "How Indian troops chased the Chinese for a kilometre over LAC in Galwan on 15 June night". *The Print*, 23 June 2020. Available at https://theprint.in/defence/how-indian-troops-chased-the-chinese-for-a-kilometre-over-lac-in-galwan-on-15-june-night/446996/ [24 June 2020]

Q 7. Existing CT operations (including LC management), Sadhbhavana, public relations (press releases of events) and the anti-agitation/protest drills are inadequate/adequate to meet ends of the five tasks assigned in AF(J&K)SPA-1990/in UAPA for other states

Option	***Adequate***	***Not Adequate***
1. Striking terror		
2. Alienating section of people		
3. Adversely affecting harmony ...		
4. Cession from India		
5. Insulting National Symbols		
6. (New) Countering public protests		


A 7.



Analysis

The target population agrees that soft tasks (2 to 6) are not being adequately addressed at present i.e., present conduct of IW is inadequate and cannot win peace. This is corroborated by PR-4, PR-5 and PR-6, but is mildly contradicted in PR-7.

The inference is that India is focussing more on symptoms viz; terrorism and protests, and less on causal factors viz; Pakistan supported secessionism and destruction of communal harmony i.e., radicalism, and its use of 'strategic (non)violent political defiance'.

Q 8.	The CoG or source of power or the unifying factor of Pakistan-led anti-India Nexus in J&K consisting of ISI, ISPR, APHC, J-e-I, terrorists, OGWs, stone pelters, etc is ... (may also be called as root cause of conflict which needs to be destroyed) ***-People of J&K, OR Pakistan's Two-Nation Theory, OR Secessionism from India, OR Pakistan***
A 8.	
Ana-lysis	*The response is split three-way despite the use of 'unifying factor' and 'root cause of the conflict to be destroyed'. 'People of J&K' (29.7%) nor 'Pakistan' (35.2%) fit Clausewitz's definition of CoG.* *Surprisingly, only 11% selected 'secessionism' as the CoG of the anti-India Nexus in J&K. This figure rises to 35.2% if 'Azadi' and 'Pakistan's Two-Nation Theory' are considered as one and the same. This is the 'unifying factor' of the Nexus and the 'root cause of the conflict to be destroyed'.[159] Only the destruction of causal factors of 'Azadi' and 'Pakistan's Two-Nation Theory' (radicalism) can help India win peace over the Pakistan-led Nexus in J&K and over Pakistan.* ***64.9% respondents have got it wrong!*** *This is a typical case of public misconception created by repeated incorrect use of 'People are the/my CoG in J&K'. Those who say this, actually mean that people are their key focus area.[160] Lieutenant General SA Hasnain (veteran) has in his response, and in discussions with the author, identified 'Secessionism from India' as the CoG of the anti-India Nexus in J&K.[161] India's CoG in J&K has deliberately not been discussed in this thesis.* *The key strategic lesson of the 1971 war for India was that, even a military defeat of Pakistan did not convert into permanent peace. As a corollary, killing terrorists alone will not lead to peace.[162]*

[159] *See supra 'CoG Defined', 26-27.*


[160] General Officer Commanding 15 Corps said in a TV interview *"… the population remains my centre of gravity and the good thing today is that the Awaam is on our side …".* Republic TV, 22 May 2020. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=skqMpopZw8o. Time in video 19:30 to 21:39

[161] Lieutenant General SA Hasnain (veteran). Discussion with author and response to questionnaire. 23 June 2020.

[162] *See supra note 128, 45.*

Q 9.	Mahatma Gandhi's *Swaraj* by *Satyagraha* and *Ahimsa*, Martin Luther King Jr's active nonviolence against segregation and Take A Knee by US Police, politicians and National Guard to contain #BlackLivesMatter protests hint at strategic importance of minimum collateral damage, force ethos and force performance matrices
A 9.	
Ana-lysis	*55.9% (48.4+7.5) respondents do not agree that smart Gandhian* Ahimsa *applies to J&K. This is a result of the absence of literature on Pakistan's use of 'strategic nonviolent political defiance' in J&K and Indian analysis of Gene Sharp's 'From Dictatorship to Democracy'. It also reflects poorly on India's Strategic Culture and the Indian Military's inside-the-box thinking.* *Overall, this may be the Indian* 'Chalta Hai' *and* 'Mujhe Kya' *attitude written about by Alpesh Patel in* 'Chalta Hai India: When 'It's Ok!' is Not Ok'? *(2018).*[163]

[163] Alpesh Patel, 'Chalta Hai India: When 'It's Ok!' is Not Ok'. (New Delhi; Bloomsbury India, 2018). As per Alpesh, India's fundamental failing is the *'Chalta Hai'* and *'Mujhe Kya'* attitude of its people, society and government. He equates it to glorifying *'jugaad'* or 'band aid approach' and 'mediocrity' at the cost of perfection and meritocracy.

Q 10.	An idea (British rule or slavery or skin colour based inequality or secessionism) can be defeated only by a better idea (*Swaraj* or equality or national integration) and a revolution/movement (Naxalism or Antifa) can be defeated only by a counter revolution/movement (democratic development for tribals or Take A Knee)?
A 10.	
Analysis	*Majority of the respondents agree that only a new idea and a counter revolution can defeat an existing idea and revolution. But, earlier responses (PR-5 to PR-9) hint at confusion over the contours of a strategy which can make this happen and the role of various armed/security forces in it.* *27.4% respondents do not agree- may be a reflection of our poor strategic culture. This leads us to focus on terrorism i.e., the symptom and to celebrate our tactical CT successes, while ignoring the causal maladies i.e., secessionism and radicalism. Success in the latter is intangible in the short-term, but holds the key to winning peace.* *General Stanley McChrystal gives a good insight into tenure-based planning for CT operations in 'Team of Teams' (2015):* "If I told you that you weren't going home until we win—what would you do differently?" *The obvious answer to win peace is—cure the causes and not band-aid the symptoms.* *It is time we shed our inside-the-box thinking and stopped sacrificing 'audacity' at the altar of 'zero-error syndrome'.*

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78. Lieutenant General SA Hasnain (veteran) via telephone and WhatsApp on 02 & 23 June 2020 on CoG of Pakistan-led Nexus in J&K and 08 June 2020 on use of ‘strategic nonviolent political defiance’ in #BlackLivesMatter protests. He was interviewed as he was General Officer Commanding 15 Corps (Kashmir) 2011-2013. He has also responded to the questionnaire.

79. Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia (veteran) in person on 12 March 2020 to discuss societal warfare, CoG of Pakistan-led Nexus in J&K and use of social media in creating a tipping point of people against secessionism, radicalism and terrorism. He was interviewed as he was Director General Military Operations 2013-2014 and is presently the Director of CENJOWS, New Delhi. CENJOWS published this author’s article ‘COVID-19: A Counter-Pandemic Strategy’ on 02 April 2020. The recommended strategy is based on ideas given in Chapter 5 of this thesis. He has also responded to the questionnaire.

80. Shri SM Sahai (Indian Police Service) in person on 16 March 2020 to discuss possibility of engineering a Tri-Colour Revolution in J&K using a

'strategic nonviolent political defiance' based J&K Strategy:2020-25 and the role of the Army, J&K Police and CAPF/PMF in it. He was interviewed as he was Inspector General of Police of Kashmir 2010-2013.

81. Brigadier Tej K Tikoo (veteran) via WhatsApp on 17 May 2020 to discuss possible role of Kashmiri Hindus in unfolding a Tricolour Revolution in J&K 2020-2025. He was interviewed as he is President of All India Kashmiri Samaj (www.aiks.org). He has also responded to the questionnaire.

82. Shri Aditya Raj Kaul in person on 12 March 2020 to discuss the situation in Kashmir post de-operationalisation of Articles 370 and 35A and possible role of Kashmiri Hindus in unfolding a Tricolour Revolution in J&K 2020-2025. He was interviewed as he is a Kashmiri Hindu journalist. He had covered the post-05 August 2019 situation in J&K from Kashmir on his Twitter handle @AdityaRajKaul. He has also responded to the questionnaire.